Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Malcolm Haslett
Edward L. Keenan
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Barry Rubin

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1984



MOSCOW'S DOUBLE TRACK

Iran
Zalmay Khalilzad

North Yemen
Mark N. Katz

Latin America
Augusto Varas

Notes & Views

Soviet Inflation
Fyodor I. Kushnirsky

GDR Navy
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

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Problems of Communism

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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1984 VOL XXXIII

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032–941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, US Information Agency, United States of America, 301 4th Street SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone (202) 485-2230.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide*, and *United States Political Science Documents*.

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Cover: At left, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni; at right, Nureddin Kianuri, Secretary General of the Tudeh party. Photos by Keler/SYGMA and Abbas/Gamma-Liaison

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

MOSCOW'S DOUBLE-TRACK POLICY

Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilemma
Zalmay Khalilzad

Soviet leaders viewed the overthrow of the Shah in Iran with high expectations. But recent political trends there have tended to push the two countries further apart rather than closer together. The Khomeyni regime remains ideologically hostile both to the Soviet Union and to local leftist forces, and the Soviets face the dilemma of how to contain Iranian efforts to export an Islamic revolution without pushing Iran into the Western camp.

Sanaa and the Soviets
Mark N. Katz

Moscow is the major supplier of arms to North Yemen and has been discreet in its support for leftist insurgents in that country, even while providing major assistance to the less populous rival Marxist regime in South Yemen. In dealing with Sanaa, the Soviet Union apparently hopes to relieve potential pressure on South Yemen, to nudge North Yemen leftward (either alone or as part of a unified Yemen), and—in a larger context—to weaken the position of Saudi Arabia.

Ideology and Politics in Latin American–Soviet Relations
Augusto Varas

Moscow's long-term interest in Latin America, while never a top priority, has usually been integrated with broader Soviet ideological and economic trends. Over the past two decades, for reasons both economic and political, Latin American governments have become more receptive to Moscow's emphasis on expanding state-to-state relations. Yet Soviet economic stringency at home and preoccupation with more pressing issues abroad probably mean that Moscow's policy in the hemisphere will remain essentially reactive to US initiatives.

* * *

Notes and Views

Inflation Soviet Style
Fyodor I. Kushnirsky

Marxist ideology notwithstanding, inflation does exist in the Soviet Union, with adverse consequences both for the Soviet consumer and for the efficient operation of the whole economy. The forms that inflation takes in the USSR are somewhat unusual, reflecting peculiarities of the economic and political system.

Notes and Reviews (over)

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GDR Naval Buildup
Dale R. Herspring

The East German navy has steadily been transformed from a small inland police force outfitted with wooden ships into a modern fleet, now second only to the Soviet navy among Warsaw Pact forces in the Baltic. As a result, the GDR role in Soviet naval strategy is likely to grow, especially if the Polish navy continues to slide toward obsolescence.

* * *

Essay–Reviews

The Andropov Enigma
Malcolm Haslett

While it is often difficult to separate fact from fiction, the portrait of Yuriy Andropov that emerged from a variety of biographies revealed a man both intelligent and ruthless in pursuing personal and policy goals. The combination might have made Andropov an effective leader—had he arrived at the top sooner and in better health.

Russian History and the Soviet Present
Edward L. Keenan

Most serious scholars of history not only illuminate the period on which they write but also reveal something about their own times and selves. Alexander Yanov's recent study of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, indeed, reveals less about that 16-century Muscovite tsar than it does about the author and other Russian intellectuals, both inside and outside the USSR, who attempt to divine *the historical determinants of their present sorry condition.*

Chasing China's Shadows
Karel Kovanda

The reality of China is always far more complex than whatever initial impressions one may have formed. But personal accounts of the everyday lives of Chinese people shed considerable light on the difference between appearances and reality in the People's Republic and breathe life into detached scholarly analyses.

Soviets and Southwest Asia
Barry Rubin

Four years after the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan's unpopular and bitterly divided Communist regime still requires an open-ended and large-scale Soviet troop commitment. It is the Afghan people who continue to pay the price for this adventure, which has entailed only limited costs for Soviet global foreign policy. The occupation will probably have less impact on Moscow's interests in neighboring Iran and in the oil-rich Arab countries across the Gulf than will local developments in those areas.

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Moscow's Double-Track Policy

EDITORS' NOTE: An important feature of Soviet foreign relations has been a double-track approach, combining varying measures of support for local leftist forces with state-to-state ties, as circumstances have allowed. In the Third World—where the potential for fundamental political change seems particularly great—these circumstances have varied widely. In this issue, we present studies of Soviet policy toward Iran, North Yemen, and Latin America, which provide some insight into the conditions affecting how Moscow has applied its double-track approach and with what consequences. In the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran, neither track has afforded the Soviet Union much success. In strategically located North Yemen and in much of Latin America, Moscow appears to have achieved considerable success by emphasizing correct state-to-state relations and downplaying support for leftist opposition forces.

Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilemma

by Zalmay Khalilzad

The superpowers have tended to view the convoluted and frequent changes in Third World countries in zero-sum terms, perceiving one's losses as the other's gains. But the situation in Iran since the overthrow of the Shah in January 1979 tends to contradict this view. The domestic changes that clearly constituted a setback for the United States have not provided new opportunities for Soviet gains. In fact, recent changes in Iran, especially the government's move to ban the pro-Soviet Tudeh (Communist) party and the crackdown on that party's secret military organization, have posed serious policy dilemmas for Moscow.

The Kremlin's initial expectations of increased cooperation with the post-Shah government have given way to growing mutual hostility and recrimination. The jailing in early 1983 of more than 1,000 of Tudeh's members—including party leaders and more than 100 military and police officers, among them Navy Commander Bahram Afzali Khoshk-Bejari[1]—and the expulsion of 18 Soviet diplomats from Tehran in May 1983 are the latest indications of heightening tensions in Soviet-Iranian relations. The jailed Tudeh leaders and military officers have been featured on government-controlled television reading confessions

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The author is grateful to Robert Jervis, Richard Cottam, Barry Rosen, Barry Rubin, and Cheryl Benard for their comments on earlier drafts of this article, one of which was presented at a Conference on Religion and Revolution: Iran's Revolution and the Middle East, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, on May 4, 1983. *The author retains copyright ©1984.*

[1]Besides Nureddin Kianuri, the party secretary general, others jailed include Central Committee members Mahmood Etemad Zadeh, Gah'im Panah, Raf'at Mohammad Zadeh, Kiumars Zarshenas, Reza Shaltuki, and Mohammad Ali Amu'i. Prominent among the military officers brought to trial was Mohammad Madhi Partovi, identified in the government press as the "chief official of the secret organization of the defunct Tudeh party." For the proceedings of his trial, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–SAS*), Dec. 15, 1983, pp. I/4–5. For the charges against Khoshk-Bejari, see *Kayhan-Havai* (Tehran—Air Mail Edition, in Persian), Dec. 14, 1983. For the names of the other accused military officers, and the proceedings of their trials, see *Kayhan-Havai*, Jan. 25, 1984, p. 8, the various accounts that appeared daily in *FBIS–SAS* from Dec. 7, 1983, through Jan. 17, 1984, and the *Iran Times International* (Washington, DC), Jan. 13, 1983. For a list of some of the Tudeh members convicted and their sentences, see *FBIS–SAS*, Jan. 23, 1984, pp. I/6–7.

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quite damaging to the Soviet image, in some cases even acknowledging association with the Soviet state security police (KGB) and plotting to carry out a military coup.[2] More revelations about Tudeh-Soviet activities seem probable as the trials go on. The Soviet Union has countered with a propaganda campaign of its own, accusing Iranian rulers of being influenced by "blind fanaticism" and warning them to curb the "growing anti-Soviet campaign."[3]

Soviet failure to gain greater influence in Iran has led Moscow to adopt a position toward Tehran similar to that of Washington: uneasiness over Iran's efforts to export its revolution to other Islamic countries and a strong desire to contain that revolution; and concern about Iran's internal instability coupled with care to avoid pushing Iranian leaders toward closer ties with the other side. This cautious approach, however, does not preclude the possibility of important changes in future Soviet-Iranian relations, especially given the existence of common religious and ethnic groups straddling the two nations' border and Iran's prominent place in Soviet military and economic strategy toward Southwest Asia and the Gulf. Geopolitically, Iran is the pivotal state in the entire region; Soviet dominance there would provide Moscow with a land presence along the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea contiguous to Soviet territory. This would have a dramatic effect on the Soviets' international position, giving the Kremlin considerable leverage against the West and making Western defense of the rest of the Gulf much more difficult. Moscow would also derive substantial economic benefits, as Iran is rich in oil, gas, and other mineral resources.

[2]Tudeh Central Committee member Raf'at Mohammad Zadeh confessed that he had been a member of the KGB since 1951. Other leaders have made statements on Iranian television affirming close Tudeh ties with the Sovet Union. These statements have been published in a booklet by the Iranian government's Islamic Propagation Organization, *Confessions of the Central Cadre of the Tudeh Party*, Tehran, Sepehr, n.d. Jailed Tudeh leaders have also admitted in public testimony to supplying political and military secrets to the Soviet Union; to supporting the Islamic Republic tactically while planning its overthrow; and to seeking a greater number of supporters in the military and better organization of their supporters. See *Kayhan-Havài*, May 11, 1983, pp. 6–7. The circumstances under which these confessions were obtained, of course, should be considered when evaluating their validity.

Moscow has denied Tudeh's Soviet connection, calling it "completely unfounded and baseless." *Pravda* (Moscow) in an article on May 6, 1983, charged Tehran's action was similar to those taken "by reactionary and pro-imperialist regimes ... in order to smear the honorable and independent relations between the Communist parties and the Soviet Communist Party." See also *Kayhan International* (Tehran), May 9, 1983, p. 2. In a subsequent article *Pravda* accused "Iranian authorities of using medieval tortures to extract confessions from the arrested leaders of the Tudeh [Communist] Party." Moscow argues that the "admissions" by Tudeh leaders have "no foundation and nothing in common with reality." See *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), May 25, 1983, p. 2. Tudeh supporters outside Iran, too, have rejected the charges against their party and the confessions of its leaders. See *Rahe Tudeh* (Frankfurt), No. 29, Bahman 29, 1361 (1983). Also see the open letter from Ali Havari, member of the political council and chairman of the Central Committee of the Tudeh party, to Ayatollah Montazeri. Copies of this letter have been distributed by Tudeh supporters throughout Western Europe.

[3]See, e.g., *The New York Times*, Jan. 1, 1984.

Some of the 18 Soviet diplomats expelled by the Islamic Republic of Iran seen departing for Moscow from Tehran's Mehrabad Airport on May 7, 1983.

—*Iran Times International* (Washington, DC).

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Moscow and the Iranian Revolution

It appears that the massive opposition to the Shah instigated by Islamic fundamentalists in 1978 was as much of a surprise to Moscow as it was to Washington.[4] For one thing, Soviet leaders were unprepared for a revolt of this type, since according to standard Soviet analyses, political movements guided by Islamic ideology are essentially anachronistic. For another, the domestic political situation in Iran appeared quite stable: among Middle East monarchies in recent years the Shah's personal rule had been the longest lived.

Initially, Moscow was uncertain about what policies it ought to follow. The Soviets faced three choices, each involving dilemmas and risks, but also potential benefits. They could support the Shah, thereby gaining his goodwill should he prevail, but this would almost certainly alienate the opposition, part of which was made up of pro-Soviet groups. They could, of course, stay neutral, remaining interested observers of the unfolding developments in Iran and delaying taking a direct stand. While this would enable the Soviets to avoid backing a potential loser, such a move could ultimately either alienate both sides or result in a forfeiture of Soviet initiative. Finally, the Kremlin could express support for the opposition, although this would risk substantial hostility from the Shah, should he succeed in suppressing the uprising. On the other hand, not extending support to the opposition could mean missing an opportunity to undermine the Western position in Iran and to increase Soviet influence there.

It was not until late fall 1978 that Moscow took a *public* position on the Iranian crisis, even though the decision to support the opposition seems to have been made several months earlier. In September of that year, the Soviets blamed the Iranian crisis on the "American plundering" of Iran.[5] Two weeks later, they condemned the Shah for his "pro-imperialist" policies and accused the United States of interfering in Iran's internal affairs.[6] And on November 18, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev warned the United States that "any interference, let alone military intervention in the affairs of Iran—a state which has a common frontier with the Soviet Union—would be regarded by the USSR as a matter affecting its security interest."[7] Moscow also warned the US that it would not accept the suppression of the opposition by a military coup.[8] Citing these statements and policy stands, the Soviets later claimed to have protected the Iranian revolution.

Once the Shah had left the country, Moscow stepped up its propaganda campaign. The Soviet press praised Iran's new regime, especially its decisions to withdraw from the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and to remove US monitoring posts, and expressed satisfaction with the damage that the Iranian revolution had done to the American security concept for the region. Under the pseudonym Aleksey Petrov, which is signed to authoritative articles, *Pravda* boasted that the "fall of the Shah had created cracks in the notorious strategic arc that the Americans had been building for decades close to the southern border of the Soviet Union."[9] Soviet analysts described the successful uprising as a positive development because of its "anti-imperialist" character[10] and even emphasized the positive role that traditional elements in society could play.

Why did the Soviets express support for the opposition? For one thing, they may have believed that the fall of the Shah was inevitable and wanted to be on the winning side; for another, they may well have preferred a different regime. Indeed, despite substantial economic ties and other relations between the Soviet Union and Iran, Moscow could not have been too pleased with the Shah, a close ally of the United States whose regional policies were often contrary to Soviet interests. Thus, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, with his potential for nonalignment, may have seemed a more desirable alternative. It is also possible that the Soviets might have believed that the opposition groups' manifest hostility toward the United States would lead those groups to seek closer ties with the Soviet Union. Perhaps the setback to the US position in Iran was sufficient grounds by itself for Soviet support of the opposition.

[4] For background on Soviet perceptions of events in Iran prior to the revolution, see Shahram Chubin, *Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf*, Adelphi Papers, No. 157, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980. According to Nureddin Kianuri, the leader of the Tudeh party, a month before the success of the Shah's overthrow, he could not even imagine that such a change could take place. See *Kayhan-Havai*, Sept. 7, 1983, p. 7.

[5] See British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts: USSR* (London—hereafter *SWB*), Sept. 28, 1978, p. A4/1.

[6] *SWB*, Oct. 19, 1978, p. A4/1.

[7] TASS, Nov. 18, 1978, in *SWB*, Nov. 20, 1978, p. C1/1. See also *SWB*, Nov. 19, 1978, p. A4/1; and *SWB*, Jan. 10, 1979, p. A4/1.

[8] See V. Ovchinnikov, "What Then Is Interference?" *Pravda*, Jan. 13, 1979, in *SWB*, Jan. 15, 1979, p. A/4-1.

[9] *Pravda*, Dec. 31, 1979, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Dec. 30, 1979, pp. D/7-10. See also Aleksey Petrov, "US Interference in Iran," *Pravda*, Jan. 26, 1979; and TASS, Jan. 12, 1979. For further details, see Chubin, *Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf*, p. 49.

[10] P. Demchenko, "Collapse of Absolutism," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, February 1979, p. 83, in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report* (Washington, DC), No. 73286, April 23, 1979, pp. 95-105. See also idem, "Iran: The Making of a Republic," *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1979, p. 116, in JPRS, No. 74011, Aug. 15, 1979, pp. 129-37.

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It could also be that Soviet observers misjudged the situation. They may have believed the religious movement to be merely the vehicle for more "progressive" social forces and expected the "figurehead" Khomeyni to give way to leftist forces sympathetic to the Soviets. Like many others, the Soviets may have figured that the religious leaders would be unable to run Iran on their own and that in time they would either share power with pro-Soviet forces or perhaps be overthrown. The Soviets may also have felt that the leaders of the new regime would be easier to manipulate than the Shah had been, and that the degradation in central authority and the political instability accompanying the mass opposition to the Shah would provide them with opportunities to enhance their influence in Iran.

By April 1979, Moscow was claiming for itself a peripheral, though important, role in the Iranian revolution,[11] apparently seeking to encourage the new government to deepen its break with Washington and to reorient its economic and security relations, preferably in the Soviets' direction.[12] Some Soviet analysts, for their part, attempted to revise earlier views on Islamic political activism and to reconcile Iranian developments with orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology.[13] According to one analyst, "social progress in the East is unthinkable unless the vast body of traditional elements is involved in it."[14] Brezhnev lent his own prestige to this line of reasoning, declaring the overthrow of the Shah an "anti-imperialist revolution" worthy of Soviet support.[15]

Nonetheless, events in Iran continued to present dilemmas for Moscow.[16] Although the dominant view in

[11]In an April 4, 1979, *Pravda* article, Moscow claimed that "during the Iranian people's struggle against the monarchy, the USSR resolutely sided with the Iranian Revolution and did everything to prevent outside interference in Iran's affairs and block plans for armed intervention against the revolution."

[12]Radio Moscow, in Persian, July 19, 1979, in *FBIS–SOV*, July 24, 1979, p. H/1.

[13]E.g., George Kim, "Ideological Struggle in Developing Countries," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1980, pp. 65–75.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Quoted in Ye. Primakov, "Dialectic of Social Development and Ideological Struggle: Islam and Social Development Processes in Foreign Oriental Countries," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 4, Aug. 11, 1980. See also Aleksandr Bovin, "Alarm, Uncertainty Replace Hope in Iran," *Nedelya* (Moscow), Sept. 3–9, 1979, in *FBIS–SOV*, Sept. 10, 1979, p. H/1.

[16]Shahram Chubin, "The Soviet Union and Iran," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Spring 1983, p. 936.

"Uncle Sam" is burned in effigy at a demonstration in Tehran in November 1979, a week after seizure of hostages at the US embassy.

—F. Ledru/SYGMA.

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the Kremlin regarded the Iranian revolution as positive owing to the setbacks it dealt US foreign policy, some analysts expressed new fears of "counterrevolutionary" tendencies that seemed to be serving the interests of the bourgeoisie and the professional middle class.[17] Generally, Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev, argued that the Iranian revolution had a special nature characterized by complexity and contradictory tendencies. They reiterated their desire for "good neighborliness" between the two countries and for intensification of economic and security ties. Soviet propaganda also sought to foment suspicion among the fundamentalist clerics toward the army because of the military's past ties with the United States. According to some accounts, Soviet leaders wanted Iran to dissolve its armed forces and replace them with Revolutionary Guards *(Pasdaran)* armed by Moscow.[18]

After the overthrow of the Shah, the Soviet Union and its Iranian friends, especially the Tudeh party, emphasized several themes, although the relative weight put on various points has changed over time. One priority, as mentioned above, was a continuous propaganda effort to encourage and intensify Iranian hostility to and dissociation from the United States and its allies. While the US sought to absolve itself of any responsibility for Iran's internal conflicts, the Soviets were busy blaming Washington for all the ills that had beset Iran: the numerous bomb explosions in Tehran,[19] the Iraq-Iran war, the ineffectiveness of the Iranian army (the US was allegedly preventing Iranian victories by encouraging Arabs to join the war against Iran,[20] and even the Saudi refusal to accept Iranian demands to lower oil production.[21] The National Voice of Iran (NVOI), which is controlled by Moscow and broadcasts from Baku, warned the Iranians that US forces were in the area as part of Washington's aggressive designs on Iran.[22] An important aim of the intensified propaganda effort was the prolongation of the 1979–81 hostage crisis, by which the Soviets hoped to decrease the prospects for normalization of relations between Tehran and Washington. To help accomplish this goal the Soviet Union sought to ease the effect of an American-sponsored economic embargo by expanding its trade ties with Iran and offering Iran political support in international forums. (The effectiveness of these Soviet efforts is discussed below.) According to one source, Moscow also assured Iran that it would not tolerate US military intervention against the Islamic Republic. Reportedly, this offer was transmitted to Khomeyni through Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat.[23]

A related priority was the Soviets' attempt to weaken the position of those Iranians regarded as either hostile to the Soviet Union or friendly to the United States. Efforts were made to enlist the services of the regime in Tehran to identify anti-Soviet Iranian officials as agents of the "satanic" US who should be "eliminated."[24] These included Mustafa Chamran, "US spy" Sadiq Qotbzadeh, and "Agent of the US CIA" Ebrahim Yazdi.[25] Moscow likewise sought to encourage not only greater regime tolerance of and cooperation with the Tudeh party, but also the adoption of radical domestic economic policies such as nationalization of foreign trade, a more substantial land reform than that attempted by the new government of Mehdi Bazargan, and an increased government role in the economy.[26] The Soviets also wanted Tehran to allow greater autonomy to Iran's various ethnic areas, especially Kurdistan, presumably in order to create greater latitude for pro-Soviet or leftist movements there.[27]

As a third theme, the Soviet Union sought to discourage Iranian economic ties and cooperation with regional states friendly to the West. Accordingly, NVOI declared that "friends of the United States cannot be friends of the Islamic Republic."[28] At the same time, Moscow and the Tudeh party tried to increase Iranian economic, political, and military ties with Moscow and other socialist countries, thus hoping to change the balance of interest in Iran in favor of the Soviet Union.[29] From the beginning, the Soviet Union sought to

[17] Some of the same Soviet analysts in 1979 were also unhappy about a "tendency" in Iran to "isolate left-wing forces." This ambivalence, however, reflected a minority viewpoint. See Primakov, loc. cit., and Bovin, loc. cit.

[18] For the hostility toward the armed forces, see Shahram Chubin, "Leftist Forces in Iran," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July–August 1980, pp. 1–25.

[19] National Voice of Iran (hereafter NVOI), "Another Dreadful Crime by Agents of World-Devouring America," *FBIS–SAS*, Feb. 24, 1982, pp. I/7–8.

[20] NVOI, "Washington's Satanic Policy," *FBIS–SAS*, Feb. 11, 1982, p. I/10.

[21] NVOI accused the US of ordering the "oil monopolies" to "undermine OPEC's unity." See "The Assault of Oil Monopolies," *FBIS–SAS*, May 13, 1982, p. I/5.

[22] NVOI, "Reagan's Hypocrisies," *FBIS–SAS*, Feb. 19, 1982, pp. I/8–9.

[23] Hans Bräker, "The Implications of the Islamic Question for Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy," *Central Asian Survey* (Oxford, UK), July 1983, p. 125.

[24] NVOI, "Dismiss the Liberals and Other Dregs from Sensitive Government Organizations," *FBIS–SAS*, Feb. 23, 1982, pp. I/11–12.

[25] Ibid.

[26] On encouraging domestic radicalization in Iran, see Bräker, op. cit., as well as numerous NVOI broadcasts cited in *FBIS–SAS* over the past several years.

[27] On the Kurdish problem, see Erhard Franz, *Minderheiten in Iran* (Minorities in Iran), Hamburg, Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1981. Also see Muriel Atkin, "The Islamic Repubic and the Soviet Union," in *The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic*, Conference Proceedings, Washington, DC, The Middle East Institute, 1982, pp. 140–50.

[28] "The Friends of the United States Cannot Be the Friends of the Islamic Republic of Iran," *FBIS–SAS*, May 11, 1982, pp. I/6–7.

[29] Nureddin Kianuri made a statement to this effect after he had been jailed. See *Kayhan–Havai* (in Persian), Sept. 7, 1982, p. 7. See also NVOI, "Justice Seekers Must Unite in a Single Rank," *FBIS–SAS*, Feb. 25, 1983, p. I/11.

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A Soviet aircraft loads emergency supplies in Moscow in March 1980 for shipment to Iran to assist victims of severe flooding in Khuzistan province.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

present itself as the protector of the Iranian revolution and the supporter of the new regime. It offered economic aid, and the Tudeh organization and its supporters urged the government to take advantage of these offers.[30] A corollary aim of this tactic was to decrease Iranian hostility to Moscow's regional policies, especially its invasion of Afghanistan.

Moscow's effort to gain greater influence in Iran has not worked. Indeed, as we shall see, some of its tactics have been counterproductive. Tehran and Moscow have become increasingly unhappy about each other's policies. Why has Moscow failed so far in achieving its goals in Iran? The reasons for the Soviet difficulties include ideological hostility toward the Soviets by the new Iranian leaders; Iranian fears of Soviet expansionism and intervention; heavy-handed Soviet tactics that have antagonized Iranian leaders; disagreement on economic issues; and conflict over regional policies.

Ideological Hostility

Although Iranian foreign policy under the new regime has not always been clear or consistent, some general ideological preferences and principles can be discerned. These are hostility toward the superpowers, a desire for Islamic internationalism, and an identification with the Third World. These Iranian tendencies have been major impediments to greater Soviet influence in Iran.

At the superpower level, even though the United States is the main target of criticism of the Islamic radicals, the USSR has not been overlooked. As early

[30]Abbas Amir-Entezam reported the Soviet offers to the Americans. See "From Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State," Oct. 9, 1979, No. 7950, (Secret). According to Iranian "students, followers of the Imam's line," these memoranda, along with numerous other US official documents, were captured when they occupied the US embassy in Tehran beginning on Nov. 4, 1979. These documents were subsequently published in a series of volumes (with at least 30 volumes to date) under the title *Documents of the Espionage Den*. The volumes carry neither the date of publication nor the publisher.

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as 1964, Khomeyni revealed his extreme distaste for the leading world powers: "America is worse than Britain, Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. Each is worse than the other."[31] In addition, the central documents of the new regime commit Iran to the slogan "neither East nor West." Principle 192 in Chapter 10 of the new constitution asserts Iran's nonalignment "with respect to the dominating powers."[32] Principle 153 excludes the possibility of any type of agreement that allows a foreign power "to dominate the natural resources, or the economic, cultural, military, and other affairs of the country." In its political program the ruling Islamic Republican Party (IRP) strikes a similar note. The revolution, it declares, will not be reconciled with any oppressive or domineering powers and will pay "attention to the dangers that the Great Satan [i.e., the US] and social imperialism [i.e., the USSR] pose to our revolution and our nation...."[33] Moreover, Khomeyni personally has called on other nations to rebel against the superpowers' efforts at domination.[34]

Iranian leaders have specifically attacked the Soviets on many occasions. Soviet communism is described as atheistic and anti-Islam,[35] and the Soviet political system as tyrannical and exploitative.[36] In a speech on the occasion of the Persian New Year in March of 1980, Khomeyni warned his listeners: "Dear Friends! Be fully aware that the danger represented by the Communist powers is no less than that of America."[37] At national ceremonies and in the presence of government leaders, complained NVOI, slogans of "Death to America" have at times been accompanied by chants of "Death to the Soviet Union."[38] Also, government-controlled broadcasts have presented unflattering reports of Soviet involvement in various parts of the world.[39]

In response, NVOI has denounced "Voice and Vision" (radio and television) of Iran for its attacks against the Soviet Union, labeling Tehran's official broadcasting authority the "mouthpiece of international capitalism."[40] NVOI has also attacked Iranian leaders who place Moscow on "the same level" as the United States.[41] Since the banning of the Tudeh party, NVOI commentaries on domestic conditions in Iran have become quite hostile. The regime is accused of instigating "superstition and religious fanaticism among the youth" in order to form a "so-called voluntary army of about 3 million." NVOI also, for the first time, now deprecates Khomeyni's role in the revolution and charges that key government posts have been "seized by the agents of imperialism, landlords, and major capitalists."[42] The Soviet-controlled radio has called on Iranians to save "the revolution" from "turbaned and hypocritical traitors who support the wealthy."[43]

Indeed, to many in the region, the Soviets and pro-Soviet Marxists are natural rivals of Islamic fundmentalists in Iran and elsewhere in the struggle to win the hearts and minds of the population. Prior to the recent developments in Iran, it was the Marxists who had seemed to monopolize the concept of revolutionary change. Now, however, some Iranians report that they turned to Islamic fundamentalism precisely because they found it the most powerful political tool available for confronting the Marxists.[44]

Soviet Intervention

Except for pro-Soviet leftists, Iranians have traditionally been apprehensive about Russian expansionism. This fear is not unfounded. In the 19th century, the Russians forced Iran to concede territory (in treaties such as Golistan in 1813 and Torkmanchai in 1828), and in 1907 Britain and Russia divided Iran into spheres of influence. Twice since the Russian revolution, Moscow has occupied parts of Iranian territory, first in 1920–21 and then in 1941–46.

After the overthrow of the Shah, both the modern-

[31] *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, Hamid Algar, trans., Berkeley, CA, Mizan Press, 1981, p. 185.

[32] For a full text of the Iranian constitution, see *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, Hamid Algar, trans., Berkeley, CA, Mizan Press, 1980.

[33] See the IRP's platform and program, *Mavazihi Ma* (Tehran), p. 84.

[34] Speech of Feb. 11, 1980, trans. in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*.

[35] Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, cited by Agence France Press (Paris), May 3, 1979, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa* (hereafter *FBIS–MEA*), May 3, 1979, p. R/3.

[36] Ibid.; and *International Herald Tribune*, Nov. 10, 1982, p. 3.

[37] Speech trans. in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, p. 285.

[38] NVOI, "A Provocative Attack at the Esteqlal Hotel," *FBIS–SAS* Feb. 5, 1982, pp. I/7–8. Also see NVOI, "World-Devouring America and Those Who Are Attempting To Have This Enemy Negated Are the Main Foes of the Revolution," *FBIS–SAS*, Apr. 6, 1982, pp. I/15–16.

[39] Pro-Soviet groups complained about this. E.g., see NVOI, "Dismiss the Liberals . . . ," loc. cit.

[40] NVOI, "Constructive Propaganda, Yes; Misleading Propaganda, No," *FBIS–SAS*, Apr. 13, 1982, p. I/7. In another broadcast, Voice and Vision is accused of feeding the "people certain items fabricated by imperialist mass media and the writers of SAVAK and the CIA." See NVOI, "A Positive Trend," *FBIS–SAS*, Feb. 26, 1982, p. I/3.

[41] NVOI, "Until When One Roof and Two Climates?" *FBIS–SAS*, Oct. 8, 1982, p. I/6.

[42] NVOI, "Fate of Popular Mobilization," *FBIS–SAS*, Dec. 6, 1983, p. I/4.

[43] Ibid.

[44] See interview with Bezad Nabavi in the *International Herald Tribune*, Nov. 10, 1982. This view was also expressed by Iranians in interviews with the author.

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ists (who dominated the provisional government of Bazargan) and the fundamentalists feared external interference in Iranian affairs. Karim Sanjabi, Iran's first post-Shah foreign minister, warned Moscow that the new regime "will not allow a reoccurrence of disturbing precedents such as requests for oil concessions, territorial demands, or the proclamation of the Kurdish Republic at Mahabad."[45] Bazargan warned both the Soviets and the Americans not to interfere in Iranian affairs, and Khomeyni is reported to have issued the same warning in June 1979.[46]

Soviet denials of any involvement in Iran's internal affairs did not allay Iranian fears. Indeed, the Soviets' presence was felt in various quarters of Iranian political and social life, especially in their association with the Tudeh party, which they provided with financial support and a "clandestine" radio station (NVOI). Although the Tudeh organization had played only a minor role in the revolution, its ranks grew rapidly as many members returned to Iran after the Shah's overthrow. The party's aim, apparently with Soviet support, was to "inherit the revolution," and it declared its support for the Islamic Republic only in the hope of ultimately overthrowing the new regime.

To achieve this goal the Tudeh organization adopted a multipronged strategy. At the international level, as noted above, it sought to move Iran closer to the Soviet Union and to weaken its ties with the West. At the domestic level, while expressing support for hardline fundamentalists, the party promoted conflict between the fundamentalists and other groups, as well as within the Islamic Republican Party itself. In this way, party leaders hoped to use the fundamentalists to eliminate not only those forces they regarded as especially hostile to the Soviets, but also those rivals who might pose the most serious threat as possible alternatives to the Khomeyni regime. Thus, the Tudeh party supported the ouster of the Bazargan government, the removal of President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, the execution of Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh, and the regime's attack against the Islamic leftist organization, Mojahedin. Meanwhile, the Tudeh party strove to gain a following among secular forces dissatisfied with the regime or with other leftist groups.

The Tudeh leadership's strategy toward the Islamic Republican Party was twofold: to promote discord within the ruling elite by sharpening ideological conflicts on such issues as the rule of the *faqih* (religious leader) and the nation's economic and foreign policies; and to infiltrate important state organizations, such as the military, the Revolutionary Guard, and the bureaucracy. Accordingly, until it was banned, the Tudeh organization routinely attacked what it termed the Hojatiyeh (supposedly the more "moderate") faction of the IRP, denouncing this group as a "pseudoreligious" organization hiding behind the "mask of Islam" but in fact serving American inter-

[45]During the occupation of northern Iran in 1945, Moscow established an autonomous Kurdish Republic. As a price to get the Soviets to leave Iran in 1946, Tehran agreed to grant Moscow oil concessions in the north. These and other, political, concessions granted at the time were revoked soon after the Soviets had withdrawn. For Sanjabi's statement see *FBIS–MEA*, Mar. 13, 1979, p. R/11.

[46]*The Financial Times* (London), June 13, 1979.

Members of the Tudeh party at an investigative hearing before Hojjatoleslam Mohammadi Reyshahri, right, Islamic Judge of the Military, in December 1983. At the right end of the defendants' table—beneath a poster condemning the United States, Great Britain, and Russia—is Tudeh leader Nureddin Kianuri.

—Iran Times International (Washington, DC).

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ests.[47] And, as admitted by several military officers jailed along with Tudeh leaders, the party had succeeded in forming secret cells in the Iranian armed forces. Apparently, the key figures responsible for establishing the party's secret military organization were Mohammad Mahdi Partovi, Shahrokh Jahangiri, and Mohammad Mo'azaz. In recent public confessions, party military members admitted passing on to Tudeh leaders and Soviet authorities highly sensitive military data on Iranian military efforts in the war against Iraq, as well as on the status of Iranian armed forces and facilities. These officers also confessed that they were in the process of expanding their organization in order to increase their ability to carry out a possible military coup in the future.[48]

Apparently, Tudeh members believed that their expression of support for Khomeyni would allow them to operate in the open, figuring that only those groups avowedly opposed to the Ayatollah would be eliminated. The Tudeh leadership also seems to have expected some members of the other leftist groups to recognize the superiority of the party's strategy and therefore join its cause. Initially, events seemed to bear them out. Khomeyni showed greater tolerance toward the Tudeh organization than toward other leftist groups, and Tudeh's newspaper, *Mardom,* was allowed to continue publishing even after papers belonging to other groups had been banned. Some leftist groups such as the majority Aksariet faction of the Fida'iyin guerrilla organization did join the Tudeh, and the party grew at a rapid pace, its membership expanding from a few hundred before the revolution to some 10,000 by 1983, according to Iranian government figures.[49]

After these initial successes, however, Tudeh's strategy did not work. The regime eventually abandoned its policy of tolerance and moved to suppress the party. The government closed the party's newspapers and purged some of Tudeh's members from government and the universities.[50] Early in 1983, the leader of the party, Nureddin Kianuri, was arrested and more than 1,000 members, including some military officers, were jailed later in the year.[51]

The clash between the IRP and the Tudeh party was inevitable. For one thing, the two parties had very different attitudes on many crucial issues. For another, quite early in the revolution the IRP had demonstrated a strong desire for total control and elimination of its rivals. Several other rival groups including Westernized modernists, Islamic leftists (Mojahedin), and more radical leftists had been attacked and weakened. Tudeh's turn had to come eventually. The timing of the move against the Tudeh organization might have also been influenced by special information on Tudeh activities becoming available to the regime. There are reports that a Soviet diplomat in Tehran, Vladimir Kuzichkin, who defected to the West, may have informed Iranian authorities of covert antiregime Soviet-Tudeh activities in Iran.[52] As we shall later see, the timing might also have been influenced by a change in Soviet policy toward Iraq.

Soviet Tactics

Some of the Soviet tactics in seeking increased influence in Iran have been heavy-handed and counterproductive. For example, immediately after the Shah's overthrow, Moscow sought to strengthen its ties with ethnic nationalists in Iran, especially those hostile to the regime. It appears that Moscow's dealings with Iranian nationalities in areas close to the Soviet Union—Kurdistan and Azerbaijan—have been particularly active, and there are reports that the Soviets may even have supplied arms and other aid to sympathetic groups; at least, that was the perception of the Iranian government.[53]

The Soviets' handling of the nationalities issue in Iran, allegedly including covert air drops to ethnic insurgents in border areas, caused considerable alarm and resentment among Iranian officials. In 1979, Bazargan's deputy, Abbas Amir-Entezam, complained to US embassy officials in Tehran that "Soviet overflights were a real problem."[54] In one case, the government gave permission for overflights of Mazandaran, but restricted the altitude of Soviet

[47] NVOI, "The Mask of US-Made Associations Must be Ripped Off," *FBIS-SAS,* May 18, 1982, pp. I/4-5.

[48] For the confessions of Iranian military officers, see *FBIS-SAS,* Dec. 8, 1983, pp. I/4-5, and Dec. 15, 1983, pp. I/4-5. Also see fns. 1 and 2 for a summary of some of the charges against the officers.

[49] See *Kayhan-Havâi,* May 11, 1983, and *Kayhan International,* May 9, 1983. On Tudeh and other leftist involvement in the early phases of Iran's revolution, see Sepehr Zabih, "Iran's Revolutionary Left," *Problems of Communism,* March-April 1983, pp. 79-84.

[50] In a Feb. 20, 1982, broadcast, NVOI complained that some Tudeh students had been expelled from the university. See "The People Demand That Universities and Institutions of Higher Learning Be Opened as Soon as Possible," *FBIS-SAS, Feb. 23, 1982, pp. I/12-13. A later statement complains further about the* "purges" of a large number of "true revolutionaries" from Iran's educational institutions. See "The Sublime Aims of Purging and the Incorrect Measures in This Connection," *FBIS-SAS,* Apr. 20, 1982, p. I/11.

[51] See the *Iran Times International.,* Oct. 29, 1982, p. 1.

[52] For an account of the defection, see *Time* magazine (New York, NY), Nov. 22, 1982.

[53] There are conflicting assessments on this point. For one view, see Sepehr Zabih, *Iran Since the Revolution,* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. For another view, see *Kayhan International,* June 2, 1983, p. 2.

[54] See document cited in fn. 31.

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Members of the Iranian military accused of belonging to the Tudeh party seen during a session of a revolutionary court that began deliberations on Dec. 6, 1983. Defendants identified from name placards, from left to right, are: Faleh Fazeli, Hossain Ramezani, Khalil Banai Masuleh, and Mohammad Bahramnezhad.

—*Iran Times International* (Washington, DC).

flights to no less than 21,000 feet. Instead, Soviet planes flew over at 4,000 feet, and en route to the Persian Gulf dropped at least one large packet to dissident Kurds.[55] Amir-Entezam also reported that his government had located and confiscated eight 50-watt radio transmitters that had been placed at various locations by the Soviets to "broadcast subversive material."[56] As Foreign Minister, Qotbzadeh complained to his Soviet counterpart in August 1980, some two months after expelling a Soviet diplomat on charges of spying, that "substantial amounts of Russian arms not used by the armed forces of neighboring countries had been found in Kurdistan." He also directly accused Moscow of colluding with Kurdish rebels by providing them with money and photographs of Iranian military positions.[57] Indeed, some Soviet statements concerning Iranian minorities have been outright menacing. For example, Heydar Aliyev—former party first secretary of Soviet Azerbaydzhan who was promoted to full membership on the Politburo when Yuriy Andropov succeeded Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow—reportedly told journalists he hoped that the Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan would be united in the future.[58] Iranian authorities were alarmed as well about assumed Soviet ties with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), which had been banned in 1979.[59]

However, once Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, the Soviets realized that additional pressure against the Islamic regime might push Iranian leaders to try to improve relations with the West—for example, by settling the hostage crisis. Thus, Moscow apparently encouraged its ethnic friends to follow a more moderate policy. Those who refused to go along with this new stance were attacked and accused of serving

[55] John Stempel's report after conversations with Amir-Entezam in Stockholm, Sweden, "From the Secretary of State to the Tehran Embassy," No. 3941, August 1979. (See fn. 31 for an explanation of how these documents were procured.) The Soviets also apparently requested permission to fly over Iranian Baluchistan but were denied access.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Qotbzadeh's message of Aug. 11, 1980, to the Soviet foreign minister had been circulated by the Muslim Student Association of the United States and Canada (the Persian Speaking Group), PO Box 6322, Albany, CA 94706. Recently, Iranians have disclosed that documents captured at the US embassy in Tehran indicate that Kurdish Democratic Party leaders had traveled to Moscow in September of 1979 to obtain assistance. See *Kayhan International*, June 2, 1983, p. 2.

[58] As reported in the *International Herald Tribune*, Nov. 30, 1982. Shahram Chubin also refers to Aliyev's statement in "The Soviet Union and Iran," loc. cit.

[59] Atkin, loc. cit.

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imperialist interests in opposing the regime.[60] But there are indications that this policy of moderation may be short-lived. The recent deterioration in Soviet-Iranian relations, including such developments as the banning of the Tudeh party and the expulsion of Soviet diplomats, might lead Moscow to encourage greater ethnic opposition to the government in Tehran. One notable change has been NVOI's shift in attitude toward the Mojahedin (who are now allied with the KDP), abandoning its earlier attacks in favor of advocating more positive, closer relations with them.[61]

Another Soviet tactic unpopular in Iran has been Moscow's refusal to accept Iranian renunciation of the "Treaty of Friendship" that the two countries signed in 1921. Articles 5 and 6 of this treaty, signed under the pressure of Soviet occupation of parts of northern Iran, give Moscow the right to intervene in Iran if a third country threatens to attack the Soviet Union from Iran or if Iran becomes a base for "anti-Soviet aggression."[62] The Soviets invoked this treaty when they occupied northern Iran in 1941, and have since insisted on their right to send troops into that country should they perceive a danger from an outside power operating through Iran. During the Shah's rule in Tehran, Moscow tried, with little success, to use the "Treaty of Friendship" as an instrument to pressure Iran to forego military ties with the West. It also invoked the treaty to warn Washington against intervention in 1978.

By virtue of the provisions of this treaty Moscow assigns what can only be characterized as "limited sovereignty" to Iran. Not surprisingly, Iranians have persistently sought to renounce it. Tehran renounced this treaty once again following the overthrow of the Shah, but Moscow, as in the past, insisted on its validity. Moscow argues, paradoxically, that Soviet insistence

[60]Ibid. This change of emphasis in Soviet policy led to a split within the KDP as a pro-Soviet faction seceded from the party.

[61]See, e.g., "Fate of Popular Mobilization," *FBIS–SAS*, Dec. 6, 1983, pp. I/3–4.

[62]For a complete text of the treaty, see Faramarz S. Fatemi, *The USSR in Iran*, Cranbury, NJ, Barnes and Co., Inc., 1979, pp. 192–94.

Demonstrators march in the town of Karmanya to honor a Kurdish "martyr" killed during January 1980 fighting between the Kurdish Democratic Party and Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Kurdistan.

—MAGNUM.

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on the treaty indicates its commitment to Iranian independence; Iranians see it as rather an indication of Moscow's expansionist designs on their country, particularly in the light of the recent developments in Afghanistan, where a similar treaty provided a pretext for the Soviet invasion. According to former Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh in 1980, Moscow's refusal to recognize Iran's abrogation of the treaty indicates that the Soviets want to use the treaty "as a pretext to launch aggression and attacks against our country."[63]

Economic Relations

After the overthrow of the Shah, Moscow made substantial efforts to expand economic ties between Iran and the socialist bloc. The Soviets were well aware that the revolution and the hostage crisis had undermined American economic relations with Iran. In 1978 Iran exported more than US$4 billion worth of goods to the United States, a figure roughly equivalent to American nonmilitary exports to Iran in the same year.[64] In 1977, 84 percent of Iranian exports and 84.8 percent of its imports were exchanged with Western countries—an overwhelming advantage over trade with Soviet bloc countries, which collectively received one-half of 1 percent of Iranian exports and provided 3.7 percent of Iran's imports.

The revolution had a mixed effect on Soviet-Iranian economic relations. Iranian exports to the Soviet Union for 1980, 1981, and 1982 remained at the same level as before the Shah's overthrow. However, Iranian imports from Soviet bloc countries increased, especially during the hostage crisis, when the United States and some of its allies imposed at least a partial embargo on Iran. In 1980, goods purchased from the Soviet bloc accounted for 8.8 percent of Iran's total imports.[65] There has also been some increase in Iran's dependence on the Soviet Union as a transit route for importing goods from other countries.

The main reason why Iran has avoided a dramatic overall increase in economic relations with the Soviet Union has been the Iranians' desire not to become too dependent on Moscow. Iranian leaders also view past economic dealings with the Soviets as having been detrimental to their country. A major source of contention has been what Iranian leaders consider Soviet exploitation of Iranian natural gas. During the last days of the Shah's regime, the numerous strikes in



A compressor station at Kazi-Magomed in the Soviet republic of Azerbaydzhan on the line built to transport Iranian natural gas to the USSR.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Iranian oil fields had disrupted the flow of natural gas to the Soviet Union. By April of 1979 Iran once again began to sell gas to the Soviets. Soon afterwards, however, conflict between the two countries developed over what price Moscow ought to pay for the gas. The Iranians pushed for a fivefold increase in gas prices from US $.76 per 1,000 cubic feet to $3.80, the world market level. Moscow insisted on paying only $2.66 per 1,000 cubic feet.[66] Moscow's refusal to accept the Iranian price increase led to Iran's shutdown of shipments in March 1980. As a result, the Soviets were forced to make costly adjustments in those areas that were dependent on Iranian gas.

The Khomeyni regime also canceled construction of the second Iran Natural Gas Trunkline (IGAT–2), which was expected to open in 1981 and was to deliver larger quantities of gas to the Soviet Union.[67] The Soviets had agreed to a complex arrangement by which they would deliver gas to Western Europe in an amount equivalent to the new gas received from Iran. Some of the transit charges against Iran were to be paid in the form of gas deliveries to the Soviet Union (three million cubic meters of gas per year). Moscow tried hard to prevent the cancellation of the project but was unsuccessful. The Iranians thereby avoided increasing economic ties with the Soviet Union.

[63] For Qotbzadeh's message, see fn. 58.

[64] See the International Monetary Fund, *Directions of Trade 1982*, Washington, DC, IMF, 1982, pp. 908 and 987.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Alvin Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union and Iran under Khomeini," *International Affairs* (London), Autumn 1981, p. 613.

[67] *The New York Times*, July 19, 1979.

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Instead, to Moscow's displeasure, Iran has sought to improve economic relations with Japan, Turkey, Pakistan, Western Europe, and the People's Republic of China. The improvement in economic ties has been most dramatic in the case of Japan, in effect recouping a substantial part of the trade that had declined precipitously after the Shah's departure. In 1978, Iranian imports from and exports to Japan were US$2.6 billion and US$4.2 billion, respectively. By 1981, the figures had declined to US$1.4 billion and US$1.9 billion. However, based on the available data for the first eight months of 1983, Iranian imports of Japanese goods will be back up at around US$2.4 billion and its imports around US$3.4 billion.[68]

Besides expanding overall economic relations with Turkey, the Iranians have been talking about shipping their natural gas to Western Europe through Turkey rather than through the Soviet Union, as had been planned by the Shah. Moscow and its Iranian supporters have tried unsuccessfully to prevent improved economic relations between Iran and either Turkey or Pakistan, charging both these trading partners with plotting to take Iran back into CENTO through the "back door" of economic dependence.[69] Soviet-sponsored broadcasts have also on occasion sought to discourage friendly Iranian relations with China, perhaps because of Moscow's fears of the emergence of some type of security cooperation between those two countries.[70]

Conflict over Regional Policies

In regard to Iran's regional policies, the picture is mixed as far as Soviet gains are concerned. Several policies of the post-Shah regime have been favorable to the Soviets' position in the region. The Islamic Republic has opposed the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the May 1983 Lebanese-Israeli agreement, and the overall US approach to the Lebanese crisis, including the presence of the multinational "peacekeeping" forces in Lebanon. Indeed, there have been reports that Iranian Revolutionary Guards based in Lebanon's Bekaa valley and their local allies—the Islamic Amal and Islamic Jihad organizations—were responsible for the attacks against the US marines and the French military headquarters in Beirut in October 1983, and against the US embassy there earlier in the same year. Iran has also opposed the presence of US forces and facilities in the Gulf region.[71]

These policy stands fit well with Soviet prescriptions for the area. One of the Soviets' deepest concerns has been to counter US efforts to reestablish a military presence in the region. Moscow is especially fearful that American forces might prevent internal and regional changes desired by the Soviets—perhaps even reestablishing a position of influence in Iran. Deployment of such forces would bring American power close to the southern flank of the Soviet Union. This would pose a serious challenge to the Soviets' potential hegemony over the region and increase substantially the risk of any Soviet military moves against its Middle East neighbors. It is not surprising, therefore, that Moscow has tried to take advantage of local sensitivities against any foreign military presence in order to promote opposition to US efforts.[72]

However, several regional issues have negatively affected Iran's relations with the Soviet Union, posing major dilemmas for Moscow. Like the Shah, Khomeyni and his followers were concerned about the Marxist-Leninist regime installed in Afghanistan in April 1978 even before the Soviet invasion late in the following year. Despite internal opposition from some challen-

[68]For the 1975–81 figures on Japanese-Iranian trade, see *MITI White Paper 1982*, Tokyo, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 1982, p. 819. For the 1983 figures, see MITI, *Monthly Trade and Industry* (Tokyo), March–August 1983.

[69]NVOI, "The Subservient Friends of the Great Satan Cannot Be the Friends and Supporters of Our Islamic Republic," *FBIS–SAS*, May 18, 1982, pp. I/5–6.

[70]See, e.g., NVOI, "Beijing Is the Foe of Revolutionary Iran," *FBIS–SAS*, May 27, 1982, pp. I/6–7. The Iranians have sent several delegations to Beijing in the hope of improving economic and other ties with China. The Chinese have reciprocated—signing in September 1983 a draft contract for scientific, cultural, and technical cooperation with Iran—but have not been enthusiastic in the area of security cooperation. This is perhaps because Chinese leaders do not want Iran to succeed in exporting its revolution to Iraq, with whom the Chinese have also signed an economic agreement. For the various exchanges between China and Iran, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Sept. 14, 1983, p. I/1, and Apr. 14, 1983, p. I/1. For the Iraqi-Chinese economic agreement, see ibid., June 17, 1983, p. I/2. In interviews with the author in Beijing in April 1983, Chinese officials expressed their reservations about Iranian success in exporting revolution.

[71]See, e.g., *The Financial Times*, June 13, 1979; and *Dawn* (Karachi), Sept. 20, 1979.

[72]Moscow has supported the idea of turning the Indian Ocean (including the Arabian Sea) into a "zone of peace," which would exclude the naval forces of the big powers from the region. The Soviets have also opposed an increase in Western-controlled bases there and have called for an end to the dispatch of large naval formations to the region and to the conduct of large military exercises there. Such an arrangement would have several benefits for the Soviets. Those Soviet forces that would most probably be used in a move against Iran and surrounding areas are land-based in contiguous territories in either the Soviet Union itself or in Afghanistan. Excluding big powers from the waters of the area would further change the military balance in favor of the USSR vis-à-vis the West. To deal with the security problems of oil exports from the Gulf, Moscow has proposed a users' conference (with Soviet participation) to guarantee access to and flow of oil from the area. The Soviets want to convince the Gulf states, Europe, and Japan that US policies toward the region will cause problems for oil trade. They are offering an alternative security framework, in which Moscow will have a role in determining Western oil supply. See speech by Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko to the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly, Oct. 1, 1982, in *FBIS–SAS*, Oct. 4, 1982, pp. CC/1–12, esp. p. CC/6.

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gers with ideological preferences similar to those of Khomeyni, the pro-Soviet leadership in Kabul, in a policy parallel to Moscow's, expressed support for the Khomeyni-led revolt against the Shah. But the Khomeyni government did not reciprocate, and relations between the two countries deteriorated. Iranian leaders expressed their opposition to the Soviet-dominated government in Kabul and warned Moscow against interference there.

Notwithstanding Iran's problems with the United States during the hostage crisis, Iranian leaders were vocal in their condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh characterized the invasion as "a hostile measure not only against the people of the country but all Moslems of the world."[73] President Bani-Sadr charged Moscow with hostile designs against the entire region and demanded immediate and unconditional Soviet withdrawal.[74] Khomeyni, too, has on many occasions condemned the Soviet invasion, declaring, for example, on March 21, 1980: "I vehemently condemn once more the savage occupation of Aghanistan by the aggressive plunderers of the East, and I hope that the noble Muslim people of Afghanistan will achieve victory and true independence as soon as possible, and be delivered from the clutches of the so-called champions of the working class."[75]

Iranian leaders have been steadfast in their protest against the Soviet invasion. The government-controlled media often discuss the Afghan crisis and portray the Soviets as an aggressive imperialist power. Iran boycotted the 1980 Olympics in Moscow and has consistently taken a hard line against the Soviets in various international forums, including the Islamic Conference, the Movement of Nonaligned Nations, and the UN General Assembly. Moreover, the Iranian foreign minister refused to participate with Soviet representatives in UN-sponsored talks in Geneva concerning Afghanistan.

Iranian authorities have sought other avenues to counter Soviet gains in Afghanistan. For one thing, they have tried to discourage Pakistan from entering into agreements that might bestow legitimacy on the Soviet-installed regime in Kabul. For another, they have provided housing for some 1.5 million Afghan refugees, as well as headquarters for Afghan resistance groups.[76] They have even given financial support to small Shiite resistance groups such as Nasr,

A demonstration at the USSR's embassy in Tehran on January 1, 1980, protests the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The banner reads: "O, impure enemy, who has set foot on our soil, with one fell swoop we will chop off your feet."

—Patrick Chauvel/SYGMA.

Shuraye Ettefaq, and Harakati Islami. Of those, Nasr seems to be currently favored by the Islamic Republic.[77] Nonetheless, Tehran has not provided substantial assistance to the main Afghan groups. One reason may be that Iran does not want to risk becoming involved in a possible conflict with Soviet forces in Afghanistan, especially while Iran itself is at war with

[73] *The Middle East* (London), April 1982, p. 18.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Trans. in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, p. 287.

[76] This is not to say that all Afghan refugees are being welcomed with open arms. Some Iranian opposition forces have accused the Khomeyni regime of turning over Afghan refugees to the Soviet-installed government in Kabul. See Radio Iran (Clandestine) *FBIS–SAS*, May 19, 1982, p. I/6. Also, the purported treatment of Afghan refugees, including a requirement to carry special identification cards, has caused resentment among Afghans, as has the sending of Afghan refugees to the front to fight against Iraq. The last two allegations have been confirmed by Iranian Minister of Interior Hojjatoleslam Nateq-Nuri, who noted that by the beginning of December more than one milllion Afghans had received ID cards. See Dec. 6, 1983, press conference with Nateq-Nuri, as broadcast by Tehran Domestic Service, in *FBIS–SAS*, Dec. 7, 1983, pp. I/3–4.

[77] See Edward Girardet, "Russia's War in Afghanistan," *Central Asian Survey*, July 1983, pp. 83–109.

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Iraq; another reason may be that the Iranians believe that the resistance groups are receiving enough support from other sources through Pakistan.

Soviet statements to Iran concerning the Islamic Republic's position on Afghanistan have not been threatening and harsh like those to Pakistan, but have contended that Tehran has "misunderstood" Soviet motives. NVOI has sought to persuade Iranians that the Afghan guerrillas are "counterrevolutionaries," comparable to those elements currently fighting the Tehran regime. The Afghan resistance is also charged with having worked together with Israel and the United States, both extremely unpopular in Khomeyni's Iran.[78] NVOI has accused Iranian officials of "distorting" the media coverage of events in Afghanistan,[79] and has called on Iran to return Afghan refugees to their homeland.[80] At times, the Soviet-controlled broadcasts have even attacked IRP leaders for supporting the Afghan guerrillas.[81] NVOI, of course, advances the official Kremlin line, portraying Soviet-occupied Afghanistan as a people's democracy with a legitimate government and urging Iran to seek normalization of relations with Kabul immediately.[82]

Another regional crisis posing major dilemmas for the Soviet Union in its relations with Iran is the Iran-Iraq war, which has been going on since September 22, 1980. On one side is Iraq, signatory of a treaty of friendship with Moscow and a major purchaser of Soviet arms. However, relations between the two countries had been strained by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet involvement in the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute and in the Iraqi-Syrian conflict, and Baghdad's oppressive treatment of the Iraqi Communist party. On the other side is strategically important Iran, where the United States had suffered a major defeat and where Moscow was seeking greater influence.

Soviet leaders were thus in something of a quandary. If the Soviets supported Iraq, Iran might move back toward the West. A failure to support Iraq, however, could lead to further deterioration of Soviet-Iraqi relations—perhaps even to a dramatic breakdown similar to that which had occurred in Moscow's relations with Egypt. Moscow also must have been concerned about the Western responses to, and role in, the war. It is possible that the Soviets feared that Iraq might have started the war in collusion with the United States. Even without such collaboration, Moscow must have been worried that the war might increase the possibility of a greater American military presence in the region and of security cooperation between Washington and some of the local states—for example, Saudi Arabia.

Moscow's official position was one of neutrality. In their public statements, the Soviets emphasized that the war should be stopped, especially since only "imperialists" would benefit from the conflict. At the same time, it appears that Moscow was hoping to maintain its influence in Iraq *and* gain greater influence in Iran. The Soviet Union continued to supply some arms to Iraq and offered to sell arms to Iran. However, Soviet policy did not succeed in influencing Iraq to put an end to its war against Iran. Nor did this policy please Iran, which publicly called on Moscow to stop all arms shipments to Iraq.[83]

Over time, Soviet policies began to favor Iran. Apparently, Moscow had decided that Iran was more important to Soviet interests and that its gain or loss would lead to a fundamental change in the geostrategic environment in the area. Besides, Moscow quite likely was frustrated with Baghdad. Thus, to demonstrate its goodwill toward Iran, Moscow stopped arms shipments to Iraq in late 1980 or early 1981, although it did maintain economic ties. The Soviets also offered to sell major weapons systems to Iran, and signed a treaty of friendship in late 1980 with Syria, Iraq's rival and Iran's ally.

Moscow's change in policy brought only limited success. According to some reports, Iran did buy some arms from the Soviets,[84] although Iranian officials deny the purchase of major weapons systems from Moscow. Shahram Chubin, citing statements by Iranian exiles as his source, argues that in July 1981 Iran and the Soviet Union signed a three-year military agreement involving the training of Iranians in the USSR, the extension of technical assistance, and the temporary dispatch of Soviet advisers.[85] Chubin claims that the Iranians also agreed to limit their support for the Afghans in exchange for this agreement—an allegation Iranian officials vehemently deny.

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[78] NVOI, "The Confessions of a Pakistani Officer," *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 15, 1982, p. I/7.

[79] NVOI, "The Afghan Problem—an Excuse to Divert Public Opinion," *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 9, 1982, pp. I/16-17.

[80] "Separate Your Policy from the Policy of Regimes Such as That of the Saudis," *FBIS-SAS*, Aug. 31, 1982, pp. I/10-11.

[81] NVOI, "Qotbzadeh's Trial Has Uncovered the Mask," *FBIS-SAS*, Aug. 26, 1982, pp. I/9-10.

[82] NVOI, "The People Are Defending the Democratic Government of Afghanistan," *FBIS-SAS*, Aug. 11, 1982, p. I/9. See also NVOI, "On the Talks about Afghanistan," *FBIS-SAS*, June 16, 1982, pp. I/3-5.

[83] The call was made by, among others, the Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Mohammad Makri. See *Kayhan* (in Persian), June 26, 1980, in *FBIS-SAS*, July 1, 1980, p. I/3.

[84] Chubin, "Soviet Union and Iran," pp. 921-49.

[85] Ibid., p. 934.

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Even if the Iranians did buy weapons from the Soviets, the amount purchased most likely fell far short of Soviet expectations. Indeed, although such Soviet friends as Libya, Syria, and North Korea did sell arms to Tehran, Iranian leaders were also able to procure American-made arms from Israel, and other weapons on the international arms black market. This pragmatic approach on the part of the Iranian leaders demonstrated the government's unwillingness to move very close to the Soviets.

As Iran began to do better in the war, Moscow once again changed its policy, this time in favor of Iraq. In 1982, Moscow resumed supplying major weapons systems to Iraq, and NVOI and Moscow's local friends attacked Iran's move into Iraqi territory in the spring and summer of 1982.[86] This change in policy may reflect the Kremlin's frustration with the lack of progress in Soviet relations with Iran, as well as a fear of total loss of influence in Iraq and concern over the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. In fact, since 1982, containing the Iranian revolution has apparently become an important Soviet goal.[87] Still, while opposing the spread of the revolution to Iraq, Moscow is likely to avoid provocative actions that might conceivably push Iran toward security ties with the West or lead to a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

One such provocative action would be a Soviet threat to invade Iran. The Soviets have substantial forces stationed near the Iranian border. Should Iran gain a decided advantage in the war against Iraq, Moscow could threaten to take military action against Tehran. Such action would have grave consequences, certainly alienating Iran and likely risking a direct confrontation with the United States—both developments the Soviet leadership would clearly want to avoid. Thus, should the Iranian threat increase, Moscow would likely adopt other, less volatile measures to prevent Iranian domination of Iraq. The USSR could expand substantially its military aid and other support to Iraq. Moscow might also extend greater indirect support to antiregime forces in Iran in order to weaken the Khomeyni government and erode its base of support. Such tactics could take their toll on the Iranian regime, thereby causing a troubled leadership to decrease its effort to export revolution to Iraq and Afghanistan, and become more responsive to Soviet interests—or so the Soviets might hope.

Nevertheless, contrary to the optimism it expressed in the summer of 1982, Tehran has not succeeded in rapidly defeating the Iraqis. As long as the situation remains stalemated, Moscow is likely to persist in seeking to maintain some influence in Iraq while gaining greater influence in Iran. In the case of Iran, Moscow would probably be willing to step up the supply of arms and military equipment, just so long as these supplies do not change the military balance significantly in favor of Iran.

Prospects and Dangers

Iran's place in superpower competition is quite central. Both superpowers have substantial interests in Iran, although there is considerable uncertainty as to which one's interests predominate: to the West, Iran's importance lies in its control over access to oil and its strategic role in Persian Gulf security; to the Soviets, the major issue is geographic and ethnic contiguity—with the border regions of the two countries having common ethnic groups. This uncertainty unfortunately increases the possibility of miscalculation by each side of what action the other might take. It also reduces the possibility, advanced by some, that the superpower with the clearly predominant interest would be able to deter the other from moving against Iran by relying ultimately on its second-strike nuclear forces, regardless of the local balance of power.[88]

As far as the conventional military balance is concerned, Moscow still enjoys a comparative advantage, despite US efforts to increase its power projection capability in this area since the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The most important factor favoring Moscow is Iran's geographical

[86]See, e.g., NVOI, "The Main Objective of Our Combatant Nation," *FBIS-SAS*, June 8, 1982, pp. I/10-11, and NVOI, "Iran and Iraq Are the Victims of the Plots of World-Devouring America," *FBIS-SAS*, June 25, 1982, pp. I/1-2. See also NVOI commentaries, "Let Us Deprive America of the Potential for Exploitation by Ending the Imposed War," *FBIS-SAS*, Aug. 18, 1982, pp. I/3-4; and "The Outcome of Incorrect Calculations Will Be Calamitous," *FBIS-SAS*, July 19, 1982, pp. I/21-22. For a concise summary of recent Soviet activity in the Gulf, see Oles Smolansky, "Gulf Security and Outside Powers," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1983, pp. 77-80.

[87]Iranians claim Moscow's fear that Islamic republicanism might have some appeal among its own growing Muslim population is another reason for Soviet opposition to the spread of their revolution. Reportedly, Moscow has curtailed contact between Iranians and Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus, and has canceled planned visits by Iran to this region. (These observations are based on conversations between the author and Iranian officials.) Also, hostile commentaries on Soviet treatment of its own Muslim population and reportage of increased anti-Soviet activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus are now appearing in Iranian publications. The authors apparently believe that anti-Soviet activities in those regions are led by "struggling" clergymen and that the officially sanctioned clerics are unpopular because they are regarded as KGB agents. They also feel that there is a significant demand for copies of the Koran among Soviet Muslims and that the struggle against "Eastern imperialism" will be a sustained one. See, e.g., "Self-Willed Mullahs of the Soviet Union," *Pasdar-e Eslam* (the magazine of the Revolutionary Guards), in *FBIS-SAS*, Dec. 14, 1983, pp. I/5-7.

[88]For a representative example of this view, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Spring 1981, pp. 49-73.

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proximity. Traditionally, this has been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, contiguity with the Soviet Union and experience with its expansionist tendencies have heightened Iranian suspicions of Moscow and of Soviet sympathizers within Iran. Indeed, this fear once pushed Iran to seek close security relations with a distant counterbalancing power, the United States. On the other hand, contiguity ensures sustained Soviet interest and easier military access. Since the Shah's overthrow and Iran's demonstrative break with the United States, the practical consequences of Iran's proximity have acquired greater importance. The degradation in Iran's security capabilities has made the country vulnerable to such efforts as the infiltration of its territory from across the Soviet border and the instigation of ethnic dissension in its northern provinces. The existence of ethnically similar populations on both sides of the border not only assures Soviet interest in Iran, but also provides Moscow with a large number of potential infiltrators to collect information and perhaps affect internal Iranian developments.

Another aspect of Moscow's geographical advantage is the substantial number of Soviet forces stationed in military districts adjacent to Iran. These forces total some 20 divisions (roughly 200,000 soldiers) in various categories of readiness and include airborne forces available for rapid deployment.[89] Several more divisions could be brought to the Iranian border in a relatively short time. In some ways, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has actually increased Soviet capabilities for pressuring or, less likely, invading Iran. For one thing, Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan could open up a new front for armed confrontation with Iran (or for Soviet meddling in internal Iranian affairs)—this time to the east. Soviet forces next door could also serve as a cover for Moscow's preparatory steps to move against Iran. Deception has long been a standard part of Moscow's strategy of invasion. Thus, Soviet military preparations near Iran might be presented as part of Moscow's efforts to reinforce Soviet troops in Afghanistan. For another thing, should the Soviets win the war in Afghanistan,

[89]See, e.g., Dennis Ross, "Considering Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf," ibid., Fall 1981, pp. 149–81.

Iranian forces at the front during an April 1983 offensive against Iraqi troops.

—Kalari/SYGMA.

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their advantage in power projection against Iran would be further reinforced.

Even short of direct intervention, Moscow could use its superior relevant military capability in order to influence domestic developments in Iran should groups sympathetic to the USSR make a bid for power and ask for Soviet assistance. The substantial Soviet military capability is also likely to affect US policies toward Iran. Although US policymakers are likely to play on Tehran's fears of its aggressive neighbor and discourage close Soviet-Iranian ties, Washington may well be reluctant to move massively and directly in support of sympathetic groups or of a potentially friendly regime in Iran. Moscow, on the other hand, is likely to take substantial risks to prevent the re-emergence of a pro-Western regime in Tehran. The 1921 Treaty of Friendship could be invoked to provide the legal rationalization for Soviet military intervention, especially if another power were to send forces into Iran.

It would be a mistake, however, to tacitly assign Iran to the Soviets' sphere of influence. Despite the USSR's comparative advantage, a Soviet invasion of Iran is far from inevitable. Moscow is generally very cautious in the use of its military forces against other states; and if the Afghanistan invasion ends up becoming very costly, it might encourage further caution. Of course, Soviet policy will depend not just on military factors, but also on the ideological, economic, and diplomatic issues discussed above. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the circumstances under which Moscow might send its forces into Iran. Keeping in mind of course that surprises are always possible, one can still identify the categories of conditions that might contribute to a Soviet intervention in Iran.

Domestic Iranian developments. At the present time, domestic conditions in Iran are not conducive to a Soviet military intervention. The Khomeyni regime remains ideologically hostile both to the Soviet Union and to local leftists, and the economic, political, and social forces in Iran in recent years have tended to push the two countries further apart rather than closer together.

However, should Iran move ideologically closer to the USSR, perhaps even going so far as the takeover of the state apparatus by pro-Soviet forces—an unlikely development in the foreseeable future but one that should not be ruled out entirely—Moscow's stake in Iran would increase substantially. Such a regime would inevitably move closer to Moscow not only because of its own ideological preferences but also because of its desire to trap Moscow into supporting it against the opposition, which would be both widespread and formidable. The Soviets would probably be willing to provide assistance in order to avoid being perceived as disloyal and in order to increase their influence in Iran and further decrease that of others. Should the gains made be threatened, the Soviets would be more willing to intervene massively to protect those gains. Moscow might even believe that the risks incurred by intervention in such circumstances would have declined, perhaps to a tolerable level—especially since Washington would be extremely reluctant to risk a war with the Soviet Union over Iran if the government in Tehran had moved close to the Soviets ideologically, if the Iranians had asked Moscow for help, and if the local military balance favored the USSR. Such a scenario is unlikely to unfold any time soon, however, given the Tehran government's recent move against the Tudeh party.

Another domestic development that might tempt Moscow to intervene would be the disintegration of central authority in Iran and the splitting of the country into its several ethnic components. In 1945, while in Iran, the Soviets established Soviet-oriented republics in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. But these republics collapsed immediately after the Soviets withdrew their troops one year later. Should the center in Iran disintegrate, the ever-opportunistic Soviets might again move into these areas to establish governments modeled on the Soviet system. Moscow might even receive an invitation to intervene from some sympathetic local group, or it might justify its move on the grounds that it was necessary to establish law and order in areas close to its territories. A Soviet intervention in northern Iran might lead to a Western move into the southern parts of the country. Such a countermove could lead either to a renewed de facto division of Iran into three areas (a Russian-occupied north, an embattled but nominally independent center, and a Western-dominated south), or to a conflict between the Soviet Union and the West for control of the whole country.

While ethnic politics remain a threat to Iran's stability, this factor alone cannot lead to the country's "balkanization." Despite the erosion in the capability of the government in Tehran after the Shah's overthrow, ethnic nationalists have not succeeded in escaping central control. Although there are many conflicts at the center, a total breakdown appears unlikely in the near future. However, a critical test for the regime's success at consolidation will be Khomeyni's death. Perhaps his successor(s) will be able to do as well, but that remains to be seen.

Superpower competition. Soviet anticipation of a possible surge in an American presence in Iran—the

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result either of the emergence of a pro-Western regime or of intervention by US forces—could play a critical role in a decision by Moscow to intervene militarily in the Islamic Republic's affairs. Although it is unlikely, there is a small chance that internal conflicts in Iran could lead to the reappearance of a government favorably disposed toward the United States. Such a regime would be likely to have many opponents, and Moscow might support some or all of them. Washington might then become more involved in Tehran's domestic affairs, perhaps even intervening on the side of the new regime. In retaliation, the Soviets could decide to back up a statement made by a Soviet official to a Western journalist in October 1982: "We shall intervene massively and immediately if the Americans get involved [in Iran]."[90] The possibility of a Soviet invasion would probably decline, however, if a pro-Western government had substantial popular support and could consolidate its power without need for direct American intervention.

A Soviet intervention in Iran would also be a possibility should Moscow suffer a series of defeats in a confrontation with the West in an area vital to the Soviets' national interest. Thus, the Soviet Union could invade Iran either to compensate for losses incurred elsewhere or to place itself in a stronger position to bargain in the other theater. This option would be even more attractive to Soviet leaders should Moscow become convinced that the military balance in the region unambiguously favored the USSR and that the West might not escalate. However, of the categories considered, this scenario has the least credibility, particularly since it is difficult at this point in time to envisage a massive and direct American military move against vital Soviet interests in any part of the world.

Assessment

The expectation that the losses suffered by the United States in Iran would almost automatically lead to Soviet gains has not been realized. Indeed, the Soviet record has been quite mixed. But the struggle for Iran is not over. Because of internal instabilities there, Soviet-Iranian relations will be susceptible to further significant changes. Moscow is likely to continue to use both positive and negative incentives not only to discourage Iran from moving toward the West, but also to encourage the current regime to persist in its hostility toward the United States and in its independent strategy in the region. Like Washington, however, Moscow faces the dilemma of how to contain Iranian efforts to export Islamic revolution without pushing Iran into the rival superpower's camp.

Moscow is likely to maintain its current, if somewhat contradictory, policy of relying on indirect methods to gain more influence in Iran on the one hand, while arming Iraq to prevent Iran's domination on the other. Despite the ban on the Tudeh party and the expulsion of Soviet diplomats, Moscow is likely to continue its offer of increased economic, political, and cultural ties with Tehran. But Moscow is not likely to abandon its ties with individuals and groups who are outside the state apparatus. Thus, the Soviets will continue to provide clandestine support for groups sympathetic to the USSR, and to encourage greater cooperation among them, in the hope that these groups might become increasingly powerful and eventually take over the state.

Whether Soviet strategy succeeds or not depends on numerous factors, over many of which the Soviets have no control. The most important is Iran's domestic politics. Although the present regime has made considerable strides in consolidating its power, it continues to face stiff opposition both inside and outside the IRP. It is difficult to categorize some of the regime's internal conflicts accurately, especially on the issue of relations with the USSR. In general, it has been assumed (by the Soviets and others) that among the IRP groupings the so-called Hojatiyeh faction is the most hostile to the Soviet Union. If true, the recent downturn in Soviet-Iranian relations could reflect a shift in domestic power in favor of this group, but there is no evidence for this. All IRP factions appear committed to nonalignment and to a policy of maintaining a comfortable distance from the Soviets, although it is possible that some might be more willing than others to accept expanded economic and military relations. Therefore, the evolution of the power struggle between various IRP factions could further affect ties with the Soviets. This struggle might well intensify after Khomeyni dies; he has dominated Iran's political scene since 1979, and his authority has never been challenged openly by any of the IRP factions.

Should more radical changes take place in Iran's domestic politics—such as the overthrow of the Islamic Republic—the state of relations between Moscow and Tehran will obviously depend upon the character of the new regime. Some elements of the opposition are friendly toward the Soviets; others are even more hostile than the current government.

Moscow's actions will also be affected by its calculations of Western capabilities and likely responses. The Soviet calculus for intervention is actually quite

[90]Soviet official quoted in *The Middle East*, October 1982, p. 31.

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simple: the higher the Western stakes in Iran and the greater the Western ability to retaliate against a Soviet threat, the more likely it is that Moscow will avoid using massive direct means to bring about important changes in Iran. In such circumstances, Moscow is likely to persist in the use of indirect means to bring about changes and use its advantages to protect the gains achieved. Therefore, the Soviet challenge to the West in Iran necessitates the development of a strategy that prevents further fundamental changes in favor of the Soviet Union in both the balance of power and the "balance of interest" in Iran. The only safe prediction seems to be that we are unlikely to have seen the last of Iranian upheavals and that Iran is likely to be one of the main testing grounds for superpower rivalry in the coming decade.

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Moscow's Double-Track Policy

Sanaa and the Soviets

by Mark N. Katz

The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR—or North Yemen) occupies a strategic location at the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula between oil-rich Saudi Arabia and the Marxist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY—or South Yemen). North Yemen also borders on the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb through which ships transiting the Red Sea between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean must pass. Although figures are not precise, North Yemen's population may exceed 6,000,000, i.e., is larger than that of any other Peninsula state except perhaps Saudi Arabia. The YAR government is relatively weak, and has had to contend with strong internal opposition, including conservative northern tribes (often supported by the Saudis) and leftist forces in the south such as the National Democratic Front (NDF), which has been supported by South Yemen.

Because of its strategic location, large population, and political instability, North Yemen is important to both East and West. The West fears that if a leftist government should ever come to power in North Yemen (either through a successful South Yemeni–backed insurgency or through peaceful unification, which both North and South ostensibly support), Saudi Arabia would be more vulnerable to Marxist subversion than it is now from the direction of the less populous South Yemen. What to the West is a feared possibility is to the Soviet Union an opportunity: a Marxist government in Sanaa, the YAR capital, would likely put the Soviets in a much better position either to pressure Saudi Arabia and other conservative countries along the Persian Gulf to become more responsive to Soviet foreign policy interests, or to promote revolution in these countries. Nevertheless, North Yemen poses a potential threat to Soviet interests as well: its larger population might one day allow it to defeat South Yemen militarily or to dominate it should peaceful unification ever occur.

The United States demonstrated its concern for North Yemen's security during a 1979 border conflict between North and South, in which the Soviet Union was perceived to be supporting a South Yemeni military effort to overthrow the relatively pro-Western government of Col. Ali Abdallah Salih. That conflict was highly publicized; subsequent events in North Yemen, though of comparable importance, have received much less attention. For one thing, the Soviet Union signed a major arms deal with Sanaa in mid-1979 and promptly delivered the agreed-on weapons. Then, soon after the Arab League negotiated a cease-fire in the North-South conflict, the Aden-supported NDF launched an insurgency in the southern part of the YAR that Sanaa was not able to defeat until mid-1982. The Soviets, in effect, came to support both sides in this battle—through direct supply of arms to Sanaa and indirect aid to the NDF via Aden.

Why has this situation come about? What does the Soviet Union hope to accomplish through its ambivalent policy toward North Yemen? Why does the North Yemeni government rely on the USSR for military assistance when the Soviets directly support its opponent, South Yemen, and indirectly assist the YAR's internal leftist opposition? What can be said about North Yemen's place in Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World generally? Answers will be sought to these questions by examining the NDF insurgency and

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Soviet-YAR military, economic, and political relations. First, however, a brief summary of North Yemen's complicated history is necessary.

Historical Overview

Islam came to Yemen during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, and the Sunni-Shi'a split that has divided the Muslim world since his death has also divided Yemeni society. In the southern part of North Yemen—in the Tihama plain along the Red Sea coast—and in what is now South Yemen, the Shafi'i school of Sunni Islam came to predominate (this is one of four legal schools accepted by Sunnis and differs from the Hanbali school that predominates in Saudi Arabia). In the northern part of North Yemen, the population is primarily of the Zaidi branch of Shi'ite Islam, which differs from the Shi'a religion practiced in Iran.[1] Although there are no accurate statistics available, it is believed that North Yemen's population today is divided roughly equally between Zaidis and Shafi'is, with the latter perhaps constituting a slight majority. Relations between the two groups are not generally hostile, but the division does have political significance: the Zaidis held political authority in Sanaa most of the time prior to 1962, when Zaidi imams ruled, and have continued to provide most of the leaders of the Yemen Arab Republic since 1962. This situation has sometimes been a source of discontent among the Shafi'is.

The Zaidi imams in Sanaa at one time ruled over the territory that now comprises both Yemens and beyond. In the 18th century, various emirs in southern Yemen broke away from the imams of the north. In the 19th century, the Turks invaded and (with great difficulty) ruled North Yemen, while Great Britain governed Aden as a colony and extended "protection" to the rest of South Yemen. After World War I, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire forced the Turks to leave, and soon the Zaidi Imam Yahya came to rule all

[1]On Yemen's pre-20th century history, see Robert W. Stookey, *Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978, Chs. 1–6.

The Soviet ship "Latviya" moored at Hodeida, after bringing Soviet dignitaries for ceremonies marking the opening of the new North Yemen port, constructed with the help of Soviet specialists.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

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of North Yemen. He and then his son, Imam Ahmad, ruled the North in a harsh and authoritarian manner, keeping it isolated internationally and underdeveloped economically. Opposition to imamic rule grew, but was ineffectual until after Imam Ahmad died in 1962.[2]

On September 26, 1962, one week after Imam Ahmad's death, a group of Nasserite army officers led by Abdallah as-Sallal overthrew the Imam's son, Mohammad al-Badr, and proclaimed creation of a Yemen Arab Republic. Al-Badr managed to escape and with military assistance from the Saudis waged an inconclusive war against the Egyptian- and Soviet-aided republicans for the remainder of the decade.[3]

It might be noted that the Soviets had given some economic and military assistance to Imam Ahmad, but once the republic was declared, Moscow recognized it immediately and by 1964 had signed a friendship treaty with the new government. (The treaty provided for automatic renewal every five years unless either party wished to abrogate it.) Soviet economic aid increased, but military assistance was channeled almost completely through Egypt. Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser wanted to control the YAR himself, and the Soviets did not want to lose his friendship by seeming to compete with Egypt for influence in Sanaa. However, after his defeat by Israel in the June 1967 war, Nasser choose to pull out of the seemingly endless Yemeni conflict. He withdrew his forces in the autumn of 1967 in exchange for Saudi promises to stop aiding the royalists and to start giving economic aid to Cairo. Upon the Egyptians' departure, as-Sallal was overthrown by Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, who was prepared to negotiate with the royalists to end the war. Instead, the royalists launched their biggest offensive and succeeded in surrounding Sanaa in December 1967. The Soviets undertook a direct airlift of arms and food to the besieged capital, and in early February 1968 the siege was broken. The royalists never regained their strength.[4]

It soon became apparent, however, that the YAR was not to be a radical state, and the Soviets seemed to lose interest in it—preferring to concentrate on competing with China for influence with the Marxist National Liberation Front that ruled South Yemen, which had become independent from Britain in November 1967. The al-Iryani government concluded the civil war in 1970 by allowing the royalists (except the royal family itself) to return to North Yemen, and Saudi Arabia recognized the YAR soon thereafter.

Relations Between the Yemens

While Saudi-YAR relations improved, relations between Sanaa and Aden deteriorated, partly because each government gave refuge to opponents of the other. There was fighting along their common border in the spring and again in the summer of 1972. Despite an agreement on unity signed by both sides after the fighting, relations between the two Yemens remained poor.[5]

In its public statements on the 1972 conflict, the Soviet Union tried to avoid openly taking sides. But afterwards, USSR-YAR relations were strained by increased Soviet assistance to Aden and by Moscow's failure both to deliver arms promised to Sanaa in the 1960's and to provide much additional economic assistance to the North. During the years 1972–78, successive YAR governments sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and the United States in order to obtain economic and military aid. The YAR did obtain large amounts of economic aid from the Saudis, but was less successful in obtaining US arms.[6]

In June 1974, Lt. Col. Ibrahim al-Hamdi overthrew the relatively weak al-Iryani government and moved to reduce the power of the tribal leaders and establish a strong central government. In 1976, six small leftist groups formed the National Democratic Front. Displaying a variety of often conflicting ideologies, members of the Front were primarily Shafi'is from the southern part of the YAR who resented the political dominance of the northern Zaidis.[7] Al-Hamdi was somewhat tolerant of the NDF because it supported his policy of weakening tribal influence on the central government. However, both he and Lt. Col. Ahmad al-Ghashmi, who came to power after al-Hamdi's assassination in October 1977, also engaged in military skirmishes with NDF guerrillas.

Al-Ghashmi was himself assassinated on June 24, 1978—by a bomb carried in the briefcase of a South Yemeni emissary. Two days later, a pro-Soviet faction led by Abd al-Fattah Ismail seized power in Aden on the pretext that South Yemeni President Salim

[2]For a detailed account of the imamate in the 20th century, see Manfred W. Wenner, *Modern Yemen, 1918–1966*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967.

[3]On the Yemeni civil war, see Dana Adams Schmidt, *Yemen: The Unknown War*, New York, NY, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968; and Edgar O'Ballance, *The War in the Yemen*, London, Faber and Faber, 1971.

[4]On Soviet foreign policy toward North Yemen in the 1950's and 1960's, see Richard E. Bissell, "Soviet Use of Proxies in the Third World: The Case of Yemen," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1978, pp. 87–106.

[5]See Robin Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, Singapore, Longman/Westview, 1983, Ch. 8.

[6]Ibid., pp. 286–95.

[7]Tamar Yegnes, "The Yemeni Arab Republic," in Colin Legum, Ed., *Middle East Contemporary Survey: Volume 1, 1976–77*, New York, NY, Holmes & Meier, 1978, p. 653.

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Figures in the government that came to power in North Yemen as a result of a coup on June 13, 1974: at left, Prime Minister Muhsin al-Ayni; at right, Lt. Col. Ibrahim al-Hamdi, Chairman of the Military Command Council and leader of the coup.

—SYGMA.

Rubayyi Ali (who opposed excessive dependence on the USSR, had close links with Beijing, and advocated improving relations with Washington) had colluded in the assassination of al-Ghashmi. However, press reports suggest that Ismail's forces had intercepted Ali's emissary and replaced him with another emissary who unknowingly carried the bomb. The USSR, Cuba, and East Germany have also been accused of complicity in all this intrigue, but their role has never been made clear. In any case, relations between North and South Yemen deteriorated sharply.[8]

Col. Salih, the new leader of the YAR, weathered unsuccessful coup attempts in September and October 1978. After these events a large group of officers—supporters of the late al-Hamdi known as the "13 June Front"—fled south and in early 1979 joined the NDF.[9] The Front demanded freedom to organize and operate political parties and trade unions, creation of a Consultative Council in which leftist forces would be represented, release of political prisoners, unification of the YAR with the PDRY, and a decrease in Saudi influence in the YAR.[10]

On February 24, 1979, fighting erupted along the border between the two Yemens. The US government became so concerned about the situation that on March 9, 1979, it was announced that President Jimmy Carter had invoked emergency procedures to send US$390 million in arms to Sanaa without Congressional approval. The weapons were to be delivered through Saudi Arabia, which would pay from them.[11]

In the meantime, however, the two Yemens had agreed to a cease-fire. Although some fighting continued, PDRY and NDF forces pulled back by March 19, and on March 30, Salih and Ismail announced a new unity accord.[12] Perhaps as a condition for South Yemen's withdrawal from YAR territory, Salih next made some changes in his government that gave it a somewhat leftist image and in June 1979 began negotiations with the NDF, which now demanded ministerial positions in the Sanaa government.[13] Alarmed at this development and at the unity effort, Saudi Arabia quickly reduced the flow of US weapons to the YAR. A North Yemeni emissary flew to Washington in an unsuccessful effort to persuade the US to send arms directly. It was widely reported at the time that the US Central Intelligence Agency was predicting the collapse of Salih's regime within six months due to opposition within his own army and to the NDF insurgency, which had flared up again. Shortly thereafter, Salih turned to the Soviet Union, which quickly concluded an arms deal and began delivering weapons to North Yemen in late 1979.[14]

The NDF Insurgency

The NDF insurgents battled on until the spring of 1982, when the YAR government launched a major offensive that resulted in a seemingly definitive cease-fire. Until that time there had been numerous cease-fires and apparent negotiating breakthroughs, none of which took hold. In February 1980 the NDF announced that an agreement had been signed under which the YAR would admit five NDF ministers into a coalition government, release political prisoners, hold free elections, and work toward unity with the South, in return for which the PDRY would reduce its backing of the NDF and withdraw some army units from the border. Yet, a few weeks later, NDF units reportedly moved across the border into the southern YAR,

[8]For more on these events, see Bidwell, op. cit., Ch. 9; and J. E. Peterson, *Yemen: The Search for a Modern State*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, Ch. 4.

[9]Aden Domestic Service in Arabic, Jan. 6, 1979, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-MEA*), Jan. 9, 1979, pp. C/2-3.

[10]Haim Shaked and Tamar Yegnes, "The Yemeni Arab Republic," in Colin Legum, Ed., *Middle East Contemporary Survey: Volume 2, 1977-78*, New York, NY, Holmes & Meier, 1979, p. 794. The NDF's commitment to free elections appeared less than sincere since in calling for unity with South Yemen, it did not call for free elections there.

[11]*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Harlow, Essex—hereafter, *Keesing's*), Apr. 18, 1980, pp. 30197-99.

[12]Ibid.

[13]J. E. Peterson, "Conflict in the Yemens and Superpower Involvement," Washington, DC, Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Occasional Papers Series, December 1981, pp. 24-25.

[14]*Keesing's*, Apr. 18, 1980, pp. 30197-99.

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seized a number of towns, removed local sheikhs, and began to govern along Marxist South Yemeni lines.[15]

In late August 1980, South Yemeni President Ali Nasir Mohammad (who had overthrown Ismail in April but was, like his predecessor, considered to be pro-Soviet) travelled to Sanaa to negotiate another cease-fire, again short-lived, in which the NDF undertook to stop clandestine radio broadcasts in exchange for permission to publish a newspaper under YAR government auspices. However, hostilities soon resumed, with Sanaa seeming to gain the upper hand against the NDF with the help of the Islamic Front—a tribal force supported by Saudi Arabia.[16]

In November 1981, Salih and Ali Nasir met again, this time in Kuwait, where the PDRY President reportedly signed a cease-fire agreement with the YAR on behalf of the NDF. A month later YAR Prime Minister Abdul Karim al-Iryani (a distant relative of the former president) revealed a year-old agreement between Sanaa and Aden "not to support any military, political, or press activity directed against the other."[17] Yet after the November accord, fighting grew heavier than ever. From all appearances, Ali Nasir seems to have preferred a peaceful solution, but two powerful rivals in Aden—Defense Minister Salih Muslih Qasim and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ali Antar—apparently advocated full PDRY support for NDF military activities.[18]

The YAR's Salih decided to seek a full military victory over the NDF and in January 1982 dismissed several high-ranking officers who reportedly advocated a less forceful approach in order not to provoke PDRY retaliation.[19] In mid-March, NDF General Secretary 'Uman stated that the Front would give up regions in the center and south of the country if the YAR freed 4,000 political prisoners and guaranteed political and labor freedom, and in April a mediation effort by the Palestine Liberation Organization led to another temporary cease-fire. This broke down when NDF forces were reported to have seized the town of Juban in North Yemen, six miles from the PDRY border.[20]

As Sanaa prepared its final offensive, the NDF was in a bad way. Leader 'Uman admitted that the 13 June Front had left the NDF.[21] Heavy rains and flash floods in late March in the PDRY's southwest made South Yemeni support for the guerrillas extremely difficult. When the YAR attacked in May, it was aided by 6,000 northern tribesmen and a locally recruited militia. In the clash, some 1,000 of the 5,000 NDF fighters defected to the YAR. A final cease-fire was signed a few weeks later by Salih and Ali Nasir.[22]

Soviet Role?

The Soviet Union, which had commented relatively little on the 1972 and 1979 border wars, said almost nothing about the NDF insurgency. Moscow did cite the Front's communiqué at the beginning of the 1979 war claiming capture of several North Yemeni towns,[23] but otherwise remained silent about NDF involvement in that conflict and the subsequent insurgency. Indeed, the Soviets behaved as if nothing were happening. They spoke approvingly of relations with the YAR, sent and received messages and delegations, and welcomed Salih when he came to Moscow in October 1981 to negotiate for further arms shipments.[24]

Whether or not the Soviets gave direct aid to the NDF insurgency is difficult to establish. The Soviets never admitted to doing so, and the NDF never claimed to have received direct Soviet support. The guerrillas certainly received Soviet arms from the PDRY (and to a lesser extent from Libya and Syria),[25] and in March 1982, two Su–22 fighters supplied to the YAR by Moscow were shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft weapons in NDF hands.[26] However, the degree to which the Soviets were involved in or approved of these arms transfers is uncertain. Moreover, in the internal PDRY power struggle (in which the NDF issue

[15] Kuwait KUNA in English, Mar. 4, 1980, in *FBIS–MEA*, Mar. 7, 1980, pp. C/12–13; also *Keesing's*, Apr. 18, 1980, p. 30199, and Mar. 6, 1981, p. 30743.

[16] See Jacob Goldberg, "The Yemeni Arab Republic," *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. 4, 1979–80*, pp. 828–29; *FBIS–MEA*, Sept. 4, 1980, p. ii, Nov. 12, 1980, p. iii, and Dec. 22, 1980, p. iii; *Keesing's*, Mar. 6, 1981, p. 30743; and Kuwait KUNA in Arabic, Jan. 26, 1981, in *FBIS–MEA*, Jan. 29, 1981, p. C/2.

[17] See *FBIS–MEA*, Nov. 27, 1981, p. iii; and *Keesing's*, Mar. 12, 1982, p. 31379. Under the terms of the agreement, the border area was to be demilitarized and the cease-fire overseen by a tripartite committee made up of YAR, NDF, and PDRY representatives.

Jean Gueyras gives a slightly different interpretation of this accord in *Le Monde* (Paris) of Jan. 7, 1982. According to Gueyras, the agreement was prepared by the Emir of Kuwait and signed by Salih and NDF General Secretary Sultan Ahmad 'Uman "in the presence of" Ali Nasir.

[18] *Ash-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), Mar. 31, 1982, in *FBIS–MEA*, Apr. 1, 1982, pp. C/8–9.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Paris AFP in English, Mar. 15, 1982, in *FBIS–MEA*, Mar. 15, 1982, p. C/9; and Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, Apr. 18, 1982, in *FBIS–MEA*, Apr. 19, 1982, p. C/6. Also *Keesing's*, March 1983, p. 3249.

[21] See interview with *As-Safir* (Beirut), Mar. 28, 1982, in *FBIS–MEA*, Apr. 20, 1982, pp. C/14–15.

[22] Nigel Harvey, "New Stability Emerges—But for How Long?" *Middle East Economic Digest* (London), Nov. 5, 1982, pp. 24, 27.

[23] Moscow TASS in English, Feb. 27, 1979, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–SOV*), Feb. 28, 1979, pp. F/3–4.

[24] See, for example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, Oct. 27, 1981, in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 27, 1981, pp. H/10–11; and Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, Oct. 27, 1981, in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 28, 1981, pp. H/2–4.

[25] *Keesing's*, March 1983, p. 32049.

[26] David B. Ottaway, "North Yemen's War: Sanaa Turns to Soviets for Military Aid," *The Washington Post*, Apr. 21, 1982.

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was admittedly only a part), Moscow appears to have backed Ali Nasir, who evidently opposed all-out PDRY support for NDF efforts to overthrow Salih in the North.

Sanaa said very little at all about any Soviet role in the NDF insurgency (or, for that matter, about the insurgency itself). YAR statements about both the USSR and the PDRY spoke mainly of friendly and cooperative relations. However, the shooting down of the YAR's Soviet-supplied Su–22's by Soviet-supplied SAM's did enrage Sanaa. In an interview with Eric Rouleau published in *Le Monde* on May 7, 1982, YAR Prime Minister al-Iryani charged that the "Yemen People's United Party" (YPUP—founded in February 1982, apparently as the political wing of the NDF) was "a 100 percent Marxist-Leninist party comparable to those that have taken up arms against the El Salvador Government"; that it had its headquarters in Aden; that three of its leaders were also "full members" of the Politburo of the PDRY's ruling Yemeni Socialist Party; that it received arms from South Yemen; and that it had guerrillas operating in the YAR. Sanaa also reportedly recalled its ambassador from Moscow in early May, according to some accounts as a protest against Soviet aid to the rebels.[27]

Yet the YAR was very cautious in its criticism. Its Moscow embassy immediately denied "deteriorating relations," and claimed the ambassador had returned home "on a working visit."[28] Al-Iryani's interview had avoided implicating the Soviets in the PDRY's extension of aid to the NDF:

They [the Soviets] assure us they have no contacts with the guerrillas, and we have no reason not to believe them.

He did add, however,

Moscow could probably advise it [the PDRY] not to equip the rebels on our territory, but I do not think it can give it orders to that effect.

Soon thereafter both al-Iryani and Salih denied any tension in Soviet-YAR relations.[29]

Despite Moscow's commitment to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and possible involvement in the NDF insurgency against North Yemen, the Soviet Union—as we have already seen—has had a long and continuing relationship with the YAR, one which it does not want to jeopardize. Let us look a bit more closely at the military, economic, and political dimensions of this relationship.

Soviet-YAR Military Relations

Soviet military aid to North Yemen actually began, as noted, even before it became the Yemen Arab Republic. From November 1956 to August 1957, the Soviets delivered eight shiploads of arms, including 50 anti-aircraft guns from Czechoslovakia, some 30 T–34 tanks, and various other weapons. Although these weapons were fairly old, Imam Ahmad hid key parts to many of them out of fear that the army might use the weapons against him. They were, however, the first relatively modern weapons introduced into the country,[30] and established an enduring pattern of North Yemeni reliance on Soviet weaponry. As of July 1983, the YAR's inventory of Soviet arms included 500 T–54/55 and 150 T–34 main battle tanks; 40 MiG–21, 10 MiG–17, and 15 Su–22 combat aircraft, and an unspecified number of SA–2 and SA–7 missiles. By contrast, the YAR possessed only 64 M–60 tanks and 10 F–5E fighters supplied by the US.[31]

Estimates of hardware delivered by the Soviets and their allies are similar, though they differ with regard to precise value. Stephen Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe value the transfers at less than US$30 million in 1955–60; more than US$30 million in 1961–64; less than US$20 million in 1965–69; negligible in 1970–74; and about US$420 million in 1975–80.[32] The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) gives somewhat higher figures: US$27 million in 1965–74 and US$625 million in 1976–80. ACDA values US arms transfers to the YAR in 1965–74 at US$1 million and in 1976–80 at US$170 million.[33]

Figures on the number of Soviet military advisers in North Yemen are also imprecise. However, there have been at least some advisers there ever since the

[27]Paris AFP in English, May 9, 1982, in *FBIS–MEA*, May 10, 1982, p. C/9; and *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), May 10, 1982, p. 1.

[28]Baghdad INA in Arabic, May 10, 1982, in *FBIS–MEA*, May 11, 1982, p. C/8.

[29]*Al-Watan* (Kuwait), May 25, 1982, pp. 11, 15, in *FBIS–MEA*, June 1, 1982, p. C/9; and *Ar-Ra'y al-'Amm* (Kuwait), June 7, 1982, pp. 19, 22, in *FBIS–MEA*, June 9, 1982, pp. C/8–10.

[30]Eric Macro, *Yemen and the Western World Since 1571*, New York, Praeger, 1968, pp. 117–18.

[31]*The Military Balance 1983–84*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983, pp. 64–65.

[32]Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts*, Lexington, MA, Lexington/D.C. Heath, 1983, pp. 17, 23, 32, 43, and 74. The authors gave no figure for 1975–80 per se; I derived the US$420 million sum for those years by subtracting the amount they gave for 1955–74 from their total of "more than US$500 million" for 1955–80.

[33]US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966–1975*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 78; and idem, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971–1980*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 119.

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

Forces of the Yemen Arab Republic photographed during the 1979 border war with South Yemen: at left, troops armed with Soviet-type Kalashnikov rifles; at right, Soviet T–34 tanks.

—Nik Wheeler/SYGMA.

mid-1950's, despite various ups and downs in bilateral relations. Some 35 Soviet instructors and about 50 technicians from the USSR and Eastern Europe accompanied the first shipments of arms in 1956–57.[34] During the Yemeni civil war, several hundred Soviet advisers helped both the Egyptian and YAR forces; the USSR reportedly even sent Soviet pilots to fly MiG's during the siege.[35] By 1975, the number of advisers had dropped from a high of some 500 to about 100. They stayed at that level through 1979, but their numbers rapidly rose to about 500 in 1981 where they still apparently remain.[36]

Nevertheless, the YAR experienced considerable difficulty in getting arms from either the East or the West in the period 1969–79. As noted above, Sanaa apparently could not even get the Soviets to deliver what they had previously agreed to supply. By the time of the 1972 border war, the government of North Yemen was openly critical of Soviet neglect,[37] and may have "leaked" rumors that it was considering expelling all Soviet advisers.[38]

Soviet-YAR relations reached their lowest point during the al-Hamdi era, primarily over the issue of arms. After being removed from the premiership in February 1975, Muhsin al-Ayni claimed al-Hamdi had postponed a pending visit of a Soviet military delegation to Sanaa, and that a new US/Saudi arms package had been substituted for Soviet weapons.[39] Lt. Col. al-Ghashmi (not yet in power) stated that the Soviets had not delivered any new weapons in a long time, that Soviet weapons in the YAR were old and deserving of a place "in the war museum," and that Soviet military experts would leave the YAR in September.[40] Al-Hamdi himself announced on August 3, 1975, that Soviet-YAR relations were "frozen" and that Sanaa had recently rejected a Soviet offer of MiG–21's; it was also reported in February 1976 that the YAR refused to accept a shipment of Soviet tanks and aircraft that had actually arrived in Hodeida.[41] And in June 1976, al-Ghashmi spoke of a suspension of Soviet-YAR military relations over Moscow's failure to deliver even spare parts for Soviet weapons in the YAR inventory; he also suggested the possibility of US arms supply.[42]

Yet, perhaps because of Sanaa's threats to turn to other suppliers, Soviet-YAR military relations began to improve in 1978–79 despite the chill in YAR-PDRY re-

[34]Stephen Page, *The USSR and Arabia: The Development of Soviet Policies and Attitudes Towards the Countries of the Arabian Peninsula 1955–1970*, London, Central Asian Research Centre, 1971, p. 37.

[35]See Bissell, loc. cit., p. 100.

[36]As with figures on arms transfers, different sources give different figures for the numbers of Soviet advisers in the YAR, but they do agree on the trends. See *The Military Balance 1973–74*, p. 7; *The Military Balance 1975–76*, p. 9; *The Military Balance 1981–82*, p. 14; *The Military Balance, 1982–83*, p. 17; *The Military Balance 1983–84*, p. 18; US Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA), *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977*, ER 78–10478U, November 1978, p. 3; CIA, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978*, ER 79–10412U, September 1979, p. 4; CIA, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954–79*, ER 80–10318U, October 1980, p. 15; US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981*, DOS Pub 9345, February 1983; and Bidwell, op. cit., pp. 286–87, 328.

[37]In October 1972, YAR Prime Minister Muhsin al-Ayni complained that no new Soviet equipment had reached North Yemen in three years. Bidwell, op. cit., pp. 239–40.

[38]See, e.g., Damascus MENA, Oct. 3, 1972, in *FBIS–MEA*, Oct. 3, 1972, p. B/3.

[39]See *As-Siyasah* (Kuwait), Feb. 13, 1975, in *FBIS–MEA*, Feb. 24, 1975, p. C/3. Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress also attacked the US/Saudi package in an Arabic language broadcast of Apr. 11, 1975, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Apr. 14, 1975, pp. F/2–3.

[40]*Akhbar al-Yawm* (Cairo), July 19, 1975, in *FBIS–MEA*, July 24, 1975, p. C/1.

[41]*Keesing's*, Apr. 16, 1976, p. 27682. This may have been a North Yemeni ploy to obtain better-quality materiel in larger quantities.

[42]Doha QNA in Arabic, June 16, 1976, in *FBIS–MEA*, June 17, 1976, p. C/2.

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lations. On the eve of the 1979 war, YAR Foreign Minister Abdallah al-Asnaj, even while complaining that his country "could not fight communism on its own," noted that North Yemen had not expelled its Soviet advisers and had no intention of doing so.[43] North Yemen's disillusionment over the subsequent short-lived US/Saudi arms arrangement apparently drove the YAR into a huge arms deal with the Soviet Union. Under this agreement, Moscow swiftly delivered 300 T–55 tanks, 40 MiG–21's, 20 Su–22's, and an unspecified number of FROG and SA–2 missiles in the period from November 1979 through February 1980.[44]

Nevertheless, the YAR continues its attempts to diversify its arms sources.[45] The greatest obstacle to direct US-YAR arms transfers appears to be the US requirement that Sanaa pay full price. The Saudi undertaking to pay for such shipments in 1979 removed this obstacle, but then Riyadh cut the arms flow. Although the Soviets, too, ask for payment, the terms are apparently more generous. Moreover, when Salih visited Moscow in October 1981, the Soviets, far from forcing the YAR to begin repaying its US$630 million arms debt, reportedly agreed to cancel US$265 million of that figure.[46]

Despite such Soviet largesse, the YAR apparently does not intend to allow military cooperation with the USSR to extend to the granting of military facilities for the Soviets or expansion of their military presence, as has occurred in the PDRY. For example, in May 1983, YAR Prime Minister al-Iryani said that although the 1964 USSR-YAR Treaty of Friendship would probably be renewed in 1984, it was "certain" that the parties would "not introduce any articles pertaining to security matters."[47]

For its part, Moscow has said little about its military aid to the YAR and virtually nothing about the numbers and types of arms provided or the numbers of Soviet military advisers there.[48] The Soviet Union was reticent even about its role at the time of the civil war in North Yemen, although it later frequently claimed credit for having saved the republic. To be sure, until 1979, Soviet military aid to North Yemen was not very extensive. The reason would appear to have been North Yemen's willingness to accept military assistance from almost anyone, but unwillingness to sacrifice any of its independence in return. The Soviet arms aid "bulge" in 1979 is probably best explained as a Soviet effort to prevent the YAR from relying solely on the US and Saudi Arabia and thereby becoming even less amenable to Soviet influence.

The Soviet-YAR military relationship is also conditioned by Soviet-PDRY military relations. South Yemen has a military establishment somewhat larger than the YAR's, although its population is less than one-third that of its neighbor. The equipment sent by the USSR to Aden is more modern, and there are 1,500 Soviet advisers as well as Cubans and East Germans in the South.[49] Since the threat that the YAR has faced in its last three armed conflicts has been either the PDRY itself or forces supported by it, Sanaa keeps a wary eye on the relative dimensions of the military support that Moscow gives to each of the two Yemens. There is, however, a limit to how much the Soviets will mili-

[43] Doha QNA in Arabic, Jan. 30, 1979, in *FBIS–MEA*, Jan. 30, 1979, p. C/5.

[44] *The Military Balance 1979–80*, p. 105. In addition, the YAR signed an agreement with Poland for 200 T–55 tanks.

[45] Salih reportedly sent a letter to US President Carter reiterating the YAR's anti-Communist posture and expressing a willingness to talk about US arms shipments to offset the Soviet shipments. See *Al-Hawadith* (London), Mar. 28, 1980, in *FBIS–MEA*, Apr. 3, 1980, p. C/6.

[46] *An-Nahar al-Arabi wa ad-Duwali* (Paris), Dec. 6–12, 1981, in *FBIS–MEA*, Dec. 15, 1981, p. C/6; and *Keesing's*, Mar. 12, 1982, p. 31379.

[47] *As-Siyasah*, May 17, 1983, in *FBIS–MEA*, May 20, 1983, p. C/6. On Nov. 12, 1983, al-Iryani was replaced as prime minister by Vice President Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani. See *FBIS–MEA*, Nov. 14, 1983, p. ii.

[48] The Soviets regularly refer in general terms to their military aid in annual greetings to the YAR's leaders on the September 26 anniversary of the revolution, as well as in joint communiqués and welcoming speeches when YAR officials visit Moscow. In 1981, Oleg Peresypkin, Soviet Ambassador to Sanaa, made the rare admission that there were Soviet advisers in the YAR "at the request of the Yemeni Government." See his interview with *As-Siyasah*, on Jan. 9, 1981, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Jan. 15, 1981, p. H/4.

[49] *The Military Balance 1983–84*, pp. 64–65.

Abd al-Fattah Ismail, leader of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and of its ruling Yemeni Socialist Party, is met at Moscow airport by Soviet President and party leader Leonid Brezhnev on October 24, 1979, just weeks before the Soviet Union initiated a large shipment of arms to the PDRY's rival, the Yemen Arab Republic.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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tarily assist North Yemen, since it not only refuses to become closely aligned with Moscow, but also is in conflict with Moscow's ally in Aden.

Soviet-YAR Economic Relations

Trends in Soviet economic assistance have been the inverse of those in Soviet military aid. The bulk of an estimated US$140 million in Soviet economic aid over the years 1954–81 was concentrated in the period 1954–75, and Moscow has been less generous since.[50] The most important Soviet aid projects were the construction of a port at Hodeida (completed in 1961), an airport near Sanaa (1963), a road from Hodeida to Taiz (1969), and a cement plant at Bajil (1973). In 1979, the USSR granted the YAR a loan of US$38 million to expand production capacity of the Bajil cement plant to 200,000 tons annually.[51] Other Soviet aid projects have included a hospital in Sanaa, several schools, various agricultural projects, a survey of water and other resources, and a fish cannery.

North Yemen has not always been very appreciative of Soviet assistance. In two September 1972 articles in Beirut's *An-Nahar,* North Yemeni officials were quoted as comparing Soviet aid unfavorably to Chinese aid. The Russians allegedly had up to that time never sent "any equipment, military or otherwise, that was not defective—either lacking some fundamental part necessary for operation, or lacking spare parts essential for consumer maintenance."[52]

One area in which Soviet assistance may have had a significant impact is in education. From the 1960's up to the present, there have been 400 to 800 non-military students from North Yemen studying each year in the USSR. The Soviets have also sent a number of economic aid technicians to the YAR over the years; in the mid-1960's there were over 600, but the figure had dwindled to an estimated 175 from the USSR and Eastern Europe together by 1981.[53]

Until the early 1970's, Soviet economic assistance accounted for a large share of the total foreign aid received by North Yemen; as late as 1972 Moscow could claim that its aid represented one-third of the total.[54] However, beginning with the Saudi-YAR rapprochement of 1970, Moscow—along with the US and China—soon found itself far outweighed in the aid game. By 1981, Riyadh was reportedly providing US$250 million a year in direct support to the YAR budget and a comparable sum each year for support of development projects and payments to various sheikhs, military officers, and other leaders.[55] Sanaa presumably would like to continue to receive these large sums from Riyadh, and this, plus the desire to remain independent, doubtless limits the degree to which North Yemen cooperates economically with the Soviet Union.

Soviet-YAR trade relations date back to 1928. Although the exchange has grown in recent years, it has never been very large and has not grown as fast as North Yemen's trade with the rest of the world. In 1980, Soviet-YAR trade turnover reached a record 48 million rubles (some US$60 million at the official exchange rate, a five-fold increase in five years), but total YAR imports for fiscal year 1980–81 from all sources came to US$2.1 billion.[56]

Political Relations

Moscow has sought good state-to-state relations with whoever happens to be governing in Sanaa, and has little loyalty to one-time "friends" who fall from power. Although the Soviet Union praised al-Badr as "a well-known Arab statesman" when he was Crown Prince and congratulated him on his succession as imam in 1962, the USSR was the first country to recognize the new republic one week later and was soon expostulating on the horrors of the imamate.[57] One could trace a sequence of such expedient shifts in Soviet attitudes toward as-Sallal, al-Iryani, al-Hamdi, and

[50] CIA, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954–79*, p. 20; and US Department of State, op. cit., p. 19.

[51] Manama Gulf News Agency, Apr. 20, 1978, in *FBIS–MEA*, Apr. 21, 1978, p. C/2.

[52] *An-Nahar*, Sept. 16 and 23, 1972, in Joint Publications Research Service, *Translations on the Near East* (Washington, DC), No. 847, JPRS 57393, Nov. 1, 1972 pp. 68–81.

[53] Page, op. cit., pp. 89, 110; CIA, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976*, ER 77–10296U, August 1977, pp. 9–10; CIA, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977*, pp. 9, 11; CIA, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978*, pp. 15, 18; CIA, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954–79*, pp. 21–22; and US Department of State, op. cit., pp. 21, 23.

[54] *Ath-Thawrah* (Sanaa), Apr. 24, 1972, in *FBIS–MEA*, May 2, 1972, pp. B/2–3.

[55] *Keesing's*, Mar. 6, 1981, p. 30743. For the period 1954–81, the US extended an estimated US$135 million, China some US$130 million, and East European countries some US$40 million in aid to the YAR. See the sources cited in fn. 52; and US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1982–83*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, December 1982, pp. 829, 832.

[56] Radio Moscow in Arabic, Mar. 22, 1981, in *FBIS–SOV*, Mar. 24, 1981, p. H/2; and "North Yemen: The Answer Lies in the Soil," *The Economist* (London), May 15, 1982, pp. 87–88.

For a detailed study of the YAR economy, see *Yemen Arab Republic: Development of a Traditional Economy*, Washington, DC. The World Bank, 1979; also Warren Richey, "North Yemen: Land of Donkeys and Camels Learns to Cope with Toyotas, Radios . . . and Canned Peas," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA) Jan. 14, 1983, pp. 12–13.

[57] Page, op. cit., pp. 33, 48, 65, 74, 76, 77.

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Ismail Ahmed Musa, left, a North Yemeni student, with his academic supervisors at the Azerbaydzhan Institute of Oil and Chemistry in Baku in May 1976.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

al-Ghashmi.[58] So far, Moscow has portrayed Salih in positive terms, but if he is ever overthrown, the Soviets can be expected to quickly embrace his successor.

This Soviet practice of staying on good terms with existing Sanaa governments suggests a dim assessment of prospects that the NDF or some other Marxist group might soon come to power. Indeed, although Moscow has spoken of "a whole spectrum of political forces" in the YAR,[59] it has been extremely reticent about the leftist opposition to the Sanaa government. As noted above, Soviet statements did little more than acknowledge the existence of the NDF. For example, when al-Hamdi was killed in October 1977, Soviet media cited NDF statements claiming that the Saudis had arranged the assassination.[60] However, the Soviets gave precious little publicity to the NDF's role in the 1979 war or to its subsequent insurgency against the YAR government. One rare Soviet article on the Front portrayed its members as supporters of the late al-Hamdi, totally ignoring the group's Marxist-Leninist aspect.[61] This Soviet silence is conspicuous in light of Moscow's more extensive coverage of other pro-Soviet liberation groups on the Arabian Peninsula—e.g., the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), the Bahrain National Liberation Front, and the Communist Party of Saudi Arabia. Except for the PFLO, the NDF has been the most active of the lot. Moscow obviously felt that good relations with Sanaa were more promising than open support for the insurgency.

At the same time, the Soviets would like to prevent a "reactionary" turn in YAR politics. Thus Moscow has repeatedly warned of the dangers of tribal influence in Sanaa. Tribal leaders are blamed for the 1972 war and accused of serving Saudi interests and blocking North-South unity. Even al-Hamdi—while seen as pro-Saudi—drew Soviet praise for "removing the ruling sheikhs."[62]

Aside from its quest for economic and military assistance from a wide variety of sources, North Yemen's principal foreign policy concerns center on its relations with its two immediate neighbors, South Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The YAR has also been concerned with a number of issues involving the Arab and Islamic worlds, but has seldom been a major actor in or had its security interests seriously affected by these issues. Events beyond the Middle East and the Horn of Africa have relatively little impact on North Yemen and engage little interest there. These priorities are reflected in the YAR's relations with the Soviet Union.

On the issue of Sanaa-Aden relations, Moscow has often called for peaceful resolution of differences and for Yemeni unification. But, although each clash between the two Yemens has concluded with renewed efforts directed toward "unity" (most recently seen in the August–September 1983 meetings of a Supreme Yemeni Council consisting of top government officials from both sides), as a practical matter, the Soviets would oppose unity if it meant that the PDRY would give up its Marxist-Leninist orientation. The YAR's insistence that a united Yemeni state be based on Islamic principles indicates that North Yemen would not be willing to adopt Marxism-Leninism as the price of unity. Indeed, actual prospects for unity appear fairly poor, not because outside forces oppose it—as both Yemens have claimed—but because neither government has been willing to surrender power to the other. The YAR government probably looks to unity talks as a means of broadening and strengthening the spectrum of elements in the PDRY supporting peace and good relations with the North, although this has not always been the result.

The YAR government has not criticized the Soviet-PDRY Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed on

[58] E.g., when al-Iryani was in power, Moscow evaluated positively his willingness to negotiate with the royalists to end the civil war, but subsequently it denounced the domination of the YAR by reactionary tribal elements during his rule. See Page, op. cit., p. 108; and Pyotr Perminov, "Problems and Policies," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 44, October 1981, pp. 24–25.

[59] V. Peresada, "Throwing Off the Burden of the Past," *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 26, 1981, p. 6.

[60] Radio Moscow in Arabic, Oct. 26, 1977, in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 27, 1977, p. F/2; and "Declaration of the National Front of North Yemen," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), Oct. 27, 1977, p. 3.

[61] "North Yemen," *New Times*, No. 2, January 1979, p. 7.

[62] A. Stepanov, "The Sana Assassination," ibid., No. 43, October 1977, pp. 14–15.

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

Soviet–North Yemeni relations over time: at top, YAR President Abdallah as-Sallal signs a bilateral treaty with Leonid Brezhnev, then Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in March 1964 in Moscow; center, Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, Chairman of the Republican Council of the YAR (second from the left) meets with Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Nikolay Podgornyy (in top hat) and deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers Dimitriy Polyanskiy (far left) Nikolay Tikhonov (far right) in Moscow in December 1971; at bottom, Brezhnev and YAR President Ali Abdallah Salih review an honor guard in Moscow during Salih's October 1981 visit.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

October 25, 1979, probably because of Sanaa's own treaty with Moscow. North Yemen has, however, been less reticent about the Trilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed by the PDRY, Ethiopia, and Libya on August 19, 1981, which it sees as paving the way for foreign intervention in the region.[63] Sanaa for its own reasons (i.e., military aid from Moscow) chooses to overlook the same implications in the case of the USSR-PDRY treaty.

With regard to Saudi Arabia, both the USSR and the PDRY have frequently warned the YAR of the danger of becoming too dependent on the Saudis, and Riyadh has in turn warned Sanaa of the dangers posed to the latter by both Aden and Moscow. The Saudis have also publicly stated their reservations about Yemeni unity and about the YAR's rapprochement with the USSR after the 1979 war. The Saudis fear that Yemeni unity might mean a Marxist government ruling both Yemens and posing a greater security threat than does South Yemen alone.[64] The YAR government, on the other hand, has resented Saudi attempts to influence its foreign and domestic policies. Yet, on the whole, both have worked to maintain good relations with each other. So long as the YAR receives such a large amount of *economic* assistance from Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Soviets are not likely to succeed in drawing the YAR away from its close relationship with Riyadh. However, so long as the YAR cannot obtain the level of *military* assistance it wants from Saudi Arabia and the West, Riyadh is unlikely to succeed in persuading Sanaa to end its military relationship with Moscow.

Like other Arab countries, North Yemen opposes Israel and supports the Palestinians and the Arab cause generally in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Most recently, the YAR became the home for a portion of the PLO fighters after their expulsion from Lebanon.[65] The YAR has criticized the US for supporting Israel, broken relations with Egypt for having signed a peace treaty with that country, and praised Soviet support for the Arabs. Joint communiqués issued after talks between Soviet and YAR officials express their similarity of views on the Arab-Israeli conflict.[66] However, even though North Yemen did participate in the Bab el-

[63] *Uman* (Muscat), Oct. 6, 1982, p. 3, in *FBIS–MEA*, Oct. 8, 1982, p. C/2. See also Kuwait KUNA in Arabic, Nov. 24, 1981, in *FBIS–MEA*, Nov. 24, 1981, p. C/1.

[64] Cairo DPA in Arabic, May 13, 1979, in *FBIS–MEA*, May 17, 1979, p. C/2; and *As-Siyasah*, Nov. 4, 1981, pp. 10–11, in *FBIS–MEA*, Nov. 5, 1981, p. C/7.

[65] See, e.g., Herbert H. Denton, "PLO Evacuees in North Yemen Miss Delights of City," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 10, 1984.

[66] See, for example, Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, Oct. 28, 1981, in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 29, 1981, p. H/11. This communiqué was issued after Salih's visit to Moscow in October 1981.

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Mandeb blockade against Israel during the October 1973 war, the YAR has not been deeply involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and has not allowed it to become an obstacle to relations with Washington. Indeed, the YAR was the first Arab state to reestablish relations with the US after the June 1967 war.[67]

Both Sanaa and Moscow have called for making the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean "zones of peace" in which the forces of non-regional powers would be severely restricted, if not banned entirely.[68] Yet, when al-Hamdi hosted a conference in Taiz in March 1977 attended by the presidents of South Yemen, Somalia, and the Sudan and devoted to transforming the Red Sea into such a zone of peace, the USSR and pro-Soviet Ethiopia objected, fearing that the nations involved would attempt to make the Red Sea an "Arab lake" and seek to exclude Ethiopia by supporting Muslim Eritrean separatists.[69] Indeed, like most other Arab states, the YAR has supported the demands of Muslim Eritreans for autonomy from Christian-dominated Ethiopia; in May 1977, the YAR allowed the Eritrean Liberation Front to open an office in Sanaa.[70] Although the Soviet Union itself had supported a Marxist Eritrean group before the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, Moscow has since switched its support to the new Marxist government in Addis Ababa.[71]

When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan at the end of December 1979, most of the Arab world condemned Moscow (South Yemen, however, defended the action). North Yemen remained quiet but did send a delegation to the Islamic Conference meeting called to discuss the invasion. When questioned by North Yemen's own government-supported newspaper *Ath-Thawra* as to why the YAR "did not have a clear stand" on this issue, President Salih responded that YAR participation in the Islamic gathering showed the country's position, but added that North Yemen would not be pushed to adopt the stands of others.[72] Events in Afghanistan clearly were not viewed as important enough for North Yemen to alter or break relations with Moscow, as Saudi Arabia urged it to do.[73]

Thus, although there are some aspects of Soviet foreign policy of which the YAR does not approve, Sanaa has not permitted them to become obstacles to its own relations with Moscow. A similar situation pertains in Sanaa-Washington relations. Sanaa is, however, extremely concerned about Soviet policy toward South Yemen, and could turn to the West—as it has done in the past—if Soviet-PDRY policies are seen as too threatening. Conversely, except in the case of its dealings with South Yemen and the NDF, Moscow has not seemed particularly concerned whether or not Sanaa approved of Soviet foreign policies.

Conclusions

Since the end of the Yemeni civil war, the primary threat to the YAR's security has been the PDRY, and this will likely continue to be the case in the future. In this context, it might appear short-sighted and self-destructive of North Yemen to rely heavily (if only for lack of US or Saudi responsiveness) on the USSR for military assistance—since Moscow gives more assistance to the South, with which it is closely allied politically, ideologically, and militarily. However, YAR leaders are convinced that building and maintaining friendly relations with the USSR is an important means of assuring North Yemen's survival.[74] Such relations, they feel, make it less likely that the Soviet Union would support Aden in a future conflict between the two Yemens. Instead, Sanaa hopes that the Soviets would be more likely to support a peaceful solution to any such conflict, as they eventually did in the 1972 and 1979 border wars. Although in both cases the USSR did take some actions helping the South, those actions were much more limited than they might have been. North Yemen's inability so far to obtain enough arms on acceptable terms from the West only compounds its caution about antagonizing the Soviet Union.

The YAR has certain obvious attractions for Soviet foreign policy. For the present, the Soviet presence in North Yemen serves to prevent Saudi and American influence from becoming predominant. YAR reliance on Soviet military aid also means that Sanaa is not likely to risk losing this assistance by attacking South Yemen. Indeed, part of the reason Moscow wants friendly ties with Sanaa is that these serve to protect Soviet interests in Aden. Over the longer term, establishment of a pro-Soviet government in Sanaa would put the USSR in a much better position to influence

[67] US-YAR relations were restored on July 2, 1972, in betwen periods of YAR-PDRY fighting that year. *Keesing's*, July 15–22, 1972, p. 25368.

[68] Both the USSR and the YAR called for a Red Sea "zone of peace" in their October 1981 joint communiqué referenced in fn. 66.

[69] V. Kudryavtsev, "Shadows over the Red Sea," *Izvestiya*, (Moscow), Apr. 16, 1977.

[70] Baghdad INA in Arabic, May 26, 1977, in *FBIS-MEA*, May 27, 1977, p. C/1.

[71] See, e.g., Paul B. Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May–June 1981, pp. 55–74.

[72] Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic, Feb. 13, 1980, in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 14, 1980, pp. C/8–10.

[73] London Reuters in English, Feb. 8, 1980, in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 11, 1980, p. C/4.

[74] During a visit to North Yemen in December 1982–January 1983, the author heard this view advanced by several Yemenis, including one high-level official at the YAR Foreign Ministry.

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Saudi policy and perhaps even promote revolution within Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. This need not take place through revolution in the North: if the North and South ever do unite—either peacefully or by force—the better-organized party and government apparatus of the PDRY might be better able to spread its influence to the more populous but politically fractured North, rather than the other way around.

Nevertheless, there are also significant obstacles to the achievement of Soviet goals in North Yemen. While the PDRY government is better organized, South Yemen is too weak by itself to impose unity on the North, and if outside forces were brought in to help the South, North Yemen would turn to Saudi Arabia and the US for military support—and might be more successful in obtaining it this time. If, on the other hand, the Yemens unite peacefully, there is no guarantee that the fractiousness of the North would not spread to the South. Even if a pro-Soviet government did come to power in Sanaa, the central government there might not control all of North Yemen. The northern tribes would fight hard to prevent such a government from extending its authority over them and, indeed, would seek to overthrow it. The Soviet Union is not likely to want another anti-Soviet insurgency—like those in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Afghanistan—that could not be easily defeated.[75]

On balance, Moscow and Sanaa each has stronger reasons for keeping their bilateral relations friendly than for allowing them to deteriorate. The Soviets also have an interest in restraining those elements in Aden advocating direct PDRY support for the overthrow of the Sanaa government, since this could provoke large-scale US and Saudi assistance to the YAR.

This commonality of interests might break down should the NDF revive or another Marxist opposition group gain strength. There is, in fact, a good possibility of revived domestic opposition to the Salih regime. Col. Salih is not popular, and his support is based only on the army; all political parties are illegal. Many of the internal conditions that generated the NDF insur-

[75]During a visit to the Institute for the USA and Canada in Moscow in early January 1984, the author was told by one Soviet scholar that the strength of tribal forces in North Yemen was similar to that encountered in Afghanistan.

Traditional tribal warriors in the north of the Yemen Arab Republic.

—Rosy Rouleau/SYGMA.

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gency have not disappeared—Shafi'i dissidence, lack of economic development, and dislike of Salih within rival army factions and other groups.[76] Should a better-organized Marxist insurgency erupt, the YAR government might no longer be able to count on its friendship with Moscow to defend it or to prevent Aden from supporting the opposition. In this sense, the YAR's strategy of relying on Soviet friendship may prove to be a weak one in the long run.

With regard to how the Soviet-YAR relationship fits into the broader scheme of Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World, North Yemen can be regarded as a qualified success. The USSR has traditionally pursued two often contradictory policies toward Third World countries: promotion of revolution, and establishment of good relations with existing governments even when they are conservative. Soviet foreign policy is obviously most successful when socialist revolution occurs in a country and that country remains a close ally of the USSR, as is the case in South Yemen. It is least successful when it is able neither to promote revolution nor to establish good relations with the existing government, as has been the Soviet experience with Saudi Arabia and all the other monarchies on the Peninsula except Kuwait, with which the USSR has friendly government-to-government relations. In North Yemen, the USSR has had success with both policies: Moscow enjoyed good relations with the imamic government, then successfully aided the republican (non-Communist) revolution, and later improved its ties with the existing government in 1979 after almost a decade of cool relations. Although the NDF insurgency failed, Moscow did succeed in retaining and improving its ties with Sanaa even when the fighting was at its height. If North Yemen's experience represented the beginning of a trend for the USSR to improve its relations with Third World governments even when they are fighting left-wing insurgents, then Soviet foreign policy would have grown extremely capable indeed. It is difficult to imagine, however, that many other Third World governments in this situation would choose to improve their ties with Moscow as did the YAR.

Part of the reason that North Yemen has turned to Moscow, of course, is that it has been unable to obtain what it wants in terms of military assistance from the US. It should be clear from the foregoing that North Yemen wants to obtain as much economic and military assistance as possible from all sources. Where the US has not been too willing to supply arms recently, the USSR has. And although Washington could be expected to react strongly (as it did in 1979) if the YAR government were seriously threatened, the USSR, by continuing to provide military assistance, ensures that the US will not supplant Soviet influence in this strategic country. At the same time, the USSR is in a position to aid a Marxist insurgency there via South Yemen should one ever occur again.

Yet there are limits to Soviet influence in the YAR, as in other Third World countries—ironically due in part to Soviet success elsewhere. Because the USSR has such close ties with South Yemen and because the two Yemens have often been at odds, North Yemen is wary of Moscow. Had South Yemen become independent under a pro-Western government, the USSR might conceivably have been more successful in acquiring influence in a North Yemen with two pro-Western neighbors. The Soviet Union has, in fact, frequently been unsuccessful in Third World countries due to its close relations with such countries' opponents. Combined with North Yemen's fierce desire for independence from foreign influence, the USSR's increasingly strong politico-military alliance with South Yemen has frustrated and will continue to frustrate Soviet attempts to gain further influence in the YAR.

[76] Many Yemenis (including YAR officials)—both in Sanaa and in Washington—have expressed this fear to the author.

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Moscow's Double-Track Policy

Ideology and Politics in Latin American–USSR Relations

by Augusto Varas

To say that Latin America has never been in the forefront of Soviet policy concerns is merely to state the obvious. What is perhaps not so obvious, however, is the way in which Moscow's approaches to the region have been integrated with other, much broader trends in Soviet policy, both foreign and domestic. The recent flurry of Western interest in Soviet policy toward Central America and the Caribbean may have distracted attention from a long-term Soviet relationship with the larger countries further south.[1] Indeed, since the early 1920's, major ideological, economic, and political shifts inside the USSR have often been reflected in changing policies toward South American governments and communist parties alike. And major shifts in global strategy also had direct effects on Soviet policy in the region.

By the same token, from a Latin American perspective, changing considerations of both foreign and domestic policy have altered the receptivity of local governments to various Soviet overtures. The issue of relations with the Soviet Union has been an important one for most of these countries, given their unique relationship with the United States and the subversive character of Soviet policy toward the regional order until 1935. Nevertheless, over the past two decades, one of the most striking features of the foreign policy of most South American regimes—regardless of ideology—has been their enduring interest in regularizing their diplomatic and economic ties with Moscow.

USSR in South American Perspective

To some extent, this trend can be viewed as simply a particular case of the global fragmentation or "multipolarization" of power. As part of this general process, South American governments have welcomed a greater variety of foreign contacts, ideologies, and even weapons. By itself, however, the evolution of a more multipolar international system cannot explain the emergence of a broadly diversified Soviet presence in the region by the end of the last decade. Another important element accounting for that presence—as we shall see later—was the package of tangible benefits that South American countries could derive from economic exchange with the USSR. But even more fundamental is the *political* role that Moscow has historically played in the foreign relations of the region.

More specifically, the early relations of Argentina or Uruguay (like those of Mexico to the north) with the USSR served as counterpoints to the difficult relations between those countries and the United States. Mexico had long had many conflicts with Washington; Argentina and Uruguay were influenced both by external pressures from England and, especially in more recent times, by the dominant economic presence of the United States. Similarly, the current relations with Moscow of Brazil, Peru, and Colombia indicate their common interest in asserting a more independent posture on the international scene.

[1]Although this article includes analysis of Soviet policy toward Latin America as a whole, the focus will be on USSR relations with South America—excluding discussion in depth of current Central American and Caribbean issues. For a recent study of the latter, see Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America*, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983.

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In fact, the primary political role of the Soviet Union in the foreign policies of many South American countries lies precisely in serving as a means of asserting relative independence from Washington. The fragmentation of international power that accelerated in the 1970's offered South American countries the chance to establish links expressing this multipolar reality, while making it more difficult for anyone to reverse the new situation. In this context, the Soviet Union plays a double role, as both a probe of Washington's tolerance and an "escape valve." As a result the USSR has acquired greater political weight than any other extrahemispheric power.

In addition, relations with the Soviet Union have had an important *internal* political component in South American societies. To the extent that social mobilization has had anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist connotations, the external counterpart became (at least for a while) the development of ties with the socialist states, especially the USSR. Hence, a relationship with the Soviet Union often represented not just a demonstration of independence vis-à-vis the United States, but also an outcome of the widening of domestic political consensus. All this was reflected in the diversification and formal upgrading of economic or diplomatic links between the USSR and various Latin American countries: Brazil (in 1959); Chile (1964); Ecuador (1967); Peru (1969); and Venezuela, Bolivia, and Costa Rica (1970).

In sum, for local reasons of both foreign and domestic policy, the USSR has been able to establish a more salient presence in South America. While that presence has been conditioned by US-Soviet rivalry and by the special US hemispheric role, it also depends on specific Soviet policies toward the countries of the region. For this reason, it is necessary to analyze more closely the internal and external factors on the *Soviet* side that account for the changing policies to which those countries have responded.

Early Soviet–South American Ties

Ever since the October Revolution, the policy of the Soviet Union toward all of Latin America has been conducted through two distinct channels: interstate relations and links between the Soviet Communist party and the Communist parties of the region.

Until the First Latin American Communist Congress (Buenos Aires, June 1929), Soviet–Latin American relations were confined to a Soviet effort at incorporating the Latin American Left into the Communist International (Comintern).[2] Latin America was still seen as an

Chairman of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces of Peru, Lieutenant General of the Air Force Eduardo Montero Rojas, center left, with Soviet Defense Minister Andrey A. Grechko, center right, during a December 1972 meeting in Moscow.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

area under the unchallengeable influence of the United States, and as a group of countries that had to pass from agrarian to capitalist forms of organization before moving toward a socialist revolution. The small size of the working class in these countries militated against a process led by the proletariat. The Mexican Revolution of 1910–17, agrarian and peasant in nature, only tended to strengthen this judgment.

A more active phase was inaugurated by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928. Responsibility for coordinating the activities of the existing Communist parties of the region, and for promoting new ones established at the Fourth Congress of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1922, was institutionalized in 1929 when the South American Secretariat of the Comintern was created. The task of the Secretariat was to implement a Bolshevik strategy toward the region that aimed at the formation of committees of peasants, soldiers, and workers and the expropriation of private capital.

This Soviet policy coexisted with weak interstate relations, and its essentially subversive orientation actually discouraged their expansion. For example, only the Soviet trade offices in Montevideo and Buenos Aires represented the USSR on the entire South American mainland. At the party level, too, even prominent leftist Latin American politicians, such as Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre of Peru's American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) party, ceased maintaining relations with the Comintern—for similar

[2]See Stephen Clissold, *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918–1968: A Documentary Survey*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970.

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reasons of concern about Communist subversion. In the late 1920's and early 1930's, leftist political failure in Colombia, Soviet difficulties with Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua, an abortive Socialist Republic in Chile, and the repression of revolutionary forces in El Salvador were all additional factors that, at the the Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1935), convinced that body of the isolation of the Communist parties in the area and of the impossibility of carrying out existing revolutionary policy there.[3]

The new Popular Front strategy of the mid-1930's, by contrast, removed Communist parties around the world from their isolation, relating them to other political forces, and moderated their tactics, directing them into institutional channels. This change in Moscow's policy, motivated primarily by the Nazi danger, was designed to avoid an armed intervention against the Soviet state. Later, in a similar step taken in the midst of World War II, Stalin dissolved the Comintern in order to facilitate negotiations with Roosevelt and Churchill.

In addition to this overriding strategic factor, there were ideological shifts that supported the new line. Lenin, from the beginning of the October Revolution until his death in 1924, had inclined toward the line that revolutionary socialism could not succeed completely in just one country, maintaining that there was a need to promote revolution throughout the globe. From this emerged the initiative to create revolutionary Communist parties in Latin America. After Lenin's death, however, Stalin reformulated this thesis, affirming that socialism could indeed be developed in only one country, the USSR. This line was strengthened after the defeat of Leon Trotsky at the Comintern's Sixth Congress.[4] For a few years, the thesis of "socialism in one country" coexisted with a contradictory Comintern policy of developing proletarian revolutions in Latin America. By 1935, however, the latter policy finally gave way to the notion that relations between the Soviet Union and Latin America had to be coherent and symmetrical, that is, that relations between the Comintern and the Communist parties of the Western hemisphere had to harmonized with the foreign policy of the Soviet state.

In South America, the policy of Popular Fronts allowed a significant diversification of the diplomatic relations of the USSR: Colombia (in 1935); Uruguay (1944); Chile (1944); Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela (1945); and Argentina (1946). But postwar East-West tensions, their crystallization in the cold war, and South American alignment in the perimeter of military and political defense of the hemisphere through the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (popularly known as the Rio Treaty) inevitably altered Moscow's political and diplomatic links with most governments in the region. For the external relations of South American states have traditionally been conditioned by the foreign policy of the United States. Particularly in view of the close economic links among the nations of the hemisphere, any change in the international environment of South America was perceived as having serious consequences for Washington; for this reason, hemispheric defense had already been defined as a question of the highest priority at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in 1936. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the postwar situation of international conflict, Washington put pressure on South American governments to produce a common front against potential aggressors. The resulting deterioration in Soviet state-to-state relations with South America—diplomatic ties with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela were all broken in the late 1940's or early 1950's—coincided with the illegalization of almost all Communist parties on the continent.

Despite this situation, the policy of the communist parties in South America did not change substantially.[5] The Popular Front strategy was carried over in the policy of Democratic Governments of National Liberation, in which all "anti-imperialist and anti-latifundist" forces were to be included. This formulation was based on the thesis that the principal obstacles to Latin American liberation lay in the domination of latifundist forces and of North American capital, both of which allegedly restricted national development. The cold war thus had an internal political correlation, in that the USSR opposed to the US position in Latin America local political forces that tried to insert themselves into a global national liberation front. Communist tactics had to fit the nature of that broad alliance, excluding the use of armed force and fortifying, wherever possible, the parliamentary and electoral positions of the local Communist parties instead.

National Liberation policy was thus designed to bring about a coincidence of Soviet ideological and diplomatic objectives, matching the internal purposes of Third World Communist parties with the interna-

[3]See the Communist International, "Struggle of the Communist Parties of South and Caribbean America," May 1935, quoted in Luis E. Aguilar, *Marxism in Latin America*, New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.

[4]A broad analysis of the policy of the Comintern can be found in Fernando Claudin, *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform*, London, Penguin Books, 1975.

[5]The theoretical and political foundations of this phase are discussed in Lilly Marcou, Ed., *La Kominform* (The Cominform), Madrid, Vallalar, 1978.

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tional interests of the USSR. The policy reached maximum expression during the latter half of Nikita Khrushchev's leadership (1958–64), though it had been initiated even before the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956). In practice, however, tensions between the USSR and the United States during the Khrushchev era impeded both the creation of broad internal political alliances sponsored by the various Latin American Communist parties and the diversification of the Soviet state presence in the hemisphere.

Post-Khrushchev Ties

After Khrushchev, there was a shift in Moscow's policy toward Latin America, preceded—as were previous such shifts—by a complex series of changes in broader Soviet policy, both domestic and foreign. The change from Khrushchev to the team of Aleksey Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev (as prime minister and party secretary general, respectively) in 1964 was the product of a number of national and international tensions that had accumulated and that the deposed leader had been unable to resolve. One of the precipitating elements was the dissident position adopted by the Romanian Communist Party in April 1964, which culminated in a string of tense confrontations within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The Soviet-Romanian dispute on economic relations revived within the Central Committee of the CPSU memories of the problems with Yugoslavia during the Stalin era, in a context aggravated by the de facto rupture with the People's Republic of China—all of which threatened to disintegrate the system of relations within the socialist bloc.

Another factor of importance was the Soviet domestic economic crisis. This was manifest, as Soviet experts themselves conceded, in a weak rate of growth due to difficulties in administration and planning, neglect of economic accountability, and incomplete utilization of material and moral incentives.[6] As a result, the regional planning system was modified, centralizing it at the national level. Further proposals were that the operation of more than 400 industrial enterprises be liberalized, leaving decisions to be guided by market indicators; and that material incentives be incorporated into production, eliminating subsidies for failing enterprises.[7] These measures were later supplemented with the introduction of the five-day work week. With these changes in the operation of the Soviet economy it was expected that the meager economic achievements of the Khrushchev era would be surpassed.

A shift in the Soviet Union's foreign policy toward détente with the United States was also necessary, to the extent that it permitted the freeing of resources to overcome the economic crisis. For this reason, the first public budget presented by Brezhnev and Kosygin in 1965 reduced the funds allocated to defense, emphasizing "peaceful coexistence" as one of the "permanent" features of Soviet policy.[8] The 23rd Congress of the CPSU (1966) concluded that the USSR

is a firm supporter of the maintenance of normal and peaceful relations with capitalist countries, of the solution of controversies between the states through negotiation and not war.... These relations, besides being peaceful, include wider mutually advantageous links in the fields of the economy, science, and culture.[9]

In this vein, by the end of the 1960's, Soviet policy was moving toward agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons, toward accords on détente between East and West, and toward opening the Soviet economy to technology and to capital and consumer goods from advanced market economies. "The contest between socialism and capitalism," as Brezhnev later put it, "should be decided not on the field of battle ... but in the spheres of peaceful work."[10] This ideological and practical shift was facilitated by the progressive isolation of the Chinese Communist Party. Political defeats in Africa and Indonesia, along with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution launched in 1966, turned the Chinese inward and away from the major issues of international affairs.

Détente had its counterpart in relations between the USSR and South America—demonstrating that those relations are dependent not only upon the internal political/economic developments in the USSR, but also upon Soviet global policy with regard to the United States.[11] The new Soviet policy facilitated the

[6]See L. Brezhnev, "Por senda de la construcción del socialismo," Informe al XXIII Congreso del PCUS ("On the Path of Building Socialism," Report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU), March 29, 1966, Santiago, Imprenta Horizonte, n.d., p. 58.

[7]See Ye. G. Liberman, "The Role of Profits in the Industrial Incentive System of the USSR," *International Labour Review* (Geneva), January 1968.

[8]Brezhnev, loc. cit. See also World Marxist Review Latin America Commission, "International Seminar: Latin American experience and lessons of revolutionary struggle," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), May 1974, esp. p. 103.

[9]Brezhnev, loc. cit., p. 44.

[10]Idem, "The October Revolution and Human Progress," *International Affairs* (Moscow), December 1977.

[11]In this respect, see Gregory J. Oswald and Anthony S. Strover, Eds., *The Soviet Union and Latin America*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1970; Bruce D. Jackson, *Castro,* *fn. 11 continued on p. 39)*

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reestablishment of diplomatic relations with most Latin American countries and the beginning of a new phase in commercial ties with the region. Back in the early 1960's, only Cuba had attracted a great deal of Soviet attention. To be sure, a Latin America Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR had been founded in 1961; but it was not until 1969 that the USSR began to publish (in Russian and Spanish) the journal *Latinskaya Amerika*, in which the relevant analysis was generalized to the whole continent.[12]

In its relations with Latin American Communist parties, the CPSU consistently maintained a policy symmetric with an orientation toward "peaceful coexistence" or détente. Thus, the policy of incorporating Latin American (and other Third World) Communist parties into wide political and social national fronts was reasserted. The 23rd Congress of the CPSU pointed in this direction when it indicated that

the success of the struggle for social progress and national independence is greater to the extent that there is cohesion among all the patriotic, progressive, and democratic forces of liberated countries.... We are committed to ... developing multidimensional collaboration with the countries that have captured their national independence and to helping them in the growth of their economies, in the preparation of national cadres and in their struggle against neo-colonialism.[13]

This policy of wide political fronts, though attempting to integrate diverse social strata, did not preclude opposition to "anti-national" policies. Thus, Brezhnev later stated that

the antagonism has sharpened between imperialism, which intensifies social oppression and negates democracy, and the popular masses, who fight for their vital interests and aspire to freedom and democracy. In this struggle there take part, increasingly, together with the working class, the broad masses of peasants, intellectuals, employees, students, and the middle strata of the urban population.... Presently the conditions are emerging to unite all democratic currents in a political alliance capable of firmly limiting the role of monopolies in the economy of countries.[14]

The policy of fronts was approved by the last Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in 1969.[15] It was reinforced by the electoral victory of the Popular Unity Coalition under socialist leader Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile in 1970—an event that the CPSU publicly and emphatically welcomed in its 24th Congress the following year.[16]

In general, Moscow's foreign policy accommodated the needs of Soviet economic development in establishing interstate diplomatic and trade relations with market economy nations—and, at the same time, opened up the possibility of unifying internal opposition forces in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World. In practice, however, this policy has faced serious challenges in Latin America almost since its inception.

Challenges and Responses

In the first place, Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 revealed the limits that Soviet leaders were inclined to impose on any movement toward economic and political liberalization. To the extent that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had tried to widen the "political space" for the resolution of the principal problems faced by socialism in that country, and that Alexander Dubček's plan implied the decentralization of planning and economic management,[17] the CPSU saw a further threat to the unity of an already divided Communist bloc—and, even more important, a fundamental challenge to the political and economic parameters of the five-year plan advanced at the 23rd CPSU Congress of 1966. But Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was able only to delay a crisis that later erupted in Poland, and this at a considerable political price.

the Kremlin, and Communism in Latin America, Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969; Herbert Goldhamer, *The Foreign Powers in Latin America*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1972; Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Soviet Economic Relations with Developing Nations," in Roger E. Kanet, Ed., *The Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974; idem, "The USSR, the Third World and the Global Economy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August, 1979, pp. 17–33. See also Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, New York, NY, 1981; and Roger E. Kanet, "The Soviet Union as a Global Power," in Kanet, Ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980's*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1982.

[12] See Blasier, "The Soviet Latin Americanists," *Latin American Research Review* (Chapel Hill, NC), No. 1, 1981, pp. 107–23; Jerry F. Hough, "The Evolving Soviet Debate on Latin America," *ibid.*, pp. 124–43; and Boris M. Merin, "The Present Stage of Soviet Latin American Studies" (in Spanish), ibid., No. 2, 1977.

[13] Brezhnev, "Por senda de la construcción del socialismo," p. 36.

[14] Idem, "Speech at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties," Moscow, June 7, 1969; text in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), July 2, 1969, pp. 3–17 (translation slightly altered).

[15] See the "Basic Document Adopted by the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties," Moscow, June 17, 1969, trans. in ibid., Aug. 6, 1969, pp. 14–24, 30.

[16] See 24th Congress of the CPSU, "Informe del Comite Central" (Report of the Central Committee), Santiago, Imprenta Horizonte, 1971, p. 39.

[17] See Alexander Dubček, *La via checoslovaca al socialismo* (The Czechlovak Path to Socialism), Barcelona, Ediciones Ariel, 1968.

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In South America, such Soviet reactions adversely affected relations both with Communist parties and with other socialist forces, by giving rise to splits—as in the case of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) of Venezuela. This group, which split off from the local pro-Moscow Communist Party in 1971, had by the end of the decade emerged as the country's leading leftist party, under a Eurocommunist banner.

Second, compounding Moscow's "Czech problem" in South America, relations between the CPSU and the Cuban Communist party deteriorated. To the degree that Cuban policy implied support for guerrilla forces that had organized in several South American countries, relations between the United States and the USSR faced the same kind of dangers that Khrushchev had not been able to prevent in 1962. Tensions increased when the Tri-Continental Conference held at Havana in January 1966, only three months before the 23rd Congress of the CPSU defined its détente policy, explicitly declared its support for revolutionary movements in Latin America. This latter policy, reiterated at a conference of the Cuban-sponsored Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS) in 1967, placed Soviet foreign policy in a difficult position, since support for Cuba and its Latin American initiatives was increasingly contradictory to détente with the United States. As Moscow's new foreign policy orientation was a necessary complement to its effort to overcome domestic economic problems, the Soviets were reluctant to jeopardize détente with this kind of contradiction.

Faced with this situation, the USSR reacted severely—suspending deliveries of oil to Cuba in January of 1968. Even though this did not prevent Fidel Castro from criticizing the decision taken against Czechoslovakia, the measure carried a clear message to all Latin American Communist parties—including the Cuban one—that détente should be translated in the domestic sphere into a non-guerrilla option emphasizing a broadly based union of leftist forces.[18]

In this context, for example, one can understand Soviet willingness to back the new revolutionary government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1968 in Peru. A strategy of guerrilla warfare appeared discredited by the unexpectedly progressive orientation of the Peruvian armed forces. To be sure, Soviet economic assistance to Peru remained insignificant; and the main weapons transfers occurred only in October 1973. Nevertheless, Moscow gave the military regime in Lima its full political support.

This conduct of foreign policy helps explain the durability and steady expansion of Soviet diplomatic and economic relations with South America, beginning in the late 1960's and continuing throughout the following decade.[19] Based on a policy of détente with the First World and of support for "broad progressive fronts" in the Third World, the USSR formulated, in practice, a state-to-state model of relations with the countries of the region. Nevertheless, two more recent situations have challenged this relatively stable system of bilateral Soviet relations with Latin America and of muted US-Soviet competition in the hemisphere: the US-Cuban confrontation on African and Central American issues, and the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile.

With regard to the first source of US-Soviet tension, it must be noted that Cuban commitments to African governments are nothing new. A Cuban presence in Africa was evident as early as 1961, when Havana had military missions in Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Congo, and Zaire, as well as some military personnel in Algeria.[20] In the 1970's, moreover, Cuban support for the socialist-oriented forces in Angola and Ethiopia arguably did not initiate the internationalization of conflict in those countries; rather, Havana's military expeditions were in part a reaction to the intervention of the United States, Zaire, and South Africa in Angola, and of Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in Ethiopia.[21] Moreover, Soviet support for the Angolan-Cuban military forces in 1978 appears to have been a response to a fait accompli, rather than a result of joint Soviet-Cuban advance planning.

Thus, even though Cuban-Soviet cooperation in Africa increased in the 1970's, this does not mean that Cuba was acting as a "proxy" of the Soviet Union in African politics.[22] More generally, policy convergence between Moscow and Havana cannot automatically be viewed as a Soviet move in which the Cubans are simply blackmailed by Soviet economic assistance; indeed, in this writer's judgment, Soviet-Cuban relations are much more complex than this simplistic approach would suggest.[23] Particularly within Latin

[18]The Chilean CP, for example, derided Cuban statements as "expressed in revolutionary phraseology, in conciliation with anti-Communist leftist factions, in irresponsible exhortations to engage in armed struggle, in a tendency to restrict arbitrarily the space for alliances of the proletariat." Luís Corvalán, "Report to the 14th Congress of the Communist Party," quoted in *Camino de Victoria* (The Way to Victory), Santiago, n.p., 1971, p. 301.

[19]An analysis of Soviet influence in the area is in W. Raymond Duncan, "Soviet Power in Latin America: Success or Failure?" in Robert H. Donaldson, Ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

[20]*Defense Monitor* (Washington, DC), January 1980, pp. 22-23.

[21]Interamerican Policy Group, "The United States and the Caribbean: Policy Alternatives for the 1980's," Mimeographed paper, Washington, DC, June 1980.

[22]On the autonomy of the Cuban role in Africa, see Merrit Robbins, "The Soviet-Cuban Relationship," in Kanet, op. cit., pp. 158–60.

[23]See, e.g., Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, "Cuban Cooperation with the USSR and the CMEA Countries," *America Latina* (Moscow), January 1983.

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Fidel Castro addresses the First Tri-Continental Conference on January 15, 1966, in Havana.

—Eastfoto.

America itself, Cuban participation in regional politics must be seen as responding to Havana's own commitments in the area.

Nevertheless, from the US point of view, Cuban actions in Africa and Latin America were widely defined as examples of "Soviet aggression." The Soviet Union reacted accordingly, increasing its support to Cuba and to other Latin American governments whose policies manifested a degree of independence from Washington. Stepped-up Soviet support to Cuba in the 1980's, in this author's view, reflects nothing but the need to protect the island against military invasion[24]—a possibility that was suggested recently in Grenada.

The military coup against Allende's constitutional regime in Chile in 1973 presented Moscow with a somewhat different problem. The USSR, as noted, had insisted on the relevance of a "Brezhnev approach" to the region—going so far as to suspend petroleum shipments to Cuba, and pointing instead to the Velasco government in Peru as the acceptable limit of the use of armed force in building socialism. The peaceful transition to socialism in Chile drew Moscow's interest in that it seemed to be realizing the preferred Soviet model: construction of the prerequisites of socialism; unity of the principal parties of the Left; broad social and class fronts; structural reforms leading to a heavily state-managed economy; and conversion of the army to support of the new government.[25] Allende's election proved that it was possible for socialists to accede constitutionally to government, initially vindicating Brezhnev's Latin American policy. Notwithstanding the sparse economic support it provided to Allende,[26] the USSR saw in this process a

[24]On increased Soviet moral and material support for Cuba in the early 1980's, see Morris Rothenberg, "Latin America in Soviet Eyes," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1983, esp. pp. 3–6.

[25]See Roundtable, "Soviet Historiography of the Chilean Revolution," *America Latina*, No. 7, 1980; Sergo Mikoyan, "Chile: Some Lessons," ibid., No. 2, 1974; idem, "The Particularities of the Nicaraguan Revolution," ibid., No. 3, 1980.

[26]See Leon Goure and Morris Rothenberg, "Latin America," in Kurt London, Ed., *The Soviet Union in World Politics*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980. See also Evgueni Kossarev, "Economic Relations between the Countries of Latin American and the Member Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA); and Romuald G. Tomberg, "Economic Relations between the Soviet Union and the Countries of Latin America" (both in Spanish). These were papers for Consejo Económico para America Latina (CEPAL), *Relaciones económicas entre los países de America Latina y los países miembros del Consejo de Asistencia Mutua Económica* (Economic Relations Between the Countries of Latin America and the Member Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), Santiago, CEPAL/UNCTAD PNUD, November 1979, E/CEPAL/Proj. 4.

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model that the Third World could follow without risking a military confrontation with the United States. Thus, the Chilean case seemed to show that, even in an area so sensitive for US interests, the USSR could gain regional positions befitting both its revolutionary expectations and its limited capacity for providing financial or other economic assistance—and all without adverse effects on Moscow's relations with Washington.

Viewed in this light, US complicity in the overthrow of Allende's government raised alarms about the Soviet position in all Latin American countries, and more generally about a newly anti-Soviet US international posture.[27] The severity of this challenge helps explain the interruption of Soviet diplomatic and commercial relations with Chile immediately after the 1973 military coup—a clear departure from normal Soviet policy toward the region, as the next section will show.

[27]See Mikoyan, "Chile: Some Lessons," loc. cit.

[28]Wayne S. Smith, "Soviet Policy and Ideological Formulations for Latin America," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Winter 1972; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in the 1970's," ibid., Spring 1971.

[29]Cited in Valkenier, "The USSR, the Third World and the Global Economy," p. 33. A similar analysis is in Robert S. Jaster, "Foreign Aid and Economic Development: The Shifting Soviet View," *International Affairs* (London), July 1961.

Economic Relations

Apart from the special cases of Cuba and Chile, the state-to-state orientation of Soviet–Latin American ties has given Moscow's economic policy in the region a pragmatic character.[28] The policy starts from the premise that

the Socialist part of the world, with its development and perspective on international relations, provides a good example of the best way to resolve the big issues that humanity faces. But, it cannot, of course, resolve the problems of all of humanity. For this it is necessary to count on the conscious efforts of each country and an extensive and constructive cooperation among all countries and people.[29]

Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens addresses a Soviet-Chilean friendship meeting at a Moscow machine-tool factory in December 1972; at right, workers and employees of the factory beneath a banner extending "heartfelt greetings" to Allende.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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In other words, the USSR is not prepared to bankroll needy Third World countries. Instead, Soviet policy emphasizes economic exchange and cooperation on the assumption that, within the state-to-state political framework described above, alternative markets will tend to favor more independent policies on the part of the developing states.[30] In addition, in the Soviet view, economic cooperation oriented toward support of social infrastructure and state industries "is, in essence, the economic basis of the revolutionary-democratic policy."[31] In sum, the "Brezhnev model" for economic relations with Latin America implied: the lowest possible unilateral financial cost to Moscow; reciprocity on commercial matters; and economic cooperation in areas reserved for the state, stimulating a type of development that, in the event that national-popular or socialist forces came to power, could be directed toward forms of economic organization similar to those of the USSR.

This model permitted higher levels of cooperation with governments that, while not socialist, could accept Soviet technical assistance and commercial offers—as the Peruvian case showed. It also explains, for example, how Soviet-Bolivian economic relations could survive so many changes of government and policy reversals in La Paz. At the same time, Soviet policy quietly challenged the perceived thrust of American activities in the region: neo-conservative economics and free trade coupled with a rightist ideological/political bias. Within this overall framework, trade between the USSR and Latin American countries (excluding Cuba) grew substantially over the last decade.[32]

The most important feature of this exchange has been a persistent tilt in the balance of trade in favor of Latin America. This pattern may explain why the first extraordinary meeting of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) integrating all countries of the region in January 1976 "considered the possibility of increasing Latin American exports to CMEA countries, of establishing cooperation in industrial development, and of realizing various economic projects in Latin America."[33]



Soviet electrical engineer Aleksey Kurasov instructs Chilean mechanics in the use of a Soviet-built spot welder at a modern plant for producing prefabricated housing elements, built in Quilpue with Soviet assistance.

—Eastfoto.

The USSR imports raw materials, particularly agricultural goods and ferrous materials. According to one Soviet source,

> *different commodities of Latin American origin have a very important place in Soviet imports. In 1979, Ecuador was the leading exporter of bananas to the USSR; Argentina was in second place (after Australia) in wool exports; Brazil was the second leading exporter of cacao (after Ghana); and Costa Rica was in third place (after India and Angola) in coffee exports.*[34]

The most significant sources of Soviet imports are Argentina, which provides cereals, wool, and meat; Brazil, which exports soya, corn, rice, coffee, cacao, and cooking oil; Peru, which sells cotton, coffee, sugar, non-ferrous metals, fishmeal, and wool; and finally, in recent years, Bolivia, which exports tin. Of the US$2.3 billion in goods exported by Latin America (excluding

[30]For some Soviet views of the characteristics of this model of relations, see Lev Klochkovski, "Economic Strategy of the US Monopolies in the Latin American Region," *America Latina*, No. 5, 1980; Svetlana Kosobchuk, "Private Foreign Capital in the Credit Markets," ibid., No. 4, 1980; Alexandr Sizonenko, "USSR—Latin American Countries: Results and Perspectives on Interstate Relations," ibid., No. 1-2, 1981; Nicolai Zinoviev,"Dynamics of Economic Relations," ibid., No. 5, 1983; and A. Voronov, "Decisive Factors on Peace and Progress," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 11, 1975. The economic role of the Soviet Union in Third World countries is also reflected in the results of bilateral treaties; on this point, see Zafar Iman, "Soviet Treaties with Third World Countries," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1983, esp. p. 69.

[31]Brezhnev, "Por senda de la construcción del socialismo," p. 38. See also Diana Kitaigorodskaya, "Ecuador: Petroleum and National Independence," *America Latina*, No. 1, 1977; Vladimir Davydov, "New Possibilities for the Second Liberation," ibid., No. 1, 1978.

[32]See Tomberg, loc. cit., and *Latin America Weekly Report* (London), "Food Producers Hang on Soviet Market," February 8, 1980, p. 8.

[33]Sizonenko, loc. cit., p. 19.

[34]Ibid., pp. 12–13.

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Cuba) to the USSR in 1982, Argentina accounted for 67.8 percent; Brazil, 22.2 percent; Uruguay, 3.4 percent; Ecuador, 1.9 percent; and Peru, 0.4 percent.[35]

As for Soviet exports, Argentina receives machinery and transportation and pumping equipment, nonferrous metals, and chemical products. Bolivia imports machinery and equipment, automobiles, fuel, and pumping and transportation systems. Brazil purchases oil, flour, mineral fertilizers, chemical products, watches, and cameras. Peru buys airplanes, tractors, electric buses, and machinery for oil exploration.[36]

Although the volume of commerce between these trading partners cannot compete in importance with that between South American countries and the United States, the trade of several South American countries with the USSR has in some years reached the proportions of their trade with other major industrial countries. Thus trade with the USSR equaled that with Japan for Argentina in 1978; for Ecuador in 1975 and 1976; for Guyana in 1971, 1973 and 1975; and for Uruguay during the entire decade of the 1970's.[37] Nonofficial sources indicate that in the last years of that decade Bolivia, too, became an important commercial partner of the USSR.[38] The importance of this exchange can be appreciated if one calculates exports to the USSR as a percentage of total exports. Thus, for Argentina, trade with the USSR represented 9.7 percent of total exports in 1975; 6.8 percent in 1978; and fully 33.7 percent in 1981, in the wake of the US grain embargo imposed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For Brazil, exports to the USSR accounted for only 4.0 percent in 1982; but this percentage is expected to rise again in view of that country's dire need for foreign markets. In 1976, Uruguay sold the USSR only 1.1 percent of its total exports, but this figure increased to 7.7 percent in 1982; for Peru, in 1980, 0.3 percent of total exports went to the Soviet Union, and in 1982, 8.4 percent.[39]

Along with the exchange of merchandise, the USSR favors technical cooperation accords to support the building of infrastructure in South American countries. In line with this policy, Moscow renders technical assistance and scientific cooperation to large projects such as the hydroelectric energy projects of Rio Parana Medio, Salto Grande, Costanera, Bahia Blanca and Yacireta in Argentina; the hydroelectric plants of Sobradinho and Itaipu in Brazil; and the hydroelectric projects Urra I and II in Colombia, in which the USSR is installing the main equipment. The Soviets have also provided support for the Los Olmos hydroelectric complex and for the Paita fishing complex in Peru.[40]

All these activities tend to support the role of the state in the economy and to provide stable markets for South American products. This latter aspect has special relevance in view of the continuing strong fluctuations in the world prices of raw materials—a common problem in the foreign commerce of South American countries, and one that tends to impede the stable growth of their economies.[41] The USSR, by contrast, offers long-term commercial agreements at stable prices, which may help protect South American economies from the irregular prices of the world market and play some part in resolving the staggering debt and other problems derived from the overall foreign trade deficits of these countries.

Soviet policy on technical assistance to the region follows a similar logic. The emphasis on public investments tends to stimulate and support in Third World countries development strategies different from those drawn from laissez faire theories and "privatization of social capital" approaches. Most recently, however, the Soviet Union has also undertaken a few joint venture initiatives with the South American private sector, such as the recently created Consorcio Soviético-Brasileiro designed to work on hydroelectric projects through subcontracts in Peru.[42]

So long as the USSR has emphasized a state-to-state approach to the countries of South America, the frequent ideological and political changes there have only rarely altered established economic relations. This has allowed the Soviets to preserve commercial ties even in periods of political tension, and to expand those ties in more favorable circumstances without having to start the whole process all over again.

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[35] *Latin America Weekly Report,* loc. cit.; and International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics: Yearbook 1983,* Washington, DC, 1983. (These sources do not include figures for Bolivia.)

[36] Tomberg, loc. cit.

[37] Ibid.

[38] *Latin America Weekly Report,* loc. cit.

[39] See *Relaciones económicas entre America Latina y los palses miembros del Consejo de Asistencia Mutua Económica (CAME). Informe de la Secretaria de CEPAL* (Economic Relations between Latin America and the Member Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [CMEA]. Report of the Secretariat of CEPAL), E/CEPAL/G.1104, Santiago, May 29, 1980. The 1981 figures for Argentina are from Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Economía, *Información Económica de Argentina* (Buenos Aires), January–April, 1982.

[40] See Gerard Fichet, "Three Decades of Relations between Latin America and the Soviet Union," *Comercio Exterior* (Mexico City), February 1981.

[41] Jerry Behrman, "The Export of Non-Fuel Raw Materials," *Revista de la CEPAL* (Santiago), No. 10, 1980; and Barend A. de Vries, "Exports on the New International Scene: The Case of Latin America," ibid., No. 3, 1977.

[42] See Augusto Varas, "The Soviet Union in the Foreign Policy of Latin America: The Cases of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru" (in Spanish), Paper presented at the Seminar on Latin American Foreign Relations, Institute of Latin American Studies, Chapel Hill, NC, and Institute of International Studies, University of Chile, Sept. 20–23, 1982, p. 30.

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V. K. Berezin, center, head of a group of Soviet technical specialists, seen with Brazilian engineers in 1980 at the Sobradinho hydroelectric power station being constructed on the San Francisco River with Soviet assistance.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

In some cases, moreover, political-military ties with the USSR have developed out of prior commercial links. In the case of Peru, for example, the value of Soviet arms transferred over the decade 1968-77 actually exceeded the comparable figure for Cuba[43]; commercial and economic cooperation agreements with Lima had paved the way for this development of relations on the political and military plane. More recently, in Brazil, building upon the strong Soviet commercial presence, high-level Soviet functionaries have initiated an exchange with the government in Brasilia on international political themes, such as the Palestine issue and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Similarly, in Argentina, Moscow has committed five tons of heavy water to support the local nuclear program, and some interest has arisen in Buenos Aires in purchasing weapons from the USSR—especially after such weapons were put to practical use in the Peruvian-Ecuadoran border clash of 1981, and even more so after Argentina's own costly Malvinas war against Britain in 1982.

Yet, in the Argentine case at least, the Soviet Union has not aggressively pursued what appeared to be a promising opening for enhancing its influence in South America at Washington's expense. The Soviets did not exercise their veto on behalf of Argentina in the UN Security Council deliberations on the Malvinas crisis. No Soviet weaons have yet been sold to Argentina, despite a high-level exchange of military delegations that dates back to 1978–79.[44] Instead, Moscow appears to be more interested in the quiet but steady expansion of normal diplomatic, cultural, and economic ties—as evidenced by continuing grain purchases from Buenos Aires, even after the signing of a new, long-term grain agreement with the United States. Indeed, the Argentine case typifies a generally cautious Soviet approach to South America in recent years. This caution, like everything else about Moscow's policy toward the continent all along, can only be understood within the broadest context of Soviet domestic and foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis the United States.

[43]See US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968–1977*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979.

[44]*Testimonio Latinoamericano* (Barcelona), No. 11, 1981.

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Soviet Policy in the 1980's

If Moscow has been cautious in responding even to seeming opportunities in Latin America, it is because that region is not a political or strategic priority for Soviet policymakers, who have been preoccupied and constrained throughout the past decade by other, more pressing problems at home and abroad. In particular, the opening of relations between the United States and China in 1971 marked the beginning of a process in which the latter reentered the international political arena, expanding its diplomatic and commercial ties. This effort has been furthered by recent internal changes in Beijing and by the beginning of US support for China's military modernization. The reduction in Chinese isolation has posed grave problems for Soviet foreign policy, since Beijing could now criticize Moscow's "hegemonism," and perhaps also press territorial claims in border areas, with greater force. One might even say that recent Chinese foreign policy, guided as it is by anti-Sovietism, has revived fears of encirclement in the USSR.

Such fears may help account, at least in part, for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And it was within this same global context of high political sensitivity that the domestic crisis in Poland erupted, with its perceived threat to the leading role of the Soviet Union in the system of relations among socialist states. But the international conduct of the USSR, instead of helping it to avoid isolation, has actually only compounded the problem—by alienating an important part of the European Communist parties and of socialist parties in other regions. To this set of challenges may be added the obstacles to new arms control agreements with the United States, one of the fundamental elements of Soviet détente policy.

Internally, given the lack of flexibility characteristic of the Soviet political system, such challenges tend to be defined as crisis situations. Moreover, to the extent that politics and policymaking in the USSR transcend formal institutions and procedures, an accumulation of such "crises" could conceivably pose a long-term threat to the existing leadership structure. To make matters even worse, all these Soviet foreign policy problems come at a time of sharpening domestic economic troubles, notwithstanding a brief upturn in 1983 and important new economic reforms. A succession of bad harvests highlighted the chronic structural problems of Soviet agriculture, which have not been resolved despite a series of personnel changes at the highest governmental level. Declining growth of oil production coupled with a decline in industrial productivity further restricts the supply of consumer goods. As for the new economic reforms, it is too early to suppose that they can promote sustained economic improvement.[45]



Grain destined for the Soviet Union is loaded at Buenos Aires in June 1982.

—Criton/SYGMA.

For all these reasons, Soviet policy options in South America are limited to a fairly narrow margin for maneuver. Economic stringency precludes large-scale assistance even to potentially friendly movements or regimes. On the strategic level, détente with the United States and priorities and commitments elsewhere preclude any Soviet military threat from this area.[46] On a political level, to be sure, Moscow has increased its denunciations of US policies in the hemisphere—mirroring Washington's inclination to blame all the region's troubles on Soviet agitation. Nevertheless, the Soviets have continued to offer political and diplomatic support for attempts at peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, including the Contadora initiative on Central America and the UN Security Council resolution on the Malvinas war.

[45]See *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 25, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Nov. 4, 1983, p. T/1.

[46]For a recent analysis of Soviet military interests in Latin America, see Blasier, op. cit., esp. pp. 139–41.

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Still, within the rather restrictive parameters outlined above, Soviet policy in South America must be accounted a success. For reasons both economic and political, local governments have become more favorably disposed toward expanded state-to-state relations with the USSR—while remaining mindful both of their own and of hemispheric security concerns. Conversely, as this historical survey has shown, ideological, political, and economic factors have long encouraged Moscow to cultivate contacts on the continent.

Such contacts have proved useful for both sides. They have been aided by the Soviet emphasis on correct official relations and advice to local Communist parties to pursue a pluralistic struggle for power in alliance with other leftist and centrist groups. Yet internal and external issues have also continually constrained Soviet relations with Latin America. Moscow's policy there is therefore probably doomed to remain essentially reactive, dependent above all on the hemispheric policies pursued by the United States.

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Notes & Views

Inflation Soviet Style

by Fyodor I. Kushnirsky

MUCH OF WESTERN analytical interest in the role of inflation in the Soviet economy derives from "mirroring"—a feeling that "what is important to us should also be important to them" and "the way things work here must be the way they work there." This, as I shall argue, is not necessarily the case.

To be sure, inflation is a crucial issue in studying real growth in any economy, and it is unquestionably present—if less visible or less well defined—in the Soviet Union. The forces causing inflation in the USSR differ from those at work in free-market economies. The distributional character of the Soviet economic system does not leave room for the standard quantity-theory explanation of price-level movements. Moreover, the dual nature of national wealth—with producer goods belonging to the public sector and only consumer goods being available to individuals—results in a different character of inflationary processes in each sector.

Study of these differences is complicated by Soviet attitudes regarding price movements in the two sectors and the desirability of publishing information on them. The level of consumer prices is a political issue, and since Soviet officials claim there is no inflation in their economy, they do not publish data that might indicate its existence.[1] When it comes to movements of prices of nonconsumer goods, official information tends to be more reliable, for there is no political sensitivity (the government having no preferences among the producers purchasing such goods).

Attention to pricing in the nonconsumer sector is aimed at two somewhat contradictory objectives—to reduce the costs of inputs to enterprise purchasers (and ultimately the state budget, which reimburses them) and to encourage producers to manufacture technologically improved products. Consequently, Soviet officials paid little heed to the *level* of nonconsumer prices in the 1960's and 1970's, attention going instead to the *justification*, according to diverse criteria, of the prices set. The base-year and current-year weighted price indices for nonconsumer goods computed in the course of planning were generally subordinated to the latter purpose and thus were often puzzling to Western analysts.

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[1]According to modern Communist thought, inflation is a political category that characterizes the general crisis of capitalism and therefore does not apply to the Soviet economy, which has overcome the anarchy of capitalist production. Here is a typical assertion: "Workers in capitalist states are attracted by many features of life under socialism such as the *lack of crises and inflation*, full employment, confidence in the future, growing social justice. . . . " I. Dudinskiy, "The Economic Laws of the World System of Socialism," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 9, 1976.

Information on retail prices published by the Soviets illustrates the idea of noninflationary growth. For example, the official index of retail prices for clothing *declined* in the period 1970–80 by 1 percent (*Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 godu* [The USSR National Economy in 1980—hereafter, *Narkhoz 1980*], Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, p. 439), while with the passage of time, Soviet consumers actually had to pay more for suits and dresses. This statistical anomaly is possible due to the techniques employed in the computation of Soviet retail prices, in particular those relating to special procedures for dealing with newly introduced products.

Another example: when I was participating in planning calculations, the aggregate index of the cost of living was set, *by normative considerations*, to equal 99 percent of the base-year level, i.e., its actual values were never computed.

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Beyond these differences in approach is a more fundamental issue: the Soviet economic system itself and the ways that it lowers resistance to or even encourages inflation.

RISES IN CONSUMER prices obviously affect individual purchasing power. Yet, there are reasons why, despite some concern with the short-term movement of prices, the Soviet consumer may be less concerned than his Western counterpart about the future value of his current wealth. The majority of Soviet consumers are poor by Western standards, but the problem of job security is not as acute for the Soviet laborer and housing is virtually free for those lucky enough to be settled by the municipal or enterprise authorities. Although Soviet citizens must by and large pay high black-market rates for effective medication, surgery, and other professional services, the availability of free medicine, even of poor quality, is for them a positive factor. On balance, real values are less attainable and, at the same time, less critical as a future cushion for the Soviet consumer than for his Western counterpart. Thus, saving is more a matter of deferring consumption than of storing value.

In the face of perpetual shortages, the critical issue for the Soviet consumer is to obtain the product, not how high the price may be. Prices of luxuries are raised periodically. In 1973, there were price rises for canned fish, caviar, furs, silver, and vodka; in 1977, for books, carpets, custom tailoring, cut glass, silk, and fares for air, ship and rail travel; in 1978, for automotive spare parts, gasoline, gold, platinum, coffee, confectionery, vodka, and wines; in 1981, for carpets, china, furniture, furs, gasoline, gold, silver, jewelry, leather apparel, tobacco products, champagne, vodka, and wines; and there are recent indications of price increases for several hundreds of goods in 1983.[2] Such increases have the paradoxical consequence of pushing demand higher—a result not in accordance with the demand-supply model.[3]

Official explanations justify these increases as contributing to social equality—making the rich pay more for luxuries while the prices of necessities remain constant, benefiting those with low income. People with less money tend to welcome this justification, oblivious to the fact that the result is really to increase prices for rich and poor alike. Those in a position to "open their purses"—operators of private food markets, speculators in commodities in short supply, or persons offering semilegal private services—actually pass on their increased costs to *all* consumers. Anyone who calls a plumber to fix a faucet, who buys tangerines for his or her children in a private market, or who buys a book on the black market is affected.

Moreover, constancy of prices for necessities is illusory. Prices for garments, footwear, or home appliances can be raised through the introduction of new products. Price increases on new automobile models far outstrip qualitative changes in the product. The reality of cost increases in the automotive sector is also attested to by the above-mentioned increases in prices for automotive spare parts.

Even for foods, the claimed stability of prices is only nominal. This is particularly important since, according to official Soviet figures (which may be understated), the Soviet family spends almost half its disposable income on food.[4] Since direct price rises in this sector are politically undesirable, authorities exploit several other options in dealing with rising costs: (1) payment of production subsidies; (2) discontinuance of food products whose ingredients become too costly and for which there are no cheap substitutes; and (3) reduction of costs by lowering the quality of products. At present, only meat—among the most important foodstuffs—enjoys production subsidies. Option 2 has been frequently chosen, with a variety of meat, dairy, confectionery, and other products simply disappearing from the shelves in food stores. However, option 3 is perhaps the most important, even if it is largely overlooked in the Western economic literature.

Decisions to lower the impact of increased costs at the expense of food quality are usually made at the national or union-republic levels by the relevant ministries and are mandatory for all producers.[5] For exam-

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 27, 1974; *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Jan. 5, 1977, Mar. 1, 1978, and Sept. 15, 1981; and *The Washington Post*, Feb. 8, 1983. Price increases for these goods and reductions for those not in demand have always been presented by the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) as improvements.

[3] The expectation of future prices, not their actual level, is important for jewelry, furs, furniture, books, etc., serving as the store of value for Soviet consumers. The greater the gap between demand and supply, the more likely is the upward movement of the good's price in the future. Therefore, if a good is chosen for a price increase, the consumer gets a signal that its value is growing.

[4] According to *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 383, a family of an urban employee and of a collective farmer spent in 1970–80 on average 34 and 38 percent of family income respectively on food. Since these income figures include public consumption, they probably overstate disposable family incomes by 15 to 20 percent. Correcting for these proportions we arrive at expenditures of 43 percent of family budgets on food. Even this result probably understates the actual proportion, since from my experience, Soviet statistics on family budgets are unreliable: the target is to reduce as much as possible the proportion of expenditures shown as going to food and to overstate expenditures on durables and services.

[5] Here I exclude criminal activities for personal gain, although one should not underestimate their magnitude. What I have in mind is official steps to replace costly ingredients by cheaper ones. Thus, in the 1970's I read in Gosplan several memorandums and decrees calling for the increase of meat and dairy production by using artificial additions—in particular, protein—and by processing ingredients formerly wasted.

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ple, the meat industry has attained almost complete utilization of the carcasses of animals used for high-quality products. In the 1970's the amount of starch and water used in meat products increased dramatically—the proportion of boiled sausage in total output of meat products has grown while that of ham, boiled pork, and smoked sausage has decreased.[6] Reducing costs for dairy products is even simpler. It is chiefly by pouring water into milk that the Soviet economy could have doubled milk production between 1965 and 1980, as it claims.[7] While Soviet citizens were not treated to information on such alterations, they could detect changes in the color of milk, butter, cheese, and cream from a yellow tint to white or light blue. Similarly, wheat bread acquired a yellow hue as corn meal was added. Chocolate products changed from brown to a light brown or grey with increased additions of soy beans. Such very real consequences of inflation are not reflected in base-year or current-year weighted price indices.

I would emphasize that party and planning authorities play a conscious part in this deception. Doubtless they wish to improve living standards—in order to revive a declining birthrate, to increase worker productivity, and to ensure political stability. At the same time, the authorities must continue to fuel a huge, ineffective economic machine and sustain ever-increasing military expenditures. To do this they must relieve the population of huge accumulated sums for which inadequate supplies of consumer goods are produced. To sustain the illusion of at least moderate prosperity, it is tempting to hide negative developments that might contribute to public anger. The resultant cosmetic manipulation of statistics on the cost of living and the level of retail prices makes the relevant official data practically worthless.

FOR NONCONSUMER goods, pricing is a different matter. Before the 1960's, prices here were ostensibly set at a level sufficient to cover individual costs plus an almost invisible profit of 3 to 5 percent. Although there were few if any provisions to use prices to stimulate one or another sort of managerial behavior, there was room for increase in output prices through the pass-through of rapidly growing individual costs.

The 1967 price reform brought two changes. First, the prices for almost all material inputs—rolled metals, electric power, coal, natural gas, oil, building materials, and lumber—were increased. Second, price policies took on a new task—to equilibrate divergent industrial profitability levels. For example, whenever the profitability of the machine-building and metalworking (MBMW) sector was considered too high, its prices were reduced (mostly in branches that were not material-intensive).[8]

At the same time, prices of material inputs continued to rise after the 1967 reform. By the close of the Eighth Five-Year Plan period (1966–70), prices of some inputs had been shifted several times; for example, costs of chemical fibers had increased 33 percent, and those of raw cotton were up 54 percent.[9] During the Ninth Five-Year Plan period (1971–75) wholesale prices of coke, coking coal, and iron ore rose. As a result, new prices were introduced for rolled metal and iron pipes from 1976. In the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976–80) there were recurrent increases in prices of iron ore, nonferrous metals, coking coal, oil products, synthetic resins, organic chemicals, reinforced concrete, and fuels. Gasoline prices were doubled in 1978 and again in 1981.[10]

The 11th Five-Year Plan (1981–85) brought a new price reform comparable in scale to that of 1967. New prices were introduced in most industries as of January 1982. As before, there was a major price increase for raw materials, fuels, and energy. The price for natural gas was increased by 45 percent; coal, 42 percent; timber, 40 percent; ferrous metals, 20 percent; and nonferrous metals, 14 percent. Prices of electric and thermal power also jumped.[11] In the case of coal, the increase was still insufficient to render the coal industry profitable; it was decided to continue subsidizing this industry rather than raise coal prices even more (which would have had a ripple effect on prices in the innumerable coal-consuming industries).[12]

A second feature of the 1982 price reforms was an

[6]Among different meat products, sausage is an important item in the Soviet diet. Unfortunately, the Soviets do not publish detailed statistics on the consumption of meat products that could illustrate the trends in production. My judgment that the proportion of boiled sausage began to grow markedly at the expense of ham and smoked sausage in the second half of the 1970's is from personal observations.

[7]According to *Narkhoz 1980*, in the period 1965–80 the food industry increased the production of milk by 116 percent, of cheese by 119 percent, and of butter by 28 percent (p. 192)—this in a period when agricultural delivery of milk grew by only about 25 percent (p. 247). The production of milk was doubled by lowering its fat content; all milk but skim milk disappeared in many regions during the 1970's.

[8]On average, prices in the MBMW sector were reduced 20 percent in 1967 and by another 13 percent in 1973. See A. N. Yezhov, *Ekonomicheskiy mekhanizm planovogo upravleniya tsenami pri sotsializme* (The Economic Mechanism of Planned Price Control Under Socialism), Mowcow, Vysshaya shkola, 1981.

[9]F. A. Dronov, Ed., *Tsena i effektivnost' proizvodstva* (Prices and Efficiency of Production), Minsk, Nauka i tekhnika, 1979.

[10]Yezhov, op. cit.; and *Izvestiya*, Jan. 5, 1977.

[11]A. Komin, "Efficiency and Price Formation," *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 11, 1981.

[12]Komin, loc. cit.

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"ordering of prices" in the MBMW sector. This means that, on average, MBMW prices were not reduced. Prices were raised in metal-consuming industries such as those manufacturing heavy machinery, machine tools, energy and power machinery, motor vehicles, and hoist and transport equipment, reflecting the increased cost of metals.[13] However, prices were slashed in the instrument-making, electronic, and radio industries.[14] This reflected a number of considerations. The latter industries are less material-intensive. Moreover, changes of product mix in them are more frequent than in the heavy branches of the MBMW sector, affording greater opportunity to counterbalance cost increases by charging higher prices for new products (more on this below). Finally, since detailed planning of output in physical terms is almost impossible in such industries, the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) sets plan targets for them in value terms, which invites creeping price growth.

The 1982 reform was the first since 1949 to allow widespread growth of prices for whole branches of MBMW production. (Previous price increases were generally restricted to specific types of machines and equipment.) Yet the prices of essential inputs had continued inexorably upward. This growth of costs could be fully compensated in the case of newly introduced products, but how did enterprises cope with growing costs in the case of existing products? The answer to this question is very important for our understanding of inflation in the Soviet economy.

For one thing, prices of newly-introduced goods are based on estimated costs in the second or third year of production, and remain unchanged even when, as frequently happens, there are subsequent declines in production costs. Then, too, as a result of the planning game, enterprises tend to conceal certain production reserves (as protection against supply disruptions and excessively demanding production goals).

Typically, in many industries there exists a mix of products with sharply varying rates of profitability, lucrative new products offsetting unprofitable product lines to achieve an overall modest average level of profitability. The logic of the situation generates an upward pressure on average prices. As input costs increase (as a result of price revisions or the introduction of more expensive new inputs), firms tend to discontinue or decrease production of inexpensive products with a relatively low rate of profitability. Such inflation—through alterations of product mix—in times of "constant permanent prices" usually escapes both base-year and current-year weighted price indices.

PRICING OF NEW PRODUCTS is of exceptional importance in Soviet inflationary processes. It is widely accepted that the pricing of new products brings about alterations in an otherwise more or less constant price structure. This does not mean, however, that prices rise only at the will or discretion of enterprise managers. The numerous stories of fraud published by the Soviet press are doubtless factual, but they oversimplify the problem—whether intentionally or unintentionally. True—as economists in both East and West often assert—a variety of groups in the Soviet Union, from enterprises on up, are interested in price increases. However, pricing practices, like all other fields of economic activity, are subject to strict regulation.

One objective of such regulation is to devise prices that will stimulate technological change. Planning authorities believe that: (1) pricing policies should not be too restrictive when it comes to the introduction of new, higher-quality products; and (2) there must be special sources of bonuses for those who introduce new products or improve product quality. Indeed, a manager will perhaps choose to introduce a new product with relatively lower profitability if it is in a category where a higher share of profits flows into the bonus fund.

Targets for improving the quality of products are included in all Soviet annual and five-year plans. Each year, enterprises must submit proposals for qualitative changes in manufactured products. Those approved become an integral part of the national economic plan. In this context, products have been certified into three quality categories—high, first-class, and second-class—through special instructions released by the State Committee on Standards. The higher the product's quality, the higher the prices and bonuses allowed. But within any quality category a variety of prices can be assigned to a product, depending on estimates of costs of serial production as well as calculations of the product's projected efficiency (productivity, capacity, etc., in the case of a machine). If given a high-quality designation, the product can be priced with a special markup through the technique of "temporary prices."

Methodological problems and lack of reliable information about temporary wholesale prices create serious difficulties for those studying Soviet pricing poli-

[13]The MBMW sector consumes one-third of the rolled metal and two-thirds of castings and forgings in the USSR. N. Ryzhkov, "The Quality of Machines and Material Inputs," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 9, 1981; A. Tselikov et al., "Conserving Metals in Machine-building," ibid., No. 1, 1981.

[14]Komin, loc, cit.; also N. Glushkov, "The New Wholesale Prices of 1982," *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 18, 1982.

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cies. Western analysts take note of these prices, but lack the information to analyze them; Soviet studies tend to deal only with permanent wholesale prices since, for planning purposes, the trends there are the most important. Yet to ignore temporary prices may yield biased results.

Regulation of temporary prices has undergone numerous changes since they were introduced after a 1955 revision of wholesale prices. Relatively high temporary prices were seen as a way of offsetting for managers the risks and expenses involved in mastering the manufacture of new products. The terms of temporary pricing were subsequently revised several times with the goal of preventing enterprises from expanding both profits and bonus funds at "undesirable" rates.[15]

To a Western reader, this serious discussion of attempts to invent prices, say, three to five years in advance may seem a sort of madness. But this is a reality of Soviet economic life. To be sure, stability of prices is important to the Soviets for some of the same reasons as it is for any other economy. And stability need not necessarily mean inflexibility. However, there are at least two aspects of the Soviet economy that impose severe inflexibility on pricing, resulting in intermittent sharp official adjustments in wholesale prices.

First, there really do not exist in the Soviet economy the mechanisms that could provide flexible prices, i.e., that would delegate pricing decisions to the producer. On the one hand, enterprises, having no economic responsibility for the resources that they expend, will not discount prices voluntarily, and on the other hand, the consumer cannot influence the level of prices at all. Therefore, the planners are probably correct in their belief that permanent administrative supervision and control—however inefficient—are the only remedy. Without such control the situation would be worse.

Second, prices play a vital role in planning. All indicators evaluating economic performance need to be estimated in the prices of the national economic plan, and this assumes rigidity of prices during a given plan period. If these indicators moved in unpredictable directions, planning itself would become meaningless. Even the proposal to enact a general revision and updating of prices on the eve of a given planning period really does nothing to enhance price flexibility as long as the intent is to keep the new prices constant throughout the period in question.[16]

THE READER might conclude at this point that the overall system of management conspires to obstruct rational pricing in the Soviet economy. But the terms "rational" and "irrational" are not so well defined in the Soviet case, where planners' decisions must compensate for the lack of market forces and economic responsibility.

For all the alterations in pricing mentioned above, the cost-plus-profit principle remains untouched. But what costs? Individual costs? Average costs for technologically similar products? Average costs for a region? Average costs for an industry? Marx's "social cost" is only an abstraction. Diverse Soviet economists have suggested numerous procedures for averaging individual costs, but failed to approach prices that could be viewed as socially desirable. Indeed, such castles are built on sand—for even individual costs are unreliable. Enterprises do not operate at minimum cost (e.g., they conceal reserves).

To think of this phenomenon only in terms of misstatements and fraud would be an oversimplification. Soviet planners try to set tough targets for production and for savings in inputs. Although managers only get high wages and bonuses if concrete output targets are met, they operate under a permanent threat of less adequate supply and tauter production targets. In this setting, high cost estimates leave room for (1) wage growth within stipulated limits, (2) the inevitable substitution of materials, (3) waste in the production process, and (4) reporting of gradual improvements in economic performance and management—all principles that operate in any bureaucracy.

Working in the same direction is the normative approach to cost computation. The normative cost is some "cost" below the actual cost of production, a concept whereby the planners constantly attempt to mobilize cost reduction. Each enterprise is expected to submit proposals for cost reduction (from technological change, from improvements in management

[15]On the history of temporary pricing, see A. Komin, *Problemy planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya* (The Problems of Planned Price Formation), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1971; A. A. Koshuta and L. I. Rosenova, *Kachestvo i tseny produktsii machinostroyeniya* (Quality and Product Prices in Machine-building), Moscow, Machinostroyeniye, 1976; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 51, 1979; and Glushkov, loc. cit.

[16]The Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers of July 12, 1979, on Improving Planning and Economic Mechanisms requires: "During five-year plan periods, wholesale prices in industry, estimate prices in construction, and freight tariffs in transport must be preserved unchanged." *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 9, 1979.

Evidently, the 1982 price reform is *in direct violation* of this requirement. A Soviet government minister complains, "The mass revision of plans takes place in accordance with new wholesale prices which was supposed to change before, not during the five-year period. As a result, *most ministries are still not in possession of real plans*." See M. Shkabardnya, "Branch Management Under Contemporary Conditions," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 7, 1982.

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and organization of production, from changes in product mix and prices, etc.). It helps if prices are padded to begin with.

With regard to acquisition of production inputs, the enterprise finds itself in a position in one way analogous to that of the consumer. Money without physical allocation of inputs is to no avail. At this point, the similarity ends, for if the inputs are available, the enterprise has no trouble getting the necessary financing from the State Bank. If the authorities raise the level of nonconsumer prices, they loosen the buyers' budget constraints accordingly. Hence prices remain normative parameters rather than a mechanism bringing supply into equilibrium with demand. This is important for understanding the lack of resistance to the growth of producer goods prices, especially those for machinery and equipment. Moreover, since an increase in unit prices results in growth of the gross value of output (and of related bonuses), purchasers of inputs may be as interested as, or even more interested than, sellers of inputs in seeing them priced high.

What is at issue here is the whole question of economic responsibility in the Soviet command economy.[17] Since inputs are virtually free for enterprises, managers operate under no strong "counterincentives," i.e., incentives *not to use* inputs when their opportunity costs are too high. The problem facing the Soviet economic system is how to convince managers and workers to act is if the national resources that they manage and use belong to them when, in fact, this is not so.

If it were just a problem with the workers, it might be solved with better instruction, more discipline, and better incentives. But the problem permeates the whole management structure. Soviet economic literature and the press often cite individual cases of mismanagement. In fact, one can be declared a bad manager even if not at fault, since there must always be a scapegoat. But blame is never directed where it belongs—at the economic system as a whole.

In attempting to reduce waste and inefficiency, the planning system has developed a whole edifice of administrative and regulatory measures, including those related to pricing. These measures, of course, can only work as barriers; they cannot really stimulate the economy. Moreover, there is always the temptation for planners at intermediate or lower economic levels to employ price increases to cover up or cushion against significant slowdowns in physical output by bloating the ruble value of output.

DOES INFLATION then really matter to anyone in the Soviet Union? For the consumer, the problem of rising prices is much less important than the problem of acquiring goods and services in short supply. Soviet managers are preoccupied with the problem of supply as well, and since the inputs they manage and use are virtually free of charge, they do not care about input prices. The authorities draw a distinction between uncontrolled price growth (which they attempt to block) and that which is planned and regulated. Hence they do approve price increases to keep pace with rising costs, to stimulate technological change, or to inflate growth figures.

In sum, fighting inflation is not a priority matter for Soviet authorities. When price growth is caused by increased input costs or is accompanied by qualitative improvements in the product, they allow it. They do not want to allow price rises related to merely cosmetic alterations in product characteristics or to waste and negligence. The authorities do not have to generate aggregate demand; they are concerned only with generating supply. Prices, while an important instrument, are far from decisive.

Soviet planners have lately concentrated increasing attention on the productivity indicator, but this is not the place to discuss their attempts to improve the country's economic performance. Suffice it to say that the described mechanisms contributing to price inflation have probably also contributed to the failure of previous major economic reform efforts. In general, loosening of control over enterprise managers who have no responsibility for property in their trust will inevitably result in economic contracts that are wasteful of Soviet national resources. This suggests that regulation is an effect rather than a cause of systemic deformations. Until or unless there are significant revisions of property institutions, the Soviet model will continue to be plagued by inefficiency.

Inflation is a problem for the Soviet economy—whether repressed, as in the case of consumer prices, or overt, as in many prices for nonconsumer goods. The Soviet consumer does end up worse off, and hence work motivation is probably stunted. In industry, price inflation without economic responsibility on the part of managers breeds inefficient utilization of finite resources. And planning authorities end up fooling themselves or at least their publics about the true nature of Soviet economic growth.

[17]The issue of economic responsibility is discussed in Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, *Soviet Economic Planning, 1965–1980*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1982.

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GDR Naval Buildup

by Dale R. Herspring

DESPITE its importance in the overall NATO–Warsaw Pact balance, Soviet–East European naval strategy in the Baltic has received little attention in the United States. Instead, the tendency has been to view this issue as primarily a matter of concern to the West Germans and the Danes. Yet, as recent developments (e.g., the presence of Pact submarines in Swedish and Norwegian waters) in the region illustrate, the Baltic naval picture is too important to ignore. This is particularly true regarding the East German navy, which over the past 30 years has been transformed from a small inland police force outfitted with wooden ships to a modern naval force second only to the Soviet navy among Pact forces in the Baltic.

As a result, East Germany's role in Soviet Baltic strategy is growing. Furthermore, if current trends continue, the fleet of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) will become still more important in Soviet naval policy—especially if the Polish navy continues its slide toward obsolescence. From East Berlin's perspective, too, the navy is likely to play a bigger part in the overall political mission of the country's armed forces at home and abroad.

Role of the Military in the GDR

The East German military serves two primary functions. On the internal scene, it is important as a vehicle for socializing the country's youth. It teaches discipline, works actively to counter Western ideas and influence, and, to the degree possible, inculcates in the minds of its recruits acceptance of (if not enthusiastic loyalty to) the GDR.

The second and more important function of the military in the GDR, for purposes of this essay, lies in foreign policy—particularly in that country's relations with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. One of East Berlin's most pressing concerns has been that the Soviets might sacrifice vital East German interests in their pursuit of improved relations with Bonn.[1] To counter this potential threat, the East Germans have attempted to make themselves indispensable to the Soviets in a number of key areas: economic, technological, diplomatic, and military. This is, for example, one of the main motives for GDR willingness to support the USSR in Africa, despite the political and financial costs, by providing security, paramilitary, and cadre development assistance.

East Berlin's hope appears to be that if such support becomes important enough to Moscow, the GDR bargaining position on other questions will be enhanced. For example, the GDR might argue that closer relations between the two Germanies—Bonn's primary goal—could undercut political and social stability within the GDR, thereby making it increasingly difficult for East Berlin to carry out its commitments in other areas of importance to the USSR. East Berlin knows well that it cannot completely avoid being pushed into closer contacts with Bonn if Moscow is determined to move in that direction. Nevertheless, the GDR seeks to persuade the Soviets either not to

[1] For an excellent discussion of this problem from the Soviet standpoint, see Angela Stent, "The USSR and Germany," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC) September–October, 1981, esp. pp. 17–22.

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adopt policies it feels are particularly threatening, or at least to devise counters to the more dangerous aspects of closer ties with the West.

Despite the key role that the armed forces play in the GDR's policy toward the USSR, there is no indication that the military is developing into an important interest group lobbying for increased arms expenditures. Rather, as has been argued elsewhere, most such lobbying—to the degree it occurs—takes place within the framework of the Warsaw Pact.[2] In the GDR there appears to be a general consensus on the part of all the top leaders, civilians and military officers alike, that the National People's Army is a key vehicle for increasing the GDR's influence vis-à-vis the USSR.

However, according to one recent study, the GDR's ability to fulfill its preferred role as a key partner of the USSR in the economic and technical spheres is decreasing.[3] If true, and if this trend continues, it could increasingly detract from East German ability to support Soviet foreign policy goals. The GDR appears to recognize this, since it is making a major effort to strengthen its military capabilities. This is particularly true of the naval area, which plays a vital part in overall Soviet strategy. The increasingly important mission of the East German navy is evident both in recent doctrinal statements and in the GDR's impressive ship construction program over the years.

Doctrinal Developments

Historically, East Germans writing on naval matters have avoided addressing broad strategic questions, preferring to translate important Soviet articles into German.[4] Instead, East German authors have focused on practical questions, such as tactical operations or personnel, or on political issues.[5] Recently, however, the East Germans took the unprecedented step of publishing a major article on strategic naval issues, by Captain G. Poschel, in the GDR's most important (and army-dominated) military-theoretical journal, *Militärwesen*.[6] The author, a senior member of the faculty at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy—the principal East German postgraduate officer training facility—draws heavily on Soviet naval writings (e.g., Admiral Sergey Gorshkov's *Sea Power and the State*). Nevertheless, in discussing Soviet naval concepts, he places them within a specifically East German context, and in so doing indirectly argues for an increased role for the navy within his country's military establishment.

Poschel's focus is on the concept of *"Seeherrschaft,"* which he equates with the Russian *"gospodstvo na more."*[7] According to Poschel, the concept has been variously translated into English as "control of the sea, sea control, command of the sea, mastery of the sea, and sea supremacy"; all "incorporate the meaning of Seeherrschaft."[8] To be useful, however, the concept must be updated to "accord with new conditions," a view Poschel notes is shared by leading Soviet writers like Gorshkov.[9] The bulk of Poschel's three-part article is devoted to updating and applying the notion of Seeherrschaft.

First, Poschel defines his central concept as

the result of combat operations by naval forces, which as a rule are carried out in the form of independent operations or in cooperation with other units, and as a result create a situation in all or part of the area of naval operations where the planned major task of the fleet can be carried out without being adversely influenced by an opponent.[10]

But the key part of the article comes in the third section, where the author discusses "some peculiarities of the struggle for Seeherrschaft in enclosed [*geschlossenen*] naval areas of operations."[11] There are, according to Poschel, a number of special characteristics of such operations. For example:

- The degree, time, and area of Seeherrschaft are dependent upon the "goal and purpose" of land

[2]Dale R. Herspring, "The Role of the Armed Forces in the Foreign Policy of the GDR," in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Gert Leptin, Ulrich Scheuner, and Eberhard Schultz, Eds., *Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR* (Three Decades of GDR Foreign Policy), Munich, Oldenbourg, 1979, pp. 313–24.

[3]Ronald A. Francisco, "East German Foreign Policy: An Economic Perspective," Paper presented at the Wingspread conference on the German Democratic Republic, Wingspread, WI, April 14–17, 1983.

[4]See, for example, Flottenadmiral S. Lobow, "The Seapower of States in their Defense Capability," *Militärwesen (Berlin)*, December 1976, pp. 85–93, and Vizeadmiral K. Stalbo, "Some Questions on the Theory of Developing and Operationalizing a Naval Combat Fleet," Parts 1 and 2, ibid., January 1982, pp. 48–54; and ibid., February 1982, pp. 39–45.

[5]See, for example, Fregattenkapitän H. Engelmann, "The Safeguarding of Naval Operations," ibid., March 1980, pp. 69–73; Fregattenkapitän L. Pilz, "Political Work to Ensure a High Level of Political Consciousness and Morale," ibid., December 1981, pp. 23–28; Kapitän zur See H. Tietze, "Typical Characteristics of Tactical Battle Operations of Naval Combat Forces," ibid., March 1982, pp. 52–56; Kapitän zur See H. Metzschke, "The Development of the Principal Types of Tactical Combat Operations Against Light and Medium Naval Surface Forces," ibid., April 1982, pp. 50–55; Kapitän zur See M. Arnold, "The Tactics and Components of Naval Combat Forces," ibid., July 1981, pp. 55–60; and Fregattenkapitän G. Krause, "The Battle Against Submarines—A Major Task of Naval Warfare," ibid., pp. 57–61.

[6]Kapitän zur See G. Poschel, "On Command of the Sea," Parts 1–3, ibid., May 1982, pp. 39–45; June 1982, pp. 70–76; and August 1982, pp. 57–62.

[7]Ibid., Part 1, p. 43.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid., p. 39.

[10]Ibid., p. 44.

[11]Ibid., Part 3, p. 57.

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forces operating in coastal areas.[12] Indeed, Seeherrschaft is vital for land operations in coastal regions; without it, it would be necessary to tie down significantly larger numbers of army troops.

- Conversely, the success of land forces in coastal areas, and the overall situation on the front, will have a major impact on the "achievement and maintenance of Seeherrschaft."[13] For example, the loss of bases and other important ground military installations could make the attainment of Seeherrschaft impossible. Likewise, as long as important hostile naval bases remain intact, it is possible for an opponent to reorganize and reemerge as a serious threat.

- Air superiority, including the use of helicopters, is vital in enclosed areas; "it is the most important criterion."[14] "Without it, Seeherrschaft cannot be achieved, and the tasks of the naval forces will not be carried out successfully, or only with heavy losses."[15]

- The goal of naval operations is continuous, all-around Seeherrschaft. It may be possible to achieve *temporary* Seeherrschaft in closed areas through ground operations and air superiority. This is particularly true if one's own forces are successful in blockading all entrances to the area of operations. However, given the other side's possession of missiles and aircraft, it will not be possible to attain total Seeherrschaft without significant sea-based operations.

- There are several ways to achieve Seeherrschaft: (1) by destroying an opponent's forces at sea, (2) by destroying an opponent's forces in their bases, (3) by blockading an opponent's forces in their bases, (4) by blockading the entrances to or exits from enclosed areas, and/or (5) by destroying key installations with land and air forces.

- Finally, the possession or loss of Seeherrschaft will have a significant influence on the behavior of neutral countries bordering on enclosed areas.

Poschel's article is notable for a number of reasons. His emphasis on the importance of operations the moment hostilities begin suggests that the Pact continues to place strong emphasis on surprise in its naval as well as in its ground and air doctrine. Still, Poschel expects the East German navy to suffer serious casualties in a naval conflict with NATO forces. His reiteration of the impossibility of attaining absolute Seeherrschaft, and his stress on the need to sustain operations in the face of enemy actions, indicate that he has some doubts about his navy's ability to prevail, or at least about the number of casualties it might suffer. The importance he assigns to maintaining an "operative regime" and to preparations for attaining Seeherrschaft suggests that the East German navy will continue to place considerable stress on training operations.

The emphasis Poschel places on coordination between naval and ground forces is not surprising in a military establishment dominated by the army. Here Poschel appears to be taking a page from Gorshkov, who faces similar problems. An effective navy requires heavy expenditures, which the army would probably prefer to use elsewhere. Poschel's message is that funds must be allocated for the navy, too, if the army hopes to conduct operations successfully in the Baltic region. Furthermore, the army must be prepared to coordinate operations with the navy, in some cases (e.g., amphibious operations) perhaps even subordinating itself to naval command.

The weight Poschel attaches to air power is also not surprising, given the GDR's location. Poschel does go beyond most other East German writers, however, in stressing the key role of *naval* air forces. In one key passage, he calls for specially trained naval aviators.[16] Since the GDR's naval air forces are now limited to a squadron of Mi-14 helicopters, his comments could be interpreted as lobbying for the creation of specially trained pilots to man fixed-wing aircraft for naval operations, under naval command. Indeed, the East German need for a better-equipped naval air arm seems obvious. For even if the Soviet Union's Backfire fighter/bombers are assigned the primary strike role in Baltic naval operations, an East German naval air arm is required not only for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations, but for air defense and reconnaissance operations as well. Poschel's focus on naval air forces is probably also indicative of his navy's genuine concern over the Bundesmarine's naval air threat.

Poschel's comments on the attitude of neutrals suggest that he expects the Swedes to adopt a more forthcoming stance if the Pact is winning. It is not clear, however, whether this would be the result of a voluntary act by the Swedes or of Pact pressure to

[12] Ibid., p. 58.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid., p. 59.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.

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support Soviet actions. While it is probably unwise to read too much into Poschel's remarks, they do suggest that the position of neutral neighbors is an important East German concern. They may also indicate that in a NATO–Warsaw Pact confrontation, the Pact has plans for at least containing the Swedes.

The article's stress on the GDR's intention to strike the other side's military bases, while not unexpected, does indicate that the GDR considers them fair game if hostilities begin. Naval facilities on the Baltic almost certainly figure high on the Pact's target list. Finally, the importance Poschel assigns to blockading suggests that the navy expects to play a major role in this area. The Pact would probably attempt to blockade major ports such as Lübeck, while other East German naval units, together with their Soviet and Polish allies, simultaneously move to seize the Danish straits, thereby cutting off the access of Western naval forces to the Baltic.

Poschel's article is also notable for its failure to focus on the Western submarine or surface threat in the Baltic. There are a number of possible explanations for this. First, the author may either consider the Bundesmarine's submarine or surface ships not to be a major threat, or—more likely—he may recognize that the GDR is simply not equipped to deal with the Bundesmarine's impressive submarine force. Discussion of the magnitude of the problem could reveal the extent of the threat, thereby undercutting morale. Also, Poschel probably recognizes that ASW is not the GDR's primary mission, and he may assume that this threat will be neutralized by Soviet forces.

Carrying out the tasks Poschel has assigned to the East German navy will require a specially configured force. Yet the GDR's efforts over the years to build a maritime force capable of carrying out these increasingly ambitious missions have never before been adequately detailed in the open Western literature. In order to understand just how far the Volksmarine has come, and how important it may yet become, it is desirable to fill this gap with a brief review of evolution to date.

Historical Overview

The history of the East German navy can be divided into four rough periods: its origins as a naval police force; its emergence as the "Volksmarine" and incorporation into the Warsaw Pact; a subsequent sharp increase in its versatility and combat role; and its inclusion in a *multinational* Baltic "combat service" since the early 1970's. Let us briefly review each of these periods.

Origins: 1950–1956. The origins of the East German navy can be traced back to the GDR Politburo's decision in February 1950 to establish a naval police (Seepolizei). During the first years, however, even this force was poorly equipped, and so devoted its main efforts to the "education and training of suitable cadre."[17] It was only in 1952 that units of naval police were actually set up. Until that time, "the security of the borders on the Baltic coasts" was entrusted to "small boats on internal waters."[18] The available ships were primitive at best. According to one authoritative source, they consisted primarily of wooden ships of World War II vintage, with an average length of 15 meters.[19]

East Berlin set out to improve this situation with typical Prussian thoroughness, and by the end of 1955 had made major strides toward acquiring an impressive naval inventory—most of which was built in East German shipyards. Included were Halbicht and Schwalbe class minesweepers, coastal and harbor defense craft, and a number of auxiliary craft. As a leading East German naval officer put it:

These ships contributed significantly to solving security tasks, the surveillance of coastal areas, and the protection of the GDR's sea borders.[20]

It is noteworthy that no claim was made at this time that the East German navy possessed the ability to operate outside coastal waters.

1956–1962. In 1956, the East German naval police were transformed—at least on paper—into a navy, as the GDR joined the Warsaw Pact and took on an obligation to contribute to overall Soviet Baltic strategy. The problem, however, was that the GDR's navy was not in a position to assume a meaningful role in Pact Baltic operations. To begin with, ships were lacking—a problem that the Soviets helped solve by supplying the East Germans with a number of naval craft, including nine motor torpedo boats. At the same time, Soviet advisers were attached to the GDR navy. As a result, the "combat capability of the naval forces increased significantly."[21] While expanding this anti-ship capability, the East German navy also began to

[17] Vizeadmiral Wilhelm Ehm, "The Development of the People's Navy of the National People's Army," *Militärgeschichte* (Berlin), No. 4, 1979, p. 407.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., p. 408. See also Vizeadmiral G. Hesse, "On the Development of Cooperation among the Allied Baltic Fleets of the Warsaw Pact," *Militärwesen*, April 1980, p. 29.

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build anti-mine and amphibious capabilities. Some ten Krake class minesweepers were added, as were Labo and Robbe class amphibious craft—all produced in the GDR.

Another factor inhibiting development of the East German navy, though, was the absence of any operational infrastructure to facilitate joint Warsaw Pact naval operations. As the commander of the East German navy later put it:

The young generation among the members of our fleet will find it hard to believe, but up to this point there was no unified command and no unified document for the interaction and leadership of the unified fleets.[22]

But in mid-1956, tactical operations involving the Soviet, Polish, and GDR fleet began, and joint maneuvers with ground forces were undertaken. In addition, a staff of representatives from all three navies to oversee joint maneuvers and carry out liaison work was established.[23]

Of symbolic importance at this time was the decision to change the name of the navy (Seestreitkräfte) to Volksmarine (People's Navy). According to its commander, this not only symbolized the navy's more important role, it also demonstrated that "the revolutionary military tradition of the struggle of the German working class had found a secure home in the GDR."[24] Finally, on November 4, 1961, only months after the Berlin Wall was built, the GDR's border forces along the coast were transferred to naval command.

By the end of this period, then, the East German navy had changed significantly in comparison with its status five years before. It possessed four destroyers, six corvettes, 37 sub-chasers, 10 minesweepers, and 49 motor torpedo boats.[25] Numerically, the Volksmarine already compared rather favorably with the Polish navy, which at that time had four destroyers, six submarines, 16 minesweepers, and 40 torpedo boats.[26] In Soviet eyes, however, both the East German and the Polish contributions to Pact Baltic operations must still have been considered minimal.

1962–1970. According to the commander of the Volksmarine, the introduction of missiles by the end of 1962 marked a major turning point in the technical development of his fleet. It gave the navy a significant anti-ship capability and, together with its fast torpedo boats, expanded its role in Pact naval operations. Moreover, with the acquisition of Labo class landing craft in that same year and the training of special army units for amphibious operations, the East German contribution in that key area grew as well. By the middle of the decade, one East German author later claimed, "cooperation with motorized infantry units was perfected."[27] Also, for the first time, a naval air arm was created, though it was limited to a squadron of Mi-4 helicopters outfitted for ASW operations.

According to East German sources, Pact naval exercises also increased at this time. As one writer put it, "from 1961 on, operational exercises and strategic undertakings in which all types of forces and branches of service participated came to the forefront."[28] In 1962, the first exercise was held involving "all three fleets under the direction of a joint [*gemeinsame*] leadership organ."[29] The next several years saw a number of other such exercises, including "Flut" (1963) and "Woga" (1964). Multilateral exercises reached a new high point, according to East German analysts, in 1968, with the command-staff exercise "Nord." This time four fleets participated: the Soviet Northern Fleet, the Soviet Baltic Red Banner Fleet, the Polish navy, and the Volksmarine. Admiral Ehm of the GDR observed:

The exercise area comprised the Baltic, the North Sea, the European Northern Sea, the Barents Sea, and the Northern Atlantic Ocean. For the first time, fleets of the Warsaw Pact coalition were involved in an exercise involving such broad areas.[30]

By the end of the 1960's the Volksmarine alone possessed an impressive array of major combatants: two destroyers, 18 minesweepers, 12 missile boats, 62 fast torpedo boats, and 20 landing craft of moderate size. Except for submarine and naval air forces, this fleet now compared favorably with the Polish navy.

By 1970, accordingly, the Volksmarine was beginning to play an important role in the Baltic. This was particularly true of amphibious, anti-ship, and (to a lesser degree) ASW operations. The Volksmarine still

[22]Ehm, "For A Reliable Protection of Coastal Boundaries—Vigilance and Combat Readiness!" *Militärwesen,* No. 2, 1976, p. 37.

[23]Idem, "Guarding the Peace in the Baltic Sea: Thoughts on the Development of the People's Navy from 1956 to 1965," ibid., No. 1, 1966, p. 21.

[24]Idem, "The Development of the People's Navy . . .," p. 409.

[25]*Jane's Fighting Ships, 1962–63,* London, Jane's Publications, 1962, pp. 108–09. Figures in this article for the size and characteristics of the Polish and East German fleets are taken from the appropriate annual volumes of this publication.

[26]Ibid., pp. 196–97.

[27]Ehm, "The Development of the People's Navy . . .," p. 412.

[28]Hesse, loc. cit., p. 31.

[29]Ehm, "The Development of the People's Navy . . .," p. 412.

[30]Ibid., p. 414.

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had a long way to go, however, before it would be able to make the vital contribution in the Baltic called for by East German foreign policy.

1971–1983. In 1971–72, in an effort to avoid surprise attack from the sea, a "combat service" (Gefechtsdienst) involving the Soviet, Polish, and East German fleets was established.[31] The three navies began to coordinate their planning for combat training programs. In addition, joint programs in areas such as navigational training were created.

Baltic naval cooperation meanwhile continued in frequent joint exercises. For example, such exercises were held off Poland in 1972, and again in 1977. In 1979 alone, according to one East German source, "29 common discussions and consultations with the fraternal fleets were held."[32] More recently, in July 1981, an exercise was commanded by an East German admiral; previously, all had been conducted under Soviet command. Similar exercises were held in 1982 in the North and Norwegian seas. Their purpose was officially described as anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and replenishment at sea.[33] According to a recent article by an East German naval officer, "the exercises by the unified squadrons [*vereinte Geschwader*] as well as the common minesweeping forces, carried out in the past three years, played a special role in the 1982 training year."[34] Such exercises are apparently conducted on at least a yearly basis, and clearly figure prominently in the Volksmarine's operational plans.

In the meantime, within the Volksmarine, increased emphasis has been placed on automation through the introduction of increasingly sophisticated electronic equipment. According to the commander of the Volksmarine, the new equipment enabled the navy to achieve "a higher level of combat readiness."[35] Most ships in service in 1971 have been replaced by more modern versions. In addition, the East German fleet has expanded in size. Thus, while the Volksmarine held two outdated Riga class destroyers in 1971, by the end of the decade these had been replaced by two modern Koni class frigates. In addition, nine Parchim class corvettes have been deployed, and nine more are said to be under construction in East German shipyards. They are probably intended as replacements for the much smaller (300 tons vs. 1,200 tons) Hai class patrol craft.

Table 1: GDR Major Naval Combatants

Type (class)	Years built	Number in service	Gross displacement, tons
Frigate (Koni)	1978–79	2	2,000
Corvette (Parchim)	1981	9[a]	1,200
Large patrol craft (Hai)	1963–69	9	370
Fast attack craft/missile (Osa I)	1960–65	15	210
Fast attack craft/torpedo (Shershen)	1962–74	18	175
Fast attack craft/torpedo (Libelle)	1975–80	31	30
Landing ship/tanks (Frosch)	1976–80	14	4,000
Minesweeper (Kondor)	1970–83	27	280
Naval air helicopter (Mi-14)		8	

[a]Nine more are under construction.

SOURCE: *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1983–84,* London, Jane's Publications, 1983, pp. 181–87.

The GDR has also devoted considerable effort to upgrading its amphibious sea-lift capability, putting it in a better position to carry out several of the tasks mentioned by Poschel. For example, the Labo and Robbe class landing craft have been replaced by the much larger Frosch class landing ships/tanks (LST's), and there is an unconfirmed report that the Volksmarine may be adding more amphibious craft, of a new "Eidechse" class.[36] In addition, at least one East German naval officer has argued that "naval artillery" will continue to play a key role in support of landing forces—thus corroborating the importance that Poschel assigns to naval forces in such operations.[37] Finally, Mi-14 helicopters were introduced in the mid-1970's to update the navy's air capability.[38] The Volksmarine's major combatants are listed in Table 1.

Contemporary Strategic Assessment

The increased importance that the Volksmarine has assumed in the Baltic is perhaps best illustrated by comparison with the Polish navy. To begin with, the

[31]Ibid.

[32]Hesse, loc. cit., p. 30.

[33]Milan Vego, "East European Navies," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute* (Annapolis, MD), March 1983, p. 44.

[34]*Konteradmiral L. Heinecke,* "*Joint Combat Training* of the Allied Socialist Baltic Fleet," *Militärwesen,* April 1983, p. 19. See also Kapitän zur See E. Lieder, "Creative Use of Soviet Experience in the Combat Training of the Volksmarine," ibid., March 1983, pp. 56–59.

[35]Ehm, "The Development of the People's Navy...," p. 415.

[36]William P. Baxter, "National Security," in *East Germany: A Country Study,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 223.

[37]Kapitän zur See H. Metzschke, "The Use of Naval Artillery in the Support of Amphibious Forces," *Militärwesen,* May 1977, p. 58.

[38]For a commentary on the importance of helicopters in naval operations, see Kapitän zur See G. Regner, "The Helicopter and its Influence on Naval Tactics," ibid., December 1977, pp. 59–63.

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Figure 1: Average Number of Major Operational Naval Combatants Entering Service (GDR and Poland, 1951-1983)



SOURCE: Jane's Publications, *Jane's Fighting Ships*, London, various annual issues. It is difficult to determine exactly when all ships entered the East German and Polish navies. Consequently, the total number of ships in a particular class was divided by the number of years such ships are listed in *Jane's* as entering each country's fleet. Averages for all relevant classes were then added together to obtain the overall average number of new ships entering each fleet in a single year. In the case of the GDR, all ships built before 1960 have been taken out of service.

East German navy now possesses a significantly larger number of combatants (139 vs. 114), despite its much smaller personnel structure (16,000 vs. 22,500).[39] From a structural standpoint, the primary difference between the two navies is the possession by the Poles of four Whiskey class submarines and of fixed-wing aircraft. Insofar as surface combatants are concerned, however, one is struck by the greater modernity and capabilities of East German ships. For example, the GDR has two new frigates, compared to one outdated destroyer for the Poles. Furthermore, while the East Germans have nine corvettes and are building nine more, the Poles have nothing comparable. Likewise, in the case of amphibious craft, Warsaw's 23 Północny class ships can carry six tanks each and have a displacement of 1,150 tons when fully loaded. The East German ships, by contrast, can carry 12 tanks each and have a displacement of 4,000 tons; they are thus significantly more capable than those of other Baltic powers. Altogether, the Polish navy, as one observer put it, "represents a rapidly aging force in urgent need of replacing its existing ... ships."[40] The difference in age between the two fleets is illustrated in Figure 1.

In strictly military terms, the Volksmarine's primary concern appears to be its ability to blockade strategic points in the Baltic. This is evident not just from doctrinal statements, but also in the strong push for an expanded amphibious capability. To further upgrade capabilities in this area, the Volksmarine needs to devote more attention to its minelaying forces. This, after all, will be one of its major tasks if it hopes to seize and hold the Danish straits.

The Volksmarine also appears to be acquiring an improved anti-submarine capability, but this, too, remains insufficient. In addition, its anti-ship forces (OSA I and OSA II class missile boats) are becoming dated. The GDR navy clearly needs to expand significantly in both these areas. Yet Poschel's failure to mention the need for submarines may mean that the GDR has no intention of acquiring any. The Volksmarine's most serious defect is its lack of a fixed-wing naval air arm. Poschel's stress on the importance of a naval air arm may indicate that this problem is being given serious consideration.

Thus, despite East Berlin's impressive buildup of naval forces, the Volksmarine still faces a number of difficulties that need to be overcome if it hopes to match the Bundesmarine. No one can say whether

[39] *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1983-1984*, pp. 181-87 and 386-92.
[40] Vego, loc. cit., p. 43.

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Table 2: Baltic Order of Battle (GDR, Poland, USSR): Selected Major Surface Combatants

Class	GDR		Poland		USSR	
	Number	Percent of class	Number	Percent of class	Number	Percent of class
Destroyers[a]	0	0	1	9	8	91
Fast frigates[b]	18[c]	17	0	0	86	83
Landing ship/tanks	14[d]	70	0	0	6	30
Landing ship/medium	0	0	23	56	18	44
Light forces	73	31	41	18	120	51
Minesweepers	27	13	49	24	125	62

[a]Includes guided-missile destroyers.
[b]Includes guided-missile fast frigates.
[c]Includes nine Parchim class corvettes under construction.
[d]Includes two Frosch II class LST's outfitted as transports.

SOURCE: *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1983–84,* London, Jane's Publications, 1983, pp. 181–87, 386–92, 486.

East Berlin will be "permitted" by the Soviets to overcome all of those difficulties. Nevertheless, based on the experience of the past 30-odd years, one thing appears certain: to the degree that the East Germans acquire new systems and equipment, they will continue to operate and integrate them into the fleet with a high degree of efficiency.

Altogether, as of 1983, the Volksmarine has developed into a modern navy, a force to reckon with in the Baltic. As the most important non-Soviet Pact navy there, the Volksmarine must figure large in Moscow's strategy for that theater. Seventeen percent of the Pact's frigates will be East German, once the new Parchim corvettes join the fleet. Furthermore, over two-thirds of the Pact's LST's belong to the GDR. As a result, while the Volksmarine may not yet be truly indispensable for Soviet naval operations in the Baltic, it plays an ever more important role in certain areas, and certainly enhances Soviet capabilities in the region. The GDR contribution to the new Warsaw Pact Baltic order of battle is shown in Table 2.

Conclusion

The decision by the East German political and military leadership to push ahead with the development of a modern, highly trained, technically advanced navy has a number of ramifications. On the internal scene, the increasingly important mission of the Volksmarine should enhance its role within senior GDR military councils. The navy's push for greater naval influence over amphibious operations, its call for a naval air arm, and its impressive building program all suggest an expanded role for that service branch, perhaps at some cost to the air force and the army.

Within the Warsaw Pact, the increasing size, number, and quality of the ships possessed by the Volksmarine, the decline of the Polish navy, Moscow's increased tendency to supply its forces in the GDR by sea (a practice followed during periods of tension in Poland), and the more important role in Soviet Baltic strategy that the East German navy appears to be assuming, all combine to strengthen that navy's role in Pact military councils. In this context, while the decision to build up the Volksmarine may not have been a direct result of the GDR's economic/technical decline in other areas, it probably will help to compensate for this development.

Assuming that a parallel phenomenon is also occurring in relation to the GDR's air and ground forces, East Berlin's overall influence within the Pact is likely to increase. (In that regard, it is worth noting that not only is the GDR spending a greater percentage of its GNP on defense than any other East European Pact member, it is also the only one besides Bulgaria that has regularly increased its military budget since 1971.)[41] This is not to suggest that the East German "tail" may be "wagging the Soviet dog"; only that the GDR's influence on military (and perhaps also political) questions will probably rise, most likely at the expense of its other East European allies.

From the standpoint of the West, the buildup of the Volksmarine is at least partially offset by the growing obsolescence of Poland's navy, and by the political instability of that country over the past three years. If,

[41]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971–1980,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 41, 45, 49, 51, 63, 64.

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however, the Poles modernize their fleet and stabilize the political situation within their country, the overall naval threat facing NATO in the Baltic will obviously increase significantly.[42] In the meantime, the East German navy—notwithstanding its diverse problems—should not be taken lightly. Like the overall Baltic military balance, it deserves far more attention than it has generally been given in the United States.

[42]It has been argued elsewhere that there were serious questions about the reliability of the Polish armed forces even prior to the rise of Solidarity. See Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Political Reliability in the East European Warsaw Pact Armies," *Armed Forces and Society* (Chicago, IL), Winter 1980, pp. 270–96. The emergence of Solidarity and the subsequent crackdown by Polish authorities has only exacerbated the problem. Nevertheless, given the tight living conditions of naval service, the more isolated environment of shipboard life, the higher state of discipline, the feeling of comradeship, and the fact that most naval personnel tend to be volunteers, the Polish navy should be one of the easier branches of service in which to rebuild reliability. Consequently, the Polish navy will probably reach a higher state of reliability at an earlier date than other branches, such as motorized infantry.

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Books

The Andropov Enigma

by Malcolm Haslett

Y. V. ANDROPOV. *Speeches and Writings.* Oxford, Pergamon, 1983.

ZHORES MEDVEDEV. *Andropov.* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983.

ARNOLD BEICHMAN and MIKHAIL S. BERNSTAM. *Andropov: New Challenge to the West.* New York, NY, Stein and Day, 1983.

M. JONATHAN STEELE and ERIC ABRAHAM. *Andropov in Power.* Oxford, Martin Robinson, 1983.

VLADIMIR SOLOVYOV and ELENA KLEPIKOVA. *Yuri Andropov: A Secret Passage into the Kremlin.* New York, NY, and London, Macmillan, 1983.

ILYA ZEMTSOV. *Andropov: Policy Dilemmas and the Struggle for Power.* Jerusalem, Israel Research Institute of Contemporary Society, 1983.

MARTIN EBON. *The Andropov File.* London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1983.

BY WHAT strange sorcery did Yuriy Andropov possess the minds of the Western world? Six full-blown studies of this Soviet leader appeared within a year of his taking power: more attention than poor Leonid Brezhnev attracted during all 18 years of his ascendancy! In large measure, this must surely be put down to the extraordinarily contradictory assessments of Andropov that began to appear in the Western media as soon as he emerged as general secretary on November 12, 1982. To some, he was a monster; to others, a potential modernizer, or even a "closet liberal." Some accounts made him a ruthless secret policeman intent upon reestablishing the iron discipline of Stalin. Others portrayed him as a realist who clearly understood that only extensive change could enhance the prosperity and stability of his country.

Several of the new crop of books on Andropov espouse one or the other of these oversimplified images of the late Soviet leader. That is their main weakness. Those that take a more complicated view of human nature accept the notion that there was an element of both the modernizer *and* the monster in Andropov. The main interest of such assessments lies in how they reconcile the existence of these apparently opposite tendencies in one man.

The book that in fact reveals least about Andropov is the one in which he himself, ostensibly, speaks directly to his public: the *Speeches and Writings* published by Pergamon Press. This may prove a useful reference for some experts. But on the whole they would be better advised to purchase the recent Russian-language collection of Andropov's pronouncements, which is rather fuller.[1] The average layman would need an extensive body of contextual notes in order to make real sense out of what is printed in the Pergamon anthology, and that is precisely what is not provided.

The other six books under review are evaluations of the late Soviet leader and of the country he ruled, and so can fairly be characterized as Sovietology. This is, of course, a very inexact science, and the student of Soviet politics has a wide choice of approaches to the subject. Some choose to stick to information that is either uncontested or relatively easily verifiable. If they supplement this with their own conclusions, they do so with caution, on the basis of what seems reasonable or in line with past precedent. This is the safest approach, and certainly the one best suited to individuals or organizations intent on maintaining some sort of dialogue with the Soviets. Yet its weaknesses are obvious. In

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[1] Yu. V. Andropov, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Writings), Moscow, Politizdat, 1983.

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dealing with such a secretive and politically one-sided place as the Soviet Union (and the Soviet Union is particularly secretive about personalities), one is left with huge gaps in one's knowledge, where factual details are either unobtainable or unverifiable. Sooner or later one comes to a point where it is impossible to draw definite conclusions, and the best one can do is to present a variety of possible interpretations.

It is here that the bolder souls among Kremlin watchers venture out into more uncharted waters, making use of uncorroborated evidence from sources within the Soviet Union. Here too the dangers are obvious. The quality of the "information" gleaned from unofficial sources is as variable as that derived from official ones. Different versions of the same event often contradict each other. Which version one cares to accept often depends more on a priori assumptions than on the intrinsic quality of the data.

The first of our books to appear—the study by Zhores Medvedev—gleans some of its information from a source inside the Soviet Union: the author's brother Roy. Some of that "information" is certainly questionable. Are we really to believe, for example, the anecdote (p. 23) about Brezhnev falling out of his coffin? But such lapses do not affect the main line of the book's argumentation, and on the whole Medvedev's work belongs in the "cautious" category. Indeed, it is a rather circumspect volume, based mainly on verifiable fact, and with fairly modest and uncontroversial conclusions. The author's assessment of Andropov is that he initiated programs that were probably "better constructed, better implemented, more skilfully presented" than those of his predecessor, yet that generally represented "the same conservative policy without any sign of liberalisation or democratic trends" (p. 197).

Even so, Medvedev has been accused by some critics of glossing over some of the nastier parts of Andropov's career. There is a certain justice in this charge. It is simply not enough, for instance, to refer to his "sovietisation" of Karelia without going into what that involved. As Arnold Beichman and Mikhail Bernstam's book shows, it almost certainly included the mass deportation of Karelians and Finns and the introduction of tens of thousands of ethnic Russians. Medvedev, moreover, in stressing (quite rightly) that Andropov was not the only one responsible for repressing dissidents, certainly goes too far in presenting him as largely a "tool" of Brezhnev and the rest of the Politburo. The refinement and invention that Andropov brought to the KGB's methods, amply described by Medvedev himself, suggest a very large measure of personal initiative—and many of Andropov's methods were no less nasty for all their "refinement." But the major weakness of Medvedev's book is not so much that it "whitewashes" Andropov as that its portrait of the man lacks sharpness and definition.

This is where Jonathan Steele and Eric Abraham's book is rather better. While they note that Andropov's public statements in the early 1960's on Stalinism and dissent appeared to put him on the "moderate" side of the Politburo, they also argue that this impression is misleading. Instead, they characterize Andropov not as a "liberal" (the word, they point out, just is not applicable in a Soviet setting), but as a "paternalist":

> *As they grow up to be Soviet citizens, individuals are supposed to be cured of any tendency towards [dissent] by the combined effect of exposure to the Pioneer and Komsomol organisations, the education system and the officially-controlled media. If they still persist, then the first line of resort is discussion and persuasion. Only at a later stage do sanctions and punishment come in. Andropov is one of those who believes in at least giving the first line of resort a try.* (p. 89)

In a similar vein, Steele and Abraham warned that Westerners should not be misled by Andropov's apparent encouragement and patronage of sophisticated intellectuals within the Soviet establishment—men like Georgiy Arbatov, Fëdor Burlatskiy, and Aleksandr Bovin. Andropov clearly appreciated intelligent advice, the authors tell us, but only if it remained within his own terms of reference.

Even this image of Andropov as a "paternalist" will seem altogether too generous to more cynical observers of the Soviet scene. And Steele and Abraham will no doubt be faulted for much the same thing as is Medvedev: understating the more reprehensible aspects of Andropov's career (Karelia, Hungary in 1956, and the entire KGB period, for instance) and generally underestimating the cynicism of those involved in the Soviet political process. Nevertheless, of the more "cautious" assessments of Andropov, theirs is the best researched.

The books by Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova and by Ilya Zemtsov, in contrast, belong to the category that depends, in large measure, on "secret" sources within the Soviet Union that the authors do not feel free to divulge, for obvious reasons. This means that they can offer very full explanations for certain aspects of Andropov's

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career. Some of these explanations are interesting and plausible, but many others must be treated with caution. The main fault of both books is that their authors do not see the need to distinguish clearly between established fact and unsupported hearsay; if one is going to include the latter, it should be explicitly labeled as such. In both cases the authors claim to know things they cannot possibly know. The effect is to reduce rather than increase the credibility of their analysis.

This is not to belittle the genuine research that has gone into these books. Some of the most intriguing passages in the Solovyov and Klepikova volume, based on inside sources, have the ring of truth. The elucidation, to take one example, of the fall of the corrupt party chief in Krasnodar oblast, Sergey Medunov, is the most complete account available. Also, in sheer stylistic terms, the authors have produced 300 pages of elegant and readable prose, liberally sprinkled with erudite allusions to Shakespeare and the Greek philosophers. The authors' intimate knowledge of the contemporary Soviet scene generates a rich tapestry of life there: the passions of Russian nationalism of various strands; the "KGB communism" of Heydar Aliyev and Eduard Shevardnadze in Transcaucasia; the lonely, isolated world of the dissidents.

But as a portrait of Andropov, this book is totally unconvincing. Some of its claims are demonstrably untrue—for instance, that Andropov's only remedy for the economy was discipline and coercion. Some of its claims are credible, but are based on entirely insufficient evidence—for instance, the contention that Andropov was the instigator of the invasion of Afghanistan. And some of its claims verge on the ridiculous—such as the assertion that when Western radio stations broadcast items based on information supplied by Roy Medvedev, the Soviets switch off or turn down their jamming.

Solovyov and Klepikova's worst failing, though, is that they find it difficult to conceal their contempt for the late Soviet leader—an understandable impulse, perhaps, but one that should not influence self-respecting biographers. Thus, they state as fact that Andropov was a "vigorous, stubborn" supporter of anti-Semitism (p. 65), a "sponsor" of young Russian admirers of Hitler (p. 79), a "complex-ridden nouveau riche" (p. 158), the least-educated member of the Politburo (p. 149), and a "pedant" who paid little heed to reality and was also "vindictive" (pp. 195, 205, 276). No attempt is made to substantiate these assertions. Worse yet, the authors include gratuitously contemptuous remarks about other international figures, some of whom are plainly less deserving of such treatment than Andropov. Thus Andrey Sakharov is described as "a living anachronism"; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, as "artless, outspoken and garrulous." It is all the more surprising to find, in this very dismissive book, that virtually the only "real hero" of recent years, in the authors' eyes, is General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who allegedly imposed martial law in Poland *without* Moscow's knowledge or cooperation, thereby saving his country from invasion. Would it be naïve to wonder what Soviet Marshal Viktor Kulikov was doing in Warsaw just then, as *The Times* of London reported at the time?

The book produced by Zemtsov shares some of the defects of the Solovyov and Klepikova volume. It exhibits a tendency to confuse fact with conjecture and to make sweeping generalizations: Andropov "detest[ed] party functionaries" (p. 108); voting in the Politburo "can never be a matter of conviction" (p. 123). But on the whole, Zemtsov's is a more sober study than that of Solovyov and Klepikova. He accepts the idea that Andropov could be both "ruthless and callous" and yet, at the same time, highly intelligent and sophisticated. The two things, as the author correctly observes, are by no means incompatible.

Zemtsov focuses his analysis on the reasons for Andropov's rise to power, and on the way he used that power to "andropovize" the system. The previous balance among the party apparatus, the military, and the KGB, as the author perceives it, has been upset. It is the KGB that was slowly taking over the "partocracy." But increased staffing of top posts by former KGB men will not, paradoxically, increase the police nature of the state, in Zemtsov's view. Indeed, he foresees that after two or three years of heightened political repression there may be a certain softening of totalitarian controls—not because the KGB is full of liberals, but because its operatives tend to be less doctrinaire than the average party functionary:

> *Their training is more informed and less affected by propagandistic orthodoxies. Consequently they are more likely to deviate from the fossilized axioms and dogmas of Communism: first, in thought, and then, with time, in their administration and control of government.* (pp. 109–10)

Such a Kremlin administration, Zemtsov warns, would be no less expansionist abroad than its predecessors, and would present the West with a stronger rather than a weaker challenge. Accordingly, his

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advice to Western governments is to "be strong." The author's final judgment on Andropov is that while he was not the leader the Soviet Union needed, he may have been the best its government could produce under the circumstances.

BEICHMAN and Bernstam's study of Andropov, unlike the two preceding volumes, is usually very meticulous about identifying sources. The authors' main achievement is to turn up a lot of good source material on the early part of Andropov's political career, a period that has hitherto seemed hazy. Because the young Andropov began his meteoric rise within the party apparatus in the 1930's, during the purges, many people have assumed that he (like other Soviet leaders of his generation) must have known of some of the horrors of that period, even if he did not personally participate in them. Beichman and Bernstam are now able to cite evidence, mainly from Soviet sources, that in the places where Andropov first held office—Rybinsk, Yaroslavl', Karelia—he was in fact closely associated with massive construction projects involving prison camp labor supervised by the KGB's predecessor, the NKVD. The authors also trace Andropov's rise through the Komsomol and party apparatus in terms of his links with various individuals and factions. They argue that he belonged to a shadowy grouping they call, somewhat melodramatically, the "Brotherhood." Beichman and Bernstam claim that it was Andropov's membership in this powerful clique, which was allegedly personally promoted by Stalin, that explains both Andropov's rapid rise to influence within the party during Stalin's lifetime and his "demotion" to the diplomatic corps after the dictator's death.

This detailed examination of Andropov's early associations is valuable and welcome. Yet it, too, is seriously flawed by numerous exaggerations and unsubstantiated claims. For example, we are told that the young Andropov "was a dropout from two colleges" (the evidence is surely too flimsy for such an assertion); that he was "a born loser" until he joined "Stalin's purge apparat" (namely, the Komsomol); and that he was promoted "over the bodies" of his superiors—a provocative phrase implying, without citing any proof, that he was a party to their fall (pp. 12–14). The book as a whole contains too many similarly emotive and simplistic phrases.

There are also some surprising factual inaccuracies. For example, notwithstanding Beichman and Bernstam's claim, there is no evidence known to this reviewer that ethnic Russians have as yet lost their majority in the Soviet Union. Most important, the authors exaggerate, in my view, the degree of Andropov's personal responsibility for the horrors of the Karelian labor camps. Moreover, their focus on the early years of his career (in other words, the "Stalinist" period) gives a distorted picture of the man as a whole. Three chapters out of seventeen are surely too few to encapsulate the General Secretary's entire career after 1956. Finally, the conclusion—that Andropov came to power "determined to change nothing"—is surely much too glib.

In this regard, the last book on our list—Martin Ebon's *The Andropov File*—probably comes closer to the truth in depicting its subject as a man who combined urbanity with ruthlessness, sentimentality with cool calculation, and willingness to entertain limited reforms with iron determination to preserve the existing Soviet system as a whole. In one sense, this book is disappointing, since the author's own text extends only halfway through and the rest is filled with unannotated texts of Andropov's speeches. Still, Ebon is perceptive in noting that "promises of reform, coupled with single-mindedness in striking down opponents, has been a tactic used over and over again by Russian leaders" (p. 13). Indeed, as the author observes, there are obvious limits on the extent of possible reform even in the economic sphere:

Andropov can make corruption less acceptable, less a matter of daily necessity, but black market activity will still be required to add lubrication to the creaking machinery of manufacturing and distributing consumer goods. And he cannot change the human spirit which has turned to cynicism, because individual ambition and workmanship cannot flourish without endangering the Kremlin's central control. (p. 142)

WHAT SORT of figure emerges from the accumulated testimony of all these biographical studies? Certainly we faced, first of all, an intelligent and ambitious man, a schemer, but one who schemed cautiously, preparing his ground meticulously before each move. Second, when he did move, Andropov was undoubtedly totally ruthless in pursuing his aims. Whether he was the orchestrator or merely a tool in outmaneuvering Hungarian Prime Minister Imré Nagy and his men in 1956, the accepted evidence points to a large measure of calculated deception on Andropov's part. Third, this Soviet leader showed every sign of being a realist, in both a conservative and a reformist sense. He was realistic enough to know that he could not afford to alienate the

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powerful vested interests of the political and military elite. At the same time, he knew that some things had to change in the management of the Soviet economy if it was to maintain any forward thrust at all. The ideology remained the same, and the apparatus of repression was actually strengthened. But within this hard-line framework, a new tactical flexibility was visible.

This formula at first seemed as if it might yield results, both at home and abroad. But more recently, with Andropov's five-month disappearance and other signs of his failing health, it became clear that even the limited goals he set for himself would be very difficult to achieve. The image of Andropov the enigma, half terrifying and half fascinating, became less prevalent, as it was progressively replaced by the image of an aged and ailing man. More and more, Yuriy Andropov looked like a man who might have got things done—had he arrived at the top sooner and in better health.

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Russian History and Soviet Politics

by Edward L. Keenan

ALEXANDER YANOV. *The Origins of Autocracy: Ivan the Terrible in Russian History*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1981.

EVERY SERIOUS work of history reveals something about the period or process it describes, as well as something about its author and his time. As a rule, those works contribute most whose authors treat the past primarily in terms of its own concerns and categories, and restrain the intrusion of personal or contemporary preoccupations. But since the writing of history (as opposed, at times, to certain forms of historical analysis) is essentially a humanistic undertaking, it is impossible—and perhaps even undesirable—that an author's personal concerns and convictions not be revealed at all. The manner in which personal beliefs color the writing of history is varied. One encounters authors who artfully employ the disciplined conventions of "objective" history as camouflage for polemical messages. There are also those who quite openly use the past as a club with which to beat the present. In the resultant battering it is usually the club, and not the target, whose shape is more significantly changed.

Russia's past is much battered. The paucity of sources and the insufficiency of scholarly methods make it particularly vulnerable to such abuse. However, there are more important institutional, cultural, and historical causes: the control of scholarship for centuries by the state and by the church; the sense of social ineffectiveness and political impotence that has been characteristic of the Russian educated classes; the recurring catastrophes and painful political afflictions that have so often been visited upon Russian society. It is not too much to say that for many Russians there is really only one question about their history: Why?

Alexander Yanov's book avowedly belongs to the "subjective" end of our spectrum. In many respects it lies squarely within this Russian historiographic tradition. Indeed, in order fully to appreciate its merits we must, as Sidney Monas hints in his Introduction to the book, treat it not as a monograph about Ivan the Terrible, but rather as a passionate statement about recent Soviet political and cultural history by a victim/participant.

Yet there is a conundrum here. Yanov insists that his interpretation of Ivan's time provides a key to understanding *all* of later Russian history, especially that of recent decades. If, however, as appears to be the case, Yanov is wrong about Ivan and his time, are we then to conclude that what he says about the present and the recent past is also totally misguided? Not really. What we have before us is not a systematic analysis of recent Soviet history, but rather a valuable document of intellectual history—a primary source—for understanding how some educated Russians, both establishment and oppositionist, perceive the "meaning" of Russian history.

ORIGINS is divided into three sections whose declared purposes are different, but whose arguments interlock and spill across their boundaries. The first, "The Adversities of Theory," deals with what Yanov calls "the science of despotology"—that is, with selected theories of despotism and absolutism—a recent Soviet debate on absolutism, and some very general theories of history. It consists, for the most part, of a murky analysis of terminologies and taxonomies, developed on the basis of Western historical experience, that have little demonstrable explanatory power in the Russian case. I suspect that even readers strongly interested in Russia, in history, or in despotism will find

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themselves skipping large parts of this section.

Two parts of this first section, however, deserve closer reading. The one that Yanov, with characteristic lexical abandon, entitles "The Serf Historians" provides a well-informed interpretation of the debate about absolutism that occupied the pages of Soviet historical publications roughly between 1968 and 1971. Yanov's exposition of the views of the participants reveals an understanding of their tactics and travail that few outsiders can achieve, and—unwittingly—shows how distant most of the participants, of whatever stripe, were from any inkling of how modern social scientists in the West treat such subjects.

The second noteworthy part of this first section is called "The Political Spiral." Here Yanov compares, in parallel columns, what he takes to be the characteristics of the times of Ivan IV and of Stalin. To say that such comparisons are forced is to be generous. The events and processes that Yanov talks about simply cannot be seriously discussed in the manner he proposes, nor in the vocabulary he employs, whatever one's objectives might be. What, to take only one example, does "halting the process of Europeanization of the country" mean in the context of Ivan's time? Was there some "process of Europeanization" afoot in Muscovy in 1560 that was "halted" in 1565? No. Was anyone consciously and as a matter of policy either "Europeanizing" or resisting such a process? No. What, indeed, did "Europe" mean to Muscovites at the time? What did "Russia" mean? Can any helpful understanding emerge from the juxtaposition of this "Russia" with Stalin's Soviet Union? Perhaps, but only after one has established some carefully articulated conceptual and terminological qualifications—and this Yanov does not do. This list of allegedly shared features is, in fact, an indictment of Stalin. Ivan, whatever his faults may have been, should be left out of it.

The second section of the book contains Yanov's declared main hypothesis: Muscovy, before Ivan's reign and the Oprichnina system he initiated in 1565, was developing quite happily: trouncing the Tatars in what Yanov calls a "reconquista"; establishing a rudimentary "parliament" and conducting "progressive" internal reforms; forming a "proto-bourgeoisie," and in general carrying out "a normal European process of intensification and rationalization of the economy." Ivan, however, for reasons that Yanov never explains, ruined everything. He turned the aggressive thrust of his foreign policy away from Tatars and against—*horribile dictu*!—Europeans by getting involved in the Livonian wars. He formed the Oprichnina, which Yanov sees in traditional fashion as a kind of "state within a state," more tyrannical and absolutist than the previous government. He permitted his cronies in the Oprichnina to ravage the economy, destroy the independent peasantry, decimate the enlightened boyars, and ultimately to create conditions in which the rise of serfdom and Muscovite absolutism became inevitable.

Most of the notions that have been combined in this interpretation are not new. As Yanov points out, Soviet historians have recently made a number of interesting observations about Muscovy's socio-economic and political development in the latter part of the 16th century, and have even talked about "crossroads" and "different paths of development." But by exaggerating some of these findings, misconstruing others, and accepting still others that are doubtful, Yanov has, in my view, produced a most perverse interpretation of the Oprichnina and its effects, an interpretation that goes far beyond the work of his predecessors—and the facts. He makes far too much of the modest economic growth, and particularly of the activities of "free" peasants, in the middle of the 16th century. He wrongly construes the foreign policy choices of the Muscovites as options involving "East" and "West." He exaggerates, even more than the most enthusiastic Soviet establishment historians, the role and institutional maturity of the "council of the land." Finally, he draws far too direct a connection between the policies (if such there were!) and depredations of the Oprichnina, on the one hand, and the subsequent development of serfdom, on the other. In general, Yanov, who appears to have done a good deal of rather oddly-directed reading in the technical literature, seems not to appreciate the problems specialists have with the limited and often dubious sources at their disposal.

This failure is the most significant, but by no means the only, reason why his third section, "Ivaniada," is less successful than it might have been. This section purports to be an "analysis of the evolution of ideas." In fact, it is an omnibus indictment of historians who have written about Ivan and his time over the last few centuries. The charges are either that historians (Yanov limits himself to Russians) have been apologists for Ivan (and, by implication, for his tyranny) or timid dupes of such official apologists, or else that they knew just how awful Ivan was but, out of cowardice or ambition, failed to follow where logic and honesty led— i.e., to Yanov's position.

I should not leave the impression

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that this section is without redeeming merits. Yanov does provide some interesting observations about both prerevolutionary and Soviet historians. It is really quite shocking, even to a specialist, to read again what some unfortunate Soviet historians were willing to say about Ivan during Stalin's time. But Yanov's "despotological" categories, his inquisitional tone, his failure to acknowledge the sheer difficulty historians have in forming *any* mental image of Ivan, and his insistence upon seeing *all* matters in terms of the concerns and concepts of his own quite *sui generis* Khrushchevian generation make this section ultimately unsuccessful.

One sometimes gets the impression that Yanov goes out of his way to juxtapose sense and nonsense. For example, he writes quite penetratingly:

The "myth of the state" arose in the epoch of Ivan the Terrible; and ... the argument over Tsar Ivan ... is the form in which it has developed. (p. 261)

Now one may not necessarily agree with this statement, but it does contain the germ of an interesting idea. Instead of developing that idea, however, Yanov wants to say something sweeping about Russia. He goes on:

But in its hypnotic and almost mystical power, the myth goes far beyond the limits of this argument, and influences the Russian worldview itself. (p. 261)

Very well, there is something to be said about the role of the notion of the all-powerful state in the formation of the Russians' self-image and in the origin of their low estimation of their ability to take the management of their public affairs into their own hands. One expects Yanov, after telling us a bit about the myth itself, to discuss these things. Instead, he takes us abruptly into that diachronic dimension where past and present intersect:

In no other area, perhaps, does this dictatorship of the myth manifest itself so vividly as in attitudes toward the political opposition as a whole and political emigration in particular. This is the test for freedom of thought; here lies the bad conscience of all of Russian historiography. (pp. 261–62).

Well. We started with a sober notion about dispelling myths, got distracted by their hypnotic and almost mystical power, suddenly came upon the "dictatorship" of the myth, and ended with the "test for freedom" and the "bad conscience" of Russian historiography. All in four sentences, each of which contains arguable but not necessarily demonstrable propositions—implicit or declared—of considerable complexity. The result is what Russians call *kasha*—a jumble.

THUS YANOV's treatment of the historiography is, like his central thesis, overstated, flawed, and highly questionable. But even if one were to take a more positive view of his treatment of the facts of Ivan's reign, there would remain serious doubt about the long-range historical importance Yanov attributes to the Oprichnina. Almost all historians would agree, I think, that the Oprichnina was short-lived, that it affected only a part of "Russia," left no institutional traces, and, aside from its largely random destructiveness, had little lasting impact upon existing social, economic, cultural, or political institutions or ideas. (Yanov's own book is sufficient evidence that the *myth* of the Oprichnina has had a lasting and deleterious effect upon Russian historiosophy—but that is a different matter.) Yanov, however, is convinced that the Oprichnina was, for Russians, a kind of national childhood trauma from which they never recovered and with which they never came to terms. Essential to this conviction are his assumptions apparent throughout the book that the Muscovite state and Russian "nation" (an anachronistic notion for the 16th century) of 1565 were the antecedents and ancestors of today's Soviet Union and today's Russians, and were, in some unspecified yet profound way, in fact the very same entities we know today—"younger," perhaps, but clearly recognizable and understandable by anyone who knows modern Russia.

Now the notion of a historical national identity that evolves but, in some immanent sense, never changes has a noble historiographic lineage, but it is of limited utility for the modern historian. Even when it can be applied, it requires very careful definition and qualification. These Yanov does not provide, and in adopting this view without modification, despite his professions of originality and rebelliousness, he lapses into the cliché-ridden lexicon of traditional Russian historiography. He uses the terms "Russia," "nation," and the like so anachronistically and carelessly as to deprive them of any real sense, leaving the reader with only the most nebulous and Slavophile interpretation of such terms as a guide to his meaning. He falls, moreover, into the outmoded contradistinction of "Europe" and "Asia," which imparts to many of his arguments an apparently unintended overtone of naive Eurocentrism (or, more precisely,

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"Eurocentripetalism"). Finally, he transmutes farfetched parallels (Ivan and Stalin) into metaphors—and, ultimately, into identifications—with such recklessness as to foreclose meaningful discussion.

Yanov anticipates criticism on this last point by asking, "Why are historians so afraid of naive questions?" He answers that "conventional history avoids diachronic inquiry that overlaps the bounds of established specialization." In contrast to such timorous specialists, Yanov says, he seeks "to analyze not artificially separated events in Russian history, but Russian history as a whole—a totality in which *all* events are not only interconnected, but also influence each other in the most fundamental way—whether they happened in the sixteenth century or in the twentieth century" (p. 19).

Leaving aside some logical problems (how 20th-century Russia could influence 16th-century Russia), I find this a most engagingly extravagant statement, one that makes me ask just what it is that Yanov is attempting to do with, and to, his nation's history. Elsewhere he answers that question:

This is no mere scholastic exercise. For the Russian opposition it is a matter of life and death. The conundrum of Russia's absolutist century is bound up with the problems of its present: do the current oppositionists have national roots, for example, or are their ideas imported into this garrison state from the West along with Coca-Cola and modern technology? Is it possible for this country to have a decent European future? (p. 20)

HERE, and in numerous other equally revelatory passages, Yanov offers what is, for me, the chief reason why this passionate, authentic, and likably wrong-headed book should be of interest to Westerners who care about Russia. For it is not a book about Ivan the Terrible at all, but a document that reveals how Yanov, and many Soviet intellectuals of his generation, attempt to construe the historical determinants of their lamentable present. It reveals, first, their pathetic isolation from most of what has taken place in Western social-science thinking in this century. Anyone who knows Yanov will agree with Sidney Monas that he is "serious, erudite, thoughtful, well-informed, witty and intelligent." All of these traits, however, plus an advanced degree in history from Moscow State University, have not saved him from innocence about how modern historians conduct analysis, description, generalization, and argument. In this failing, of course, Yanov is not alone—Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the Medvedevs, and others share it. It is sad indeed to have to say that many of the Soviet establishment historians whom Yanov criticizes—pusillanimous, brave but muzzled, tragic, or bootlicking as they may be—write better history, and can tell us more about Ivan the Terrible.

But not, perhaps, about Russia. Even in the liberal years that Yanov describes so well, Soviet censors, fearful of "uncontrollable allusions," did not allow historians or anyone else to speculate freely upon Russia's "fate." That is, they did not allow the printing of what educated people, including censors, wanted to read and were eager to discuss in the bibulous bonhomie of the "evenings" Russian intellectuals love so much. It is as a specimen of this kind of historical vernacular culture that Yanov's book is most valuable, for it reproduces quite authentically, in all its characteristic excessive detail and theoretical confusion, the kind of monologue that can be generated when Russians fall into spontaneous speculations about their country's historical experience. This seemingly eternal monologue deals with questions intellectuals ask but cannot answer, questions that, because of the sadness of their condition, they pose not as cool, "how" questions, but as passionate, "why" questions: Why has Russia gone wrong? Why is there no hope? Why is there no real political option for Russia and no real "opposition"? Why does the mass of the population tolerate—even support—the present system? Why do Russians fear chaos more than slavery? Why aren't they really like other "Europeans"? Why did all of this happen to them?

Yanov speaks of the "enigma" of Russia's history when describing his lifelong efforts—of which the present book is only a part—to unravel it. In addition to representing the thoughts and yearnings of his fellow intellectuals, he is, in viewing Russia's history as a riddle, honoring an ancient historiographic tradition—one that, like the myth of Ivan he criticizes, has obscured understanding, lured historians into foolish postures, and confused large numbers of Russians about themselves. Why, after all, should Russia's history be thought more "enigmatic" than that, say, of China, Ethiopia, or Ireland? One reason, it seems, is that anyone who has any sympathy for Russians—or for fellow-beings in general—must conclude, after even a superficial study, that Russians somehow deserve better than they got. But then so do the citizens of Belfast, Ramallah, or the South Bronx. Is Russia's history "enigmatic," or just unfortunate?

The real reason, I would suggest, why Russia's intellectuals search, like characters in a fairy tale, for

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the liberating answer to a riddle they cannot even express lies in that preoccupation with the European experience that is so much a part of Yanov's interpretation of Russian history. Russians—especially Russian intellectuals—*are* "Europeans," by most measures. In the centuries since Ivan's time they have done all the correct "European" things: they have developed a nation-state, industrialized and urbanized it, got the bomb, learned to dance on their toes, sing in Italian, and write novels. And yet, they still question whether they can have—or are worthy of—"a decent European future." How, if not by postulating the existence of some unique enigma, can one explain this paradox?

But the spirit of the steamy, congenial soirées of which I have spoken is drawing me in and taking me, too, behind the looking glass. I cannot explain, or even frame, the paradox. Neither, it appears, can Yanov. What he *does* do is to provide, in *The Origins of Autocracy*, a peculiarly valuable testimony of a plucky and imaginative man's struggle with the demon of history who seems, to many Russians, to have cast an inexorable curse upon their unfortunate nation. His book also testifies to how distant their efforts to explain their present travail are from the methods of modern social science. As such, it is to be recommended to those who hope to understand how Russians understand Russia.

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Chasing China's Shadows

by Karel Kovanda

ROGER GARSIDE. *Coming Alive: China After Mao.* New York, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1981.

RICHARD BERNSTEIN. *From the Center of the Earth: The Search for the Truth about China.* Boston, MA, Little, Brown & Co., 1982.

FOX BUTTERFIELD. *China: Alive in a Bitter Sea.* New York, NY, Times Books, 1982.

LIANG HENG and JUDITH SHAPIRO. *Son of the Revolution.* New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1983.

EDOARDA MASI. *China Winter: Workers, Mandarins, and the Purge of the Gang of Four.* New York, NY, E.P. Dutton, 1982.

YAO MING-LE. *The Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao.* New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1983.

OF THE PILE of books reviewed here, most were authored by foreign visitors to China: one diplomat, two journalists, two "foreign experts." Most are impressionistic accounts of events that took place during the authors' sojourn there, and one can arrange them chronologically. Roger Garside, a first secretary in the British embassy, arrived in Beijing in January 1976 and stayed through winter 1978–79. Overlapping his stay was that of Edoarda Masi, who taught at the Shanghai Foreign Language Institute for a year beginning in the summer of 1976. Fox Butterfield, of *The New York Times,* arrived three years later, in June 1979, and stayed until February 1981. And Richard Bernstein, of *Time* magazine, began his stay in April 1980.

I arrived in China just as Masi was leaving, and left soon after Butterfield arrived. For two years, I worked as a foreign expert, a language specialist for the overseas broadcasts of Radio Beijing. I had arrived in Beijing full of curiosity. After a few months, I had the country figured out; I was even ready to write a book about it. But that period of blissful certainty passed; by the time I left, one thing was clear: the reality of China was *always* far more complicated than whatever initial impressions one may have formed.

A key episode that unhinged my cocky self-confidence occurred in the fall of 1978 during a visit to Guilin in Guangxi Province. Although renowned for its natural beauty, Guilin is one of China's poorer cities. While the superficial observer may think that all Chinese dress alike, important differences are detectable. In the south, for example, clothing is visibly shabbier, more washed out, more patched up, with larger patches. Guilin is visibly poor.

Instead of taking *xiuxi,* the obligatory after-lunch siesta, I went for a walk. Upriver from the hotel, I ran across a free market. This was still a novelty in China: markets used to be considered "tails of capitalism," in Lenin's words, and had been banned for years. The more exotic items for sale included shallots, minnows, herbs, even an owl. There were more onlookers than buyers. The market had a relaxed though businesslike atmosphere about it.

One or two men were wandering about the marketplace, picking up orange peels. This was another sign of sure poverty: for a thrifty peasant to throw something away, it had to be quite worthless; for another to pick it up, he had to be quite desperate.

An old man shuffled down the street, in a black coat that was not merely old but old-fashioned, with cotton buttons, peasant-style. A small bundle was slung over his shoulder, and he carried a cane in

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one hand, his rice bowl in the other. A swarm of 10-year-olds galloped by, taunting and teasing the oldster. He waved his cane at them but in vain, of course; he did not stand a chance against the rascals.

I felt sorry for him. I turned around to get a last image of his grizzled face with a white stubble—and instantly froze: a smiling marketeer was just then dropping a couple of aluminum coins in his rice bowl. I realized at once that the old man was a beggar. I was shocked and dismayed: I had not expected to find a beggar in socialist China! I quietly passed by him and placed a small bill in his bowl.

I SPENT HOURS discussing the old beggarman with my Chinese colleagues. In their view, he probably was not, as I had supposed he must be, a dispossessed middle peasant who had been expelled from a people's commune as a "class enemy." He could have been anyone—peasant lives are hard, they assured me, and had been even harder under the "gang of four." And, I was told, there were beggars everywhere in China, except for Shanghai and Beijing, where they are not tolerated.

The espisode shook me up like no other. Nothing had prepared me for the discovery of eleemosynary socialism. Poverty, yes; poverty one had heard about. Misery—why, even misery one could expect. But beggars? In socialist China? And so openly, scarcely a mile from the nearest tourist hotel?

Here I had been living in China for over a year, reading everything I could about the country, talking to people both Chinese and foreign—and only once had I heard it whispered that someone had spotted a beggar in Guangzhou (Canton), but who knows what that really was, anyway.

Metaphorically, the story of the beggar in Guilin can be viewed as a nexus of a number of dimensions that make up a foreigner's view of China. It reflects the circumstances of the peasantry; the rural-urban differences; social stratification in China; and of course foreigners themselves, in their ever-ambivalent roles.

It reflects, above all, the epistemological difficulty of finding out a measure of truth about China. The foreigner lives in one place, and knows (after a fashion) Beijing or Shanghai. But 80 percent of the Chinese live in rural China. How does one develop a composite view of the country as a whole? Indeed, can it be done?

Several authors of the books under review experienced their own "Guilin beggars," a moment of revelation of how little they (we) really know about the country. China has been "open" a very short time, and areas of access have always been very carefully controlled. Visitors know far, far more about the cities of China than they do about the countryside. Certainly, a trip to a people's commune is featured on every itinerary, but what can it tell?

Administratively, China is divided into some 2,300 counties. Probably not more than 200 of them have ever welcomed a foreign visitor. The cumulative observations of *all* foreigners thus reveal nothing about perhaps 2,100 entire counties in China, counties where altogether, figuring conservatively, some 500 million people live.

But the ignorance goes even deeper. Every county has a number of people's communes, and every commune is subdivided into production brigades and production teams. A production team—a small collective farm composed of an average of 34 households (approximately 160 people)—generally corresponds in area and population to a traditional Chinese village.[1] And even among production teams within the same brigade there can be substantial differences in work habits, work assignments, and living standards. Thus, if we know a little about a few model teams in a few communes in 200 or so counties, we know *nothing* about the other counties. The limitations on how far we can generalize are enormous. In fact, we cannot generalize at all.

WHAT ELSE may be happening in China, unknown to the world? The Chinese press from time to time alludes to continuing poverty. Take a recent story about how things have improved: 47 counties have doubled their production since 1979. Among these, 80 percent (37 counties or so) had started out with a per capita income of less than 50 yuan (about US$30) annually.[2] This alone speaks of 10 to 15 million people who until recently lived in extreme poverty, about which foreigners knew nothing. We learn about them now only because their lot has improved substantially. One wonders how many other counties still have an annual per capita income of less than $30, and what life is like there.

But the urban Chinese do not seem to know how the peasants live either—or at least they did not know until the Cultural Revolution. During the chaos of the late 1960's, city youth roaming the countryside were apparently as shocked as foreigners would be today at the abysmal misery they en-

[1] In 1979, there were 53,348 communes, 699,000 brigades, and 5,154,000 teams in China. See Francis C. Tuan and Frederick W. Crook, *Planning and Statistical Systems in China's Agriculture*, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 181, Washington, DC, US Department of Agriculture, 1983, pp. 8–9.

[2] *Beijing Review*, Oct. 10, 1983, p. 7.

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countered. In Roger Garside's book, for example, we have the testimony of Wei Jingsheng—who in 1978 became one of China's most prominent leaders of the then-burgeoning "Democracy Wall" human-rights groups. One of Wei's most poignant recollections concerns rural misery—of which, at age 16, he had been quite unaware:

As our train stopped at a station in the Gansu Corridor, a woman with a dirty face and long, loose hair came forward in a group of beggars. She stood begging below the window of my compartment, together with several teenagers. I leaned out of the window to hold out a few buns, but instantly fell back, because I saw something I could never have imagined: the woman with long, loose hair was a girl of eighteen and her body was naked. What I had thought were clothes were coal dust and mud that covered her body. As I shrank away, the girl and youngsters with her raised their plaintive voices. I threw down a few buns and they scrambled for them. A man sitting opposite me in the compartment said wryly: "This is the first time you've seen something like this, isn't it? But here we see it all around us.... (p. 268)

Liang Heng, about whom more later, grew up in Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province. He too knew nothing about the life of the peasantry, but the ignorance, as it turned out, was mutual. At one point during the Cultural Revolution he visited distant relatives in the countryside. They lived some three miles from the county seat, which had a regular bus connection with Changsha. But apparently "aside from one or two young men who had joined the army, the people there had never met anyone from the [provincial] capital, and had never had any reason to go there themselves" (p. 95).

Nevertheless, the villagers' posters carried the same message as those in the city: "Down with Capitalist Roaders." But there was a difference. The local Cultural Revolution Committee leader was not really sure who these capitalist roaders were supposed to be. "It's so hard for us to get information here," he explained. "There is no radio in the Production Team, and we have to go all the way to the commune office to see a newspaper" (p. 97).

These voices, of the Chinese themselves, are the most valuable aspect of books about China, and the most refreshing one. Writing about China is in some ways an art—that of working extremely hard at learning about China but being able to convey the immediacy of the country as though it were an effortless achievement. Unfortunately, Richard Bernstein is not too good at that. Instead, he seems to focus far too much on the extremely hard work of being the correspondent. When trying to bring the reader close to the sights, sounds, and lives of China's people, he cannot seem to get out of the way. Thus, one sees only *his* efforts, *his* opinions, and *his* commentary—when often, one would like just the facts.

This may be just a quibble, for the facts certainly are there. Bernstein's writing about Sichuan Province, for example, is as good as any, and in the last chapters of the book, he does stand aside and let his Chinese friends take over. But overall the Bernstein book is irritating, especially when measured against the Garside and Butterfield books.

Butterfield introduces an entire cast of ordinary people, some of them unforgettable. One of his friends, Lihua, was six years old when the Cultural Revolution erupted. At that age, her life took a bitter turn. Her family was rusticated—"sent down" to the countryside to work among the peasants—and her parents were tormented by activists, leaving Lihua to care for her younger siblings. This is searing, devastating reading. An old woman at age 20, Lihua will find happiness only in death; she has not been happy for a single day of her life, and does not expect that to change.

OUR UNDERSTANDING of China expands along a new, human dimension when illuminated by these personal accounts. They breathe life into a scholar's detached analysis. We comprehend a country through empathy with its people, and want to know as much about their daily affairs as possible. We want, in effect, to learn every detail of Lihua's life.

This type of understanding we get from Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro. The charm of their book sparkles on the first page, and never dissipates. At age four, Liang Heng tries to escape from his child-care center because it is "hateful." He misses his grandmother, who earlier had cared for him while his parents worked as cadres in the party—his mother a clerk validating arrest warrants in the Changsha Public Security Bureau, his father a reporter/editor on the party's newspaper, the *Hunan Daily*. But now he is a ward of the state educational system, at least during the daytime, a privilege reserved only for the children of cadres.

Liang Heng sounds typical of millions. He was born after the 1949 "liberation," to parents with a slightly blotted dossier. During the Cultural Revolution, he at times rode high in the saddle, at times

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was trampled underfoot. A streetwise gamin, he leaped at the few breaks life had in store for him: basketball, a factory job, a little more education. We owe this book to the chance through which he met Ms. Shapiro: first his teacher, now his wife.

Their book is priceless. It is an extremely well-written, unpretentious, moving account of growing up. In my opinion, it supplants Chen Jo-hsi's excellent *Execution of Mayor Yin* as the single best book on the Cultural Revolution, fact or fiction, popular or academic.

We have all wondered about the Cultural Revolution, about the twists and turns of Chinese politics, about reversals of policies, about the rewriting of history. How do the Chinese really feel about all this? And how do they manage?

We get to find out. To manage is difficult. Since the "line" changes all the time, one has to take advantage when the moment is favorable. Mistrust permeates—and paralyzes—all social intercourse; even pillow talk between spouses all too often turns into virulent arguments, especially during political campaigns. (Paradoxically, many foreign teachers, including Edoarda Masi, find that the Chinese seem to trust them more than they trust their own colleagues. Foreigners may not understand, but they will not squeal.) As a result, informal connections become all the more critical. They are based on family, school ties, or services rendered—known in China as *guanxi*—but very seldom on mutual trust.

Above all, we find out how demoralizing certain aspects of the Chinese system can be—the secrecy, the intrigue, the vacillation, which, in essence, deprive the country of any consistent code of social behavior.

Damage wrought by the Cultural Revolution extends to the area of ethics as well. Before the Cultural Revolution, Lihua notes, peasants had been *hen lao shi,* very upright and honest. But to survive the chaos, they became "evil." "Peasants began to steal from each other's private plots. You had to watch your neighbors didn't take your chickens or pig. People's philosophy became *guo yi tian, suan yi tian* (get through the day and forget it)" (p. 119).

Wei Jingsheng, Lihua, and Liang Heng are so credible precisely because they come across as moral people. They are moved by motives that we recognize and that we can identify with: they crave for honesty, decency, morality. They may not know Kant's categorical imperative by name, but they are guided by it just the same.

EDOARDA MASI, who taught Italian in Shanghai in 1976–77, the pivotal transition year after Mao Zedong's death, brings a very different perspective to bear on all these issues—the perspective of a person enamored of the Cultural Revolution. At times, it seems as though Masi neither sees nor cares about the lives of individual people. She meets a teacher who had been persecuted for 20 years, listens sympathetically to his story, and then catches herself: "Love and compassion. Be careful of those feelings..." (p. 212). This she does to remind herself that ideology is more important than people's well-being. Thus, the constant changes in policy that the ordinary Chinese perceives as thoroughly disruptive become in Masi's view a "dialectic between construction and struggle" (p. 16). At other times, she seems to see things positively wrongly. Even as Butterfield's Lihua is starving in Hunan, Masi is writing that "nobody died of hunger" during the Cultural Revolution (p. 295), indeed that "today, no one lacks for food" (p. 56).

Masi's book is unsettling. How can she be so gullible, blind, biased, brainwashed? It may be that Masi simply never found her "Guilin beggar." Three million people in China, all partisans of the Cultural Revolution and the leftist policies then in vogue, are to undergo ideological rectification in the coming years.[3] Masi's book is at least a useful reminder of what thinking they are to be purged of, while Liang Heng and others detail the sufferings that the process will likely entail. (Bernstein illustrates with chilling detail—on pages 210–11—the methods of brainwashing that appear to have been in place as early as 1942, in Yan'an.)

Even Masi, who insists on the correctness of the Cultural Revolution, at times understands the difference between appearances and reality; she knows that reality is always more complex than whatever opinions one may have reached. About the flood of "large character" wallposters, *dazibao,* that followed the fall of the "gang of four" (an outpouring she regards "with disgust") she makes this observation:

Each person understands more or less, depending on his mastery of the communication code. A mandarin empire is coming to light, where long-lived gangs contend for power, join forces, split. Where power lies in knowing the secrets of those gangs. Where any opinion whatever is expressed, but only by

[3] For the full text of "The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Party Consolidation—Adopted by the Second Plenary Session of the 12th Party Central Committee (October 11, 1983)," see ibid., Oct. 17, 1983.

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allusion or metaphor. Where everything that is said or written on whatever subject can be twisted to convey a second, third, fourth meaning.... To what lengths the ciphering of discourse can go is hard to imagine. (p. 186)

Masi's reflections on the multiplicity of meanings and on the contortions that facts can be put through are illuminated in Yao Ming-le's book about Lin Biao, Mao's erstwhile heir apparent, who perished in a plane crash over Mongolia in September 1971—or so goes the official version, at least. However, the basic contention of *The Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao* is quite different. According to Yao, it was not Lin Biao who died in the crash, but his son, Lin Liguo. At the time, contends Yao, the elder Lin was in Beijing supping with Mao. On his way home from the dinner, he and his wife were assassinated on orders from Mao.

Wang Dongxing, the head of Mao's personal security apparatus, conducted the investigation of Lin Biao's demise. This was extremely convenient, states Yao, since Wang allegedly arranged Lin's assassination. According to the book, Wang collected two sets of documents: the real evidence; and a doctored version of the real evidence, amounting to a cover-up, which was eventually fed to the public. Yao claims to have read memoirs of the person who was in charge of collecting the real evidence.

OTHER REVIEWS of Yao's book have focused on the question of whether all this is true or just an elaborate hoax. In view of the principle that everything in China is more complex than it appears, the story is certainly plausible. But the books under review here inspire a different—and maybe overly cynical—question: Does it really matter whether Lin Biao died in Beijing or in Mongolia, or whether the Chinese leadership has been engaged in yet another falsification of history?

Someone somewhere in China (the since disgraced Wang Dongxing for one) knows the real truth. Nothing is forgotten in the People's Republic. An obscure polemic between Lu Xun, arguably China's greatest 20th-century writer, and the then very young Zhang Chunqiao, one of the gang of four, was disinterred 40 years later, a few days after Zhang fell from power, to be used as an argument against him.[4] So, too, may the Lin Biao story be exhumed.

But nothing is remembered, either. As part of his curriculum at Hunan Teachers' College, Liang Heng was assigned for a period of student-teaching to what was reputed to be Changsha's best school. His pupils viewed him with utter disbelief when he talked about the Cultural Revolution. They simply could not visualize battles of such magnitude raging in their own town. "Their political indoctrination," Liang says, "was the same as ours had been before the great upheaval; they were certainly not being taught to evaluate things for themselves, and movies and books about China's past were still above all else political documents, criticized and censored. There seemed to be no way to ensure that the same tragedy would not be replayed" (p. 291). Perhaps the books under review will help ensure that the same tragedy will not also be replayed in foreigners' perceptions of China.

[4] See Masi, *China Winter*, p. 161.

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Soviets and Southwest Asia

Barry Rubin

HENRY BRADSHER. *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.* Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1982.

ANTHONY ARNOLD. *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1983.

K. P. MISRA, Ed. *Afghanistan in Crisis.* New York, NY, Advent Books, 1981.

G. S. BHARGAVA. *South Asian Security after Afghanistan.* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1983.

ARYEH YODFAT. *The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula.* London, Croom Helm, 1983.

MIRON REZUN. *The Soviet Union and Iran.* Leiden, Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1981.

WHEN A SOVIET fighter plane shot down a Korean airliner with 269 people aboard last September, several journalists suggested that the emotional outpouring and political anger around the Western world were a bit anomalous. After all, men, women, and children were being killed by Soviet forces every week in Afghanistan. If one is seeking a fitting example of the nature of the USSR, its imperialist war in Afghanistan is far more suitable than a random event over the even more remote skies of Siberia.

Of course, it is not difficult to discover the reason for this anomaly. Destruction of a Boeing 747 passenger plane by an air-to-air missile is both more dramatic and more comprehensible for people who have experienced international air travel but not village life in a war zone. But it is the distant, secluded nature of Afghanistan itself, and the difficulty of obtaining reliable reports from that country, that are probably at the root of the Western mass media's relative disinterest. Only for a few weeks immediately following the Soviet invasion did this large-scale violence get significant coverage.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan represents a continuing and tragically clear-cut case of Soviet aggression. The background, already dim in popular memory, can be briefly recapitulated here. A tiny minority of pro-Moscow Communists, themselves split into two antagonistic factions whose mutual loathing goes beyond even murder, seized power in Kabul in April 1978. They embarked on a campaign of ruthless repression and "modernizing"—but unpopular—reforms. While discontent and revolt boiled over in rural areas, not kindly inclined toward central authority to begin with, the Afghan army started to dissolve in purges and desertions. The government's feeble powers of administration declined still further, while the beleaguered Communist rulers fought among themselves to the point of assassination attempts and shootouts in the presidential palace.

The Soviet Union, whose advisers were taking more and more control over the daily management of the country, sensed a humiliating reversal in the making. The Soviets wanted someone in power who was totally under their control. Their plot to eliminate the increasingly powerful maverick Hafizollah Amin, the number-two man in the Afghan Communist hierarchy, was bungled. Instead, Amin eliminated the revolution's original leader, Nur Mohammad Taraki, and desperately tried to cope with the wellnigh impossible task of running a Communist regime loyal to and dependent upon Soviet masters who were trying to kill him.

Clearly, this situation could not long endure. At the end of December 1979, Soviet troops did the job themselves. Amin was killed, and an elaborate but transparent ruse was enacted in which the Soviets invited themselves into the country. The newly installed Afghan leader, Babrak Karmal, was a mere

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figurehead, next to whom the rulers of Poland and Czechoslovakia might well be considered paragons of nationalism. Afghanistan as a whole could hardly be compared even to Eastern Europe, where indigenous Communists at least run the daily operations of government; for, notwithstanding the uncontrollable internecine conflicts of the Afghan Communists, Kabul came almost as tightly under Moscow's rule as any part of the USSR itself.

With the country under Soviet occupation, the opposition of the Afghan people became nearly total. Millions of refugees fled across the border into Pakistan and Iran. An Afghan guerrilla resistance movement received clandestine support from a number of Western and Islamic countries—though military supplies, especially of antiaircraft equipment, remained well below the movement's absorptive capacity. The guerrilla war appeared endless, despite occasional hints of a political settlement. Some observers saw the conflict as "Moscow's Vietnam"; others (or sometimes the very same individuals) thought it a forward thrust of Soviet forces toward vital Western lifelines.

In global perspective, the brutal Soviet action reproduced some of the saddest aspects of the late 1940's, when Moscow's expansionist intentions were so clearly demonstrated. With the heightened importance of the Persian Gulf's oil and newfound wealth, the invasion was particularly alarming to Western thinking. Events in Afghanistan, one of the most remote and seemingly least important countries in the world, sparked a dramatic increase in East-West tensions, military buildups or shifts to the right among politicians and intellectuals in many countries, and (at least for a while) a rude jolt to Moscow's overall political/ideological position in the Third World.

While most of the foregoing is familiar, several controversies and mysteries remain. How closely was Moscow involved in the original Communist takeover in Kabul? What has been the exact relationship of Afghanistan's two competing Communist factions, so uncomfortably united under the Soviet thumb? Why did the USSR invade Afghanistan, and what do its motives tell us about broader Soviet objectives? How will the crisis develop in the future: is the occupation permanent, or is a diplomatic resolution possible? And finally, in what manner does the invasion relate to Moscow's wider policy in the Middle East—particularly in neighboring Iran and in the oil-rich Arab countries across the Gulf?

AT FIRST GLANCE, it may be difficult to imagine a Communist party overthrowing a government without consulting Moscow in advance. Nevertheless, the information offered in the books by Henry Bradsher and by Anthony Arnold makes it seem quite possible that, in the Afghan case, the takeover was indeed something of a snap decision. Communist leaders, who were being rounded up by the neutralist pre-1978 government of Mohammad Daoud, managed to send a message to key army officers who were also party members to act immediately. The Afghan officers who staged the April 1978 coup no doubt informed the Kremlin even as they moved to capture Kabul, and the Soviets quickly came to their assistance. It seems plausible that the whole operation may not have been entirely thought through, though Bradsher probably goes too far (pp. 76–81) in suggesting that the army—as in the Ethiopian case—acted on its own, and that the party took over only after the event. Rather, as Arnold clearly shows, the coup's leaders were tightly tied to the party, and their records demonstrate a loyalty to the Soviets even greater than that evinced by the Communist party's civilian leaders.

In this connection, Arnold notes the important shift of both Communist factions, some years previously, toward stressing recruitment of army officers—most of whom had been trained in the USSR. Obviously, they were preparing for a future takeover (pp. xiii-xiv), but events forced their hand. What, asks a Soviet commentator (cited by Bradsher, p. 82), was "this political vanguard to do?" They could scarcely pass up such an opportunity for power, but many of the new regime's subsequent problems of disorganization, infighting, and disastrous economic and social programs arose from the takeover's ad hoc origins.

Beyond such insights into the original Communist coup in Kabul, both authors provide a wealth of fascinating information about more recent events. Although the two books disagree on some issues and overlap in some of the material they cover, they generally complement each other very nicely. Bradsher, a veteran journalist, has written a well-researched and readable book that is perhaps the best overall account of Afghanistan's sorry fate. Arnold, a former intelligence officer, has produced an extremely useful volume focusing in more detail on that country's bifurcated Communist party. His work is useful not only for its intrinsic merit, but also as an example of the skills and chain of thought employed by a good political analyst.

Arnold's most original contribution, suggested in the title of his book, lies in his knowledgeable and detailed analysis of the internal makeup and often violent inter-

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action of Afghanistan's two Communist factions: the currently dominant Parcham (Banner), and the larger but subordinate Khalq (Masses), to which both Taraki and Amin had belonged. The former faction, he suggests, recruited from the children of the elite (mostly, but not exclusively, the sons, in Afghanistan's male-dominated society); while the latter had more success among those from humbler backgrounds. Both initially drew heavily from among teachers, government employees, and students, all of whom faced an uncertain future. Parchamis, more addicted to power, took a more gradualist line, which permitted them to participate in the traditionalist Daoud regime. Their Khalqi rivals, by contrast, saw themselves as more revolutionary and remained outside the government.

There seems to be much merit in the possibility suggested by Arnold (pp. 55-56) that the Soviets found it useful to have two factions with these somewhat different strategies. Parcham, Karmal's faction, was more explicitly and slavishly devoted to Moscow, maintaining closer ties than Khalq with the Soviet embassy, and supporting Daoud's government so long as it served Soviet interests. But Khalq, too, remained basically loyal to Moscow, and too isolated at home ever to escape its grasp. The one point on which both factions refused to heed Soviet advice was their continued determination to displace, imprison, and even kill each other's leaders. A minor but interesting point illustrated by Arnold is the Soviet use of third-country Communist parties (especially the Indian CP) in attempting to recruit members for and impose unity upon Afghanistan's quarreling Communist factions.

When this indirect approach proved futile, the Soviets moved directly and in force, sending some 85,000 troops across the border to shore up the tottering Kabul regime. The decision to invade was undoubtedly facilitated by a complex of underlying factors, which Bradsher sensibly summarizes (pp. 163–68) as follows: Moscow's stronger military and political situation in recent years; its "experiments" in intervention in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen; a lessening US ability to counter such moves; Marxist ideological dictates; Soviet concern about maintaining credibility; and a calculation that US-Soviet relations—already strained for other reasons—would not be significantly damaged.

As for Moscow's ultimate intentions in the wake of the 1979 invasion, these have occasioned perhaps the greatest single controversy over Afghanistan, generating a lengthy and somewhat arid debate. There are "offensive" and "defensive" schools, usually coinciding with the observer's political views. The former holds that the invasion of Afghanistan was part of a regional or even global design to attain hegemony. At a minimum, Moscow is seen as improving its ability to operate militarily in that vicinity, and to take further steps toward gaining leverage over the Persian Gulf. The latter school argues that the USSR acted "only" to prevent the collapse of a Communist regime and the possible spread of an Islamic fundamentalist "virus" among its own growing Muslim population.

This whole issue has taken too much time and attention. The situation is as inherently ambiguous today as it was just after World War II, when US policymakers were faced with a similar riddle. Were Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe and other neighbors designed to extend Moscow's rule, or were these policies born of the trauma of past invasions of the USSR through those very same territories? The answer, of course, was that these two approaches were mutually reinforcing. The plains of Poland could be used as easily for Soviet advances to the west as they had been for anti-Soviet offensives to the east.

"If initially successful," wrote US diplomat George Kennan from Moscow in May 1944, "will [the USSR] know where to stop? Will it not be inexorably carried forward, by its very nature, in the struggle to reach the whole—to attain complete mastery of the shores of the Atlantic and the Pacific?"[1] Kennan's boss, Ambassador Averell Harriman, added the following September that, "What frightens me ... is that when a country begins to extend its influence by strong-arm methods beyond its borders under the guise of security, it is difficult to see how a line can be drawn. If the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbors for security, penetration of the next immediate neighbors becomes at a certain time equally logical."[2] That same month, White House adviser Adolph Berle, referring to the Soviet doctrine that neighboring governments must be "friendly," observed that "if it is meant that these governments must not engage in intrigue against the Soviet Union there could be no possible objection"—but if it meant that "virtual puppet governments are to be established, a different situation would prevail."[3]

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[1] See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), October 1967, pp. 22-52.

[2] W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin*, New York, NY, Random House, 1975, pp. 345-47.

[3] Beatrice Berle, *Navigating the Rapids*, New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973, pp. 462, 468.

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These arguments, which defined the position of US leaders in accepting the challenge of cold war, are worth citing at length because they fit Washington's response to the contemporary Afghan situation so well. The United States never had serious problems with the Daoud regime's pro-Soviet tilt, and never tried to pull Afghanistan away from its understandable course of carefully cultivating good relations with its powerful northern neighbor. But once Soviet forces crossed the border, the first problem for the United States was the transformation of Afghanistan into a Soviet puppet to an extent hardly true of other Soviet clients in the Third World. The relationship between, say, Libya or Syria and the USSR does not generally prevent those states from doing what they please in internal or regional affairs. The situation in occupied Afghanistan is quite different. The USSR, most Western analysts would agree, did not miscalculate its *interests* in Afghanistan, but factors beyond its control provoked an invasion where it would have preferred more indirect methods. The main Soviet mistake was to underestimate international opposition to its move—yet even this error has entailed only limited costs.

The second problem for the United States is that, whatever motivations can be adduced for the USSR's Afghan policy, the fact of Soviet occupation and the potential for further expansion when local opportunities arise—as in the Eastern Europe of the 1940's—are highly disturbing in relation to the future of US interests in the region. Moreover, given this situation, Moscow is determined to maintain its control over Afghanistan, making a political settlement there unlikely. This, at any rate, represents a typical if not unanimous US assessment.

RATHER DIFFERENT perspectives are presented in the two books produced by Indian authors reviewed here. K. P. Misra, an international relations professor at Nehru University, and G. S. Bhargava, a veteran Indian journalist, take positions more characteristic of some Third World responses to Soviet policy. Misra and his contributors represent the mainstream of current official Indian thinking. The Soviet invasion is seen as not too dissimilar from the kinds of things done by the United States; they cite the example of US hostility toward Salvador Allende's regime in Chile, and one suspects that the US military intervention in Grenada would furnish these writers with an even more recent analogy. There are, in this view, simply two superpowers that dominate their respective spheres of influence, and there is not too much qualitative difference between them. The various authors are particularly suspicious of opposition to the Soviets and to the Kabul government because it is Pakistan, India's arch-rival on the subcontinent, that has been the beneficiary of increased US aid and support in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

These analysts view the Afghan resistance as merely "a backlash [against] long-overdue social and economic reforms" and as a "religious crusade." At any rate, they are not especially worried about the Soviet takeover, since they see Afghanistan as an atypical extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Soviets, they argue, had little interest in converting Afghanistan to communism and even less in using it as a springboard for further expansion. In fact, Moscow "walked into a trap" in Afghanistan because it now shoulders the whole burden of war and political rule, with none of the advantages of having a neutral buffer on its borders. Thus, the contributors to the Misra collection are sanguine about the prospects for an eventual negotiated settlement, since Moscow will ultimately realize that it was better served by the pre-1978 situation.

Bhargava's view of Soviet priorities is similar, but he is more moderate on a range of related issues. He understands the legitimacy of Afghan grievances, and is both less hostile to Pakistan and less prone to conspiracy theories. He agrees that Soviet interests ultimately require extrication from the Afghanistan quagmire, but he is nevertheless more pessimistic about negotiations. The Soviet idea of a political solution, he writes, "does not tally with what may be necessary to preserve the independence and nonalignment of Afghanistan and, more crucially, with what will satisfy Western security interests in Southwest Asia" (p. 2).

Undaunted, Bhargava tries to outline a possible solution. The United States might give up the Indian Ocean base of Diego Garcia and agree with the Soviets on a mutual disengagement from the region, in exchange for the neutralization of Afghanistan. An integral part of this plan would be a rapprochement between India and Pakistan. The problem with this approach is that it assumes that the Soviets are looking for a way out even if it would involve a surrender of control over Afghanistan, and that Moscow thinks its interests would be served by an end to Indo-Pakistani friction—both of them questionable assumptions.

By contrast, Arnold argues that only much greater pressure from the Afghan guerrillas might yet persuade the Soviets to leave; and Bradsher is convinced that the occupation is likely to be permanent no matter what. Unfortunately, it is hard to believe that Bradsher is

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wrong. The Soviets can put up with the guerrillas for a long time; their casualties are bearable, and the worst of the international reaction is long past. Despite the Indian scholars' arguments, both precedent and the local balance of forces suggest that the USSR will not find a sustained presence in Afghanistan to be contrary to its own interests.

In fact, from a wider Mideast perspective, intervention in Afghanistan appears to be part of a basic change in Soviet strategy. Moscow has shifted its emphasis from the region's core to its periphery, from the more to the less developed states, and from those subject to traditional Arab nationalism to those where that ideology is less important. Clearly, this is a response to the opportunities of the 1970's as well as to the lessons of the 1950's and 1960's. The Soviets expended a great deal of effort (and sometimes even money) in Egypt, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria, with almost no long-term return or even (except in the last country) a lasting political or military foothold for attempting to assert their influence.

Given such long-standing differences between Arab nationalists in those "core" countries and the USSR, the Soviets have lately found it more profitable to work with favorably disposed forces in Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of (South) Yemen, Afghanistan, and, to a lesser extent, Libya. In the first three cases, Moscow sought alternatives to Arab socialism and the "noncapitalist road," seeking to install in power—with varying degrees of success—Leninist-style parties committed to doctrinaire Marxism rather than independently minded military officers.

This strategy has so far yielded rather mixed results. In Ethiopia, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam has successfully resisted the formation of an exclusive Communist party, since this would undoubtedly undermine his personal control. Ideology, moreover, is largely a matter of lip service for his government, which views Soviet-Cuban help against secessionist opponents as a higher priority. Addis Ababa's mounting debts to the USSR have increased the strain between the two countries, so Moscow's foothold in Ethiopia is potentially insecure. South Yemen represents a greater Soviet success story, since a single-party Marxist regime there has consolidated its rule. The USSR-PDRY relationship may have reached a point of no return beyond which no government in Aden could displace Soviet influence. Even there, however, there have been internal power struggles between individuals more inclined toward dependence on Moscow and those attracted by the prospect of Saudi financial aid.

In the core area of the Middle East, meanwhile, Moscow's influence—despite the recent enhancement of the Soviet presence in Syria—remains at about its lowest point in the last quarter-century. In part this must be traced to the decision to invade Afghanistan. In Iran and perhaps even more so in Iraq, the invasion appears to have had a significant adverse effect on relations with the USSR. Yet it is too easy to overstate this connection. The idea that the Soviets will pay dearly for their misdeeds in the court of public opinion has often arisen in earlier crises—the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, or the more recent suppression of Solidarity in Poland—and yet the shock of such actions eventually seems to pass. Notwithstanding the lopsided majority votes in the United Nations opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the alarms set off by that event ring less clearly in the Third World (as the books by our Indian authors indicate) than some US policymakers might like to believe.

INDEED, even in the nearby (and overwhelmingly Muslim) Arabian Peninsula, it is mainly other issues besides Afghanistan that effectively limit Soviet influence. Aryeh Yodfat's book succinctly describes these issues: local dislike of Communist parties, divisions among the Arabs, differing cultural orientations, preoccupation with local conflicts, rapid political change and instability that often operate against the USSR's friends, the poor quality of Soviet aid, the traditionalist political conservatism of the sheikhdoms, and the rediscovery by a new generation of Arab leaders of the value of Western organizational techniques and technology. As a result, even as the Gulf Arab states shy away from a formal "strategic consensus" or basing agreements with Washington, the potential Soviet (and, more immediately, Iranian) threat has impelled them toward a fair measure of quiet security cooperation with the United States.

Generally, however, Western observers tend to exaggerate the East-West aspects of regional developments; in reality, the local actors have enough conflicting ambitions of their own to fuel sporadic upheavals. Indeed, Moscow has only rarely penetrated the conservative monarchies of the Peninsula, and there is thus not much story for Yodfat to tell. Nevertheless, his book is important because it describes what may be the prologue to some rather dramatic developments in international politics and Soviet foreign policy in the coming decade. The Gulf's importance and potential instability are both

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manifest, and Moscow is unlikely to accept easily or indefinitely the exclusion that has characterized its arms-length relationship with that area in the recent past.

Miron Rezun's book looks at a still earlier era of Soviet policy in and around the Gulf: relations with Iran during the 1920's and 1930's. The book as a whole is uneven, occasionally endorsing rather farfetched theories without convincing evidence. But Rezun's detailed narrative, based on a variety of archival sources, contains much of genuine interest, especially on the way that Moscow blended diplomacy, economic relations, and covert operations. The Iranians, for their part, responded by experimenting with a Daoud-type approach to relations with the USSR. In some cases, they were able to evade Moscow's grasp; for example, the Soviets spent years cultivating the then-Shah's minister of court, Abdul Hossein Khan Teymourtash, only to look on helplessly as he later fell victim to court intrigue. Rezun's analysis thus illustrates Yodfat's point that "the Soviet position in the region depends heavily on local developments and on the existence of local friends or allies" (p. 157).

If that is indeed the case, and if (as is all too likely) the Mideast mosaic continues to shift with the bewildering rapidity of recent years, one may wonder how "relevant" the historical analyses presented in the volumes under review will remain. Yet in the Middle East—where perhaps more than in any other part of the world local quarrels and prejudices have festered for generations—contemporary issues cannot be understood without some knowledge of their history. The Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, in particular, will almost certainly be an arena where past conflicts continue to be played out in the coming years. Of the authors reviewed here, Bradsher, Arnold, and Yodfat have made the largest contributions to an understanding of the background of current events in that region, thereby establishing a framework for informed analysis of unfolding Soviet policy in this volatile part of the world.

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Correspondence

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KOSOVO AS MICROCOSM?

TO THE EDITORS: I found Mark Baskin's contribution, "Crisis in Kosovo," in your March-April 1983 issue an informative account of the Kosovo disturbances in 1981.

Permit me to comment, however, on the section entitled "Economics of Stabilization." In this section, Mr. Baskin examines Kosovo's past economic achievement in order to test the hypothesis that "well-stocked stores and full stomachs ... elicit the political acquiescence of the population in the short term, and ... provide a basis for support of the regime in the long term" (p. 65).

He finds that in Kosovo—the least-developed region in Yugoslavia—"there has unquestionably been rapid growth of national income.... Yet, the gap separating Kosovo from the rest of Yugoslavia has continued to widen." Therefore, Kosovars could complain in 1980 that " 'the resources set aside were not sufficient to ensure developing Kosovo as rapidly as possible' " (p. 65).

At issue here are two principal questions: why was there a gap to start with, and why has it widened? People have written whole books on these matters without providing definitive answers! In the case of Yugoslavia—let us be brave—"severe regional dualism may in part be explained by historical accident. Yugoslavia's unusual history, which has produced such a high degree of ethnic, religious and linguistic nonhomogeneity, surely explains a large part of their contemporary problems with regional inequality" (Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: A Description of the Patterns," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* [Chicago, IL], July 1965, Part II, p. 16).

Regional differences in income per capita reflect differences in labor productivity, which in turn are governed, inter alia, by differences in labor/capital ratios. If there are no constraints to free movement of productive factors, labor would move to areas with lower labor/capital ratios, where their earnings would be greater. In practice, such an outflow of labor may adversely affect the growth of the sending region, if the emigrants are replaced by less-productive workers. Of course, movement of capital in the reverse direction would result in equalization of labor/capital ratios, thus eliminating a fundamental cause of income differentials. To what extent either movement is experienced in reality is determined largely by the economic policies of the country in question.

During the postwar period, Yugoslav policy appears to have been more willing to import capital to Kosovo than to export labor from the region. The richer "North" contributed an increasing share of its gross material product (GMP) as direct aid to the less-developed "South," and Kosovo received the bulk of it. In the period 1976–80 the share was 1.97 percent (Mr. Baskin's figure of 1.85 percent was for the period 1966–70), which represented more than 70 percent of the total investment capital in the region. The federal government also allocated 0.97 percent of Yugoslav GMP for supplementary financing earmarked for the development of social services in the less-developed republics. Finally, a series of indirect measures were introduced with the specific purpose of stimulating investment in the underdeveloped "South" (On these measures, see *The Policy and Results of the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Republics and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo,* Belgrade, Secretariat for Information, 1977, pp. 41–42).

All of these efforts, nevertheless, were insufficient to close the gap. The persistence of income differentials, however, is not a Yugoslav peculiarity. Italians worry about Mezzogiorno; Canadians, about the Maritimes; Australians, about the Outback—the list is long. If we, at the same time, remember that Kosovars in Yugoslavia enjoy a much higher standard of living than the Albanians in Albania and that there are regions in the so-called developed republics of Yugoslavia whose inhabitants are no better off than Kosovars but are expected to fend for themselves, there is little in Yugoslav policy here that could be criticized.

Kosovars could complain that "the resources set aside were not sufficient to ensure developing Kosovo as rapidly as possible," but surely this complaint cannot be taken seriously. Since economic resources are scarce (even) in Yugoslavia, what is meant by insufficiency? To answer this would require an article in itself.

Mr. Baskin is off the mark when he writes that "the decentralizing principles ... continue to provide northern elites with incentives to keep their investment capital ... in their own republics" (p. 66). There is *no way* that a northern republic can avoid contributions to the fund for the development of economically underdeveloped republics. The measure introduced in December 1980, allowing one-half of such assistance to be in the form of direct investment in Kosovo by enterprises from

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Table 1: Unemployment in Yugoslavia

(number unemployed/labor force)

	1961	1971	1981	1982
All of Yugoslavia	2.4	3.6	11.9	12.3
Kosovo	4.7	7.7	27.7	28.6

SOURCE: *Statistiçki Kalendar Jugoslavije* (Statistical Calendar of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, for relevant years.

the developed regions, does not allow "northern" firms to *choose* whether to invest in Kosovo or at home. Consequently, his illustration of "foot-dragging" by the "North" is misplaced.

There is, to be sure, a problem with interregional joint ventures, but it lies in the nature of the self-management system. "Northern" enterprises (or, for that matter, foreign investors) can invest funds and avail themselves of various benefits available to such joint investors, but they *cannot assume control* over the "Southern" enterprise. Therefore, the decision-making authority does not rest with the investor, only the burden of possible losses.

Mr. Baskin's analysis of the unemployment malaise is welcome. A high birthrate, misallocation of educational expenditures (How many Albanian-speaking political scientists can one employ?), and the tendency to invest in prestige projects that are capital-intensive exacerbate what I would consider Kosovo's primary problem. But unemployment is also Yugoslavia's primary problem. The Yugoslav unemployment rate, despite massive temporary emigration to the West, has steadily risen over the last 20 years, while unemployment among the young has reached levels deserving of serious concern. (Of course, given Kosovo's high fertility rate, youth unemployment there is even more pronounced.) However, since the "last two years have provided little good economic news" to Yugoslavia itself, why should things be different for Kosovo?

My main point is that Kosovo, in essence, can be taken as a microcosm of Yugoslavia and that not much should be read into the economic plight of Kosovars that could not rightly be seen as the economic plight of all inhabitants of Yugoslavia in the 1980's (see Table 1). An envious Kosovar will, of course, compare his lot with that of a Slovenian. But who is to deny a Slovenian his right to engage in the equally futile exercise of comparing his lot with that of other Alpine residents? In so doing, he would discover, alas, that resources available in Slovenia were insufficient to provide economic gains to parallel those enjoyed in Kanton Zurich.

E. PRIMORAC
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MR. BASKIN RESPONDS: Professor Primorac's comments on regional economic inequality in Yugoslavia are welcome. They confirm that this problem remains an important issue to observers abroad just as it does to Yugoslav decision-makers. He apparently concurs with my caution regarding Kosovo's capacity to narrow the gap separating it from the rest of Yugoslavia, for he amplifies many of the circumstances to which I pointed in my article: the significant portion of Kosovo's investment capital and government budget provided by the larger Yugoslav community; the positive relationship between differences in labor productivity and differences in per capita income; problems in interrepublic joint ventures; and the "inefficient" use of resources by those responsible for Kosovo's development. The question arises of where hope lies in such a situation.

On strategies for mitigating regional inequality, Primorac raises the interesting issue of resource transfers from the relatively more developed republics (the North) to the relatively less developed republics (the South). He suggests that those in the North are trapped, for "there is *no way*" that a Northern republic or autonomous republic can avoid contributing to the Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Regions. Thus, he implies that the December 1980 measure "allowing one-half of such assistance to be in the form of direct investment in Kosovo by enterprises from the developed regions" does not give them a choice and that therefore they cannot be "dragging their feet" in transferring resources to the less developed republics and Kosovo.

I submit that there is a choice—whether to transfer resources via direct investment or via the Fund—and that it is a significant one, with broad political and economic consequences. On the direct investment of economic resources in Kosovo, moreover, those in the North have been "dragging their feet," not only in the eyes of Kosovar elites but also according to the letter of the law.

This is disappointing because direct investment and joint ventures would seem by far the more promising means of resource transfer. In addition to the transfer of financial resources, joint ventures might also entail the transfer of technical know-how and skills—an effect that is important, if difficult to quantify. Since they would also contribute to economic interdependence between the various republics and autonomous provinces and presumably utilize regional comparative advantages—in Kosovo, labor and natural resources—joint ventures would also contribute to the "unification of the Yugoslav market" in deeds as well as in constitutional rhetoric. The more efficient use of scarce resources would generate greater growth—though not necessarily absolute equality—in all regions of Yugoslavia. Given these multiplicative effects of direct investment, the 1.97 percent of gross material product transferred might well be viewed by "Northerners" more as a lower limit than as a cross they must bear.

Why, then, have those in the North seemingly shunned joint ventures and direct investment in the less developed regions? First, the decentralized political structure has led to compartmentalized financial markets, rendering the interregional transfer of capital less likely. Decision-making in Yugoslav firms reinforces this by retaining accumulated funds for the firms' own use or for the use of the local commune or republic. Artificially high wages in Kosovo's social sector also offsets the province's comparative advantage with respect to labor. In all, the risks are higher and the returns lower in such investment. (On this, see Martin Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan, and Nawal A. El Tatawy, Eds., *Yugoslavia: Self-Management Socialism and the Challenges of Development*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, p. 307.)

Given the administrative difficulties and low potential return, the easiest solution to those in Northern enterprises is to deposit the required 1.97 percent in the Fund and be done with it. Then, too, there is little payoff to those in Northern political structures who facilitate joint ventures and direct investments; regionally based selectorates are far

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CORRECTIONS

It has been brought to our attention by a reader in Malaysia that the caption of a photograph published with Shee Poon Kim's article "Insurgency in Southeast Asia" (*Problems of Communism,* May–June 1983) contained incorrect information. In the photo on p. 46 of that article insurgent leader Chin Peng is the person at the far left. In addition, Malaysia's former leader Tunku *Abdul* (not Aboul) Rahman was still living as of autumn 1983.

* * *

Peter Reddaway has provided the following corrections and expansions on the captions of several photos that accompanied his article "Dissent in the Soviet Union" (*Problems of Communism,* November-December 1983).

Viktor Braylovskiy, included in the photo on page 8, did not emigrate from the Soviet Union; he was arrested in 1980 and sentenced to a five-year term of internal exile.

Elena Bonner, pictured on page 9, is the wife of Andrey Sakharov.

Musa Mamut, whose funeral procession is pictured on page 5, was a Crimean Tatar who immolated himself in the summer of 1978 to protest Soviet efforts to remove from the Crimea some of those few Crimean Tatars who had succeeded in returning to their homeland.

Sergey Batovrin, shown on page 14, was a leading member of the Group for the Establishment of Trust between the USSR and the USA. The hospital in which he is shown is an ordinary, not a special, psychiatric hospital. In May 1983, Soviet authorities granted Batovrin's request to emigrate, and he currently resides in the United States.

* * *

The photo of the harvest in the Soviet Union's Voronezhkaya Oblast in July 1983 (p. 52 of the November-December 1983 issue of *Problems of Communism*) was furnished by TASS from Sovfoto.

more salient to politicians than are federally based ones. In practice, then, the Fund remains the primary instrument of resource transfer.

Why has the Fund not been more effective in mitigating the great inequality between Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia? The most interesting aspect of the Fund's operation is its consistency with federal-level political compromises—i.e., it respects Kosovo's internal integrity. Thus, those supplying the capital to the Fund have little say about how the capital is used. Unfortunately, the composition of investment is determined more by those staffing Kosovo's political institutions than by those active in business and the economy. The result here is investment designed primarily to enhance national pride. Luxury hotels and university libraries do not contribute directly to increases in production, and capital-intensive investment in raw material exploitation maximizes the incomes of those employed while minimizing the growth of employment. If this does little to industrialize Kosovo's economy, it does increase the leverage of those active in politics, placing in their hands the single largest supply of patronage (capital). Finally, there are few penalties for investing in money-losing propositions, for this year's losses can always be covered by next year's allocation from the Fund.

In this context, one may consider Kosovo rather typical in Yugoslavia, for no republic has escaped the mire of politically based economic decision-making. The bauxite processing plant in Obrovac (Croatia) belies the claim that policymakers in the more developed republics minimize economic irrationality. Indeed, Professor Primorac goes so far as to suggest that "Kosovo, in essence, can be taken as a microcosm of Yugoslavia and that not much should be read into the plight of Kosovars that could not rightly be seen as the economic plight of all inhabitants of Yugoslavia in the 1980's."

A sober consideration of Kosovo's position in Yugoslavia might, however, suggest caution on this last score. If measured by such common indicators of development as per capita income, efficiency of fixed assets, labor costs per unit of output, capital stock per capita, or rate of accumulation, Kosovo lags seriously behind all other regions in Yugoslavia. Or take the problem of unemployment cited by Professor Primorac. While no one denies its seriousness nationwide, its intensity varies widely by republic and autonomous province (as well as within these regions). Thus, the more developed regions in Croatia and Slovenia import labor from Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bosnia. (Interestingly, this migration is attended by problems and negative consequences similar to those characterizing migration of Yugoslavs to jobs in Western Europe.) My point here is simply that Kosovo's problems in generating self-sustaining growth are far more serious than those of other parts of Yugoslavia.

Kosovo's unique position within Yugoslavia must also be viewed in its cultural and political dimensions. Recall that Kosovo's overwhelmingly non-Slavic population represents a potential irredenta to neighboring Albania. While some maintain that no amount of resource transfer can reverse the outmigration of Slavs from the province, others have taken to referring to Kosovo as the "Yugoslav Belfast." All of this suggests that Kosovo is far less a microcosm of Yugoslavia than it is an extreme example of the negative consequences attending the decentralization of political and economic decision-making from Federal authorities to regional oligarchies.

MARK BASKIN
University of Michigan

POLAND'S MILITARY BURDEN

TO THE EDITORS: In the article "Poland's Military Burden" (*Problems of Communism,* May-June 1983), Michael Checinski provides a view of Poland's military burden that looks very convincing from Polish eyes but which looked at from a wider perspective gives a different picture, particularly as it seems to contain some important errors.

Mr. Checinski implies (p. 42) that the Poles were forced to produce obsolete T-54/55 tanks until the end of the 1970's. However, S. J. Zaloga states that the USSR itself only stopped producing this model in 1981 (see the entry on the Soviet T-72 tank in *Jane's Defence Review* [London], Vol. 4, No. 5, 1983, pp. 423–34). Third World buyers prefer these earlier models, as they

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combine good firepower and protection with simple, easy-to-maintain systems. Moreover, as both Soviet and other Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) forces rely heavily on reserves to bring divisions up to strength in wartime, it is sensible to maintain a stock of "cheap" tanks with which reservists are familiar and which are simple to operate. One surely cannot complain about the high burden of defense and at the same time demand new and expensive military equipment such as T-72's and MiG-23's. The reason Poland has older military equipment is that it cannot afford better and the USSR does not demand that she acquire same.

The statement that "only in 1977 did Poland start manufacturing An-2's" (p. 42) is very interesting, as all expert opinion to date agrees that the first Polish-built An-2 flew on October 23, 1960, and that 5,000 Polish-built units had been delivered by Feb. 3, 1973 (J.W.R. Taylor, Ed., *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1977-78,* London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1977, pp. 150-51). Similarly, it is generally held that the Mi-2 helicopter has been produced in Poland since 1965, with over 5,000 delivered to date to Soviet and other WTO forces (William Green and Gordon Swanborough, *Observer's Directory of Military Aircraft,* London, F. Warner, 1982, p. 240) as well as exported to the Third World as part of a Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) division of labor. I shall be very interested to read Mr. Checinski's reply to these important points.

Next, there is the point about an unfavorable balance of Poland's arms trade. Surely, this is typical of second-league powers. Can Poland really afford to design and develop complicated weaponry as the Czechs do? Poland spends 4.3 percent of its GNP on defense—less than East Germany and about the same as Bulgaria (*The Military Balance 1982-83,* London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982, p. 124). Clearly, this is a burden, but it is difficult to see how Poland could get away with less, given her geographic position, unless the Poles were willing to accept more than the two Soviet divisions presently on her soil. It is worth pointing out that even Yugoslavia, while having less military control over the government than does Poland, has a more "militaristic" society in budget terms —spending 4.6 percent of its GNP on defense (*The Military Balance, 1982-83,* p. 124).

Of course the USSR will exploit its satellites when it can, although the Russians have extended about 23 billion dollars of aid and loans to Poland over the last 11 years—i.e., almost as much as the West (Jan Vanous, "East European Economic Slowdown," *Problems of Communism* [Washington, DC], July-August 1982, pp. 1-20). The real problem is not that the defense burden is too great, but that the Polish arms industry, like the rest of Poland's economy, is inefficient. That this may well be the result of the imposition of an alien system upon a proud and nationalistic nation is not disputed. But to single out the defense burden for specific blame only hinders analysis and understanding of the real problems.

JOHN A. CLEMENTS
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Mr. Clements is a former Research Fellow in East European Studies at Southampton University and currently a Lecturer in Military Studies at that university's Department of Adult Education. **—Eds.**

MR. CHECINSKI RESPONDS: *Mr. Clements ponts out some factual errors which crept into the published version of my essay. For this I am most grateful. His astuteness seems to fail him, however, when it comes to the basic issue—the total subordination of Poland's military strength to Soviet political and military aims.*

Take, for example, his justification of the spending of 4.3 percent of Poland's GNP for defense. In fact, the defense burden is much higher (see my article on "The Military-Industrial Complex" in NATO Directorate, *The CMEA Five-Year Plans (1981-1985) in a New Perspective: Planned and Non-Planned Economies,* NATO Economic Colloquium, Brussels, 1982, pp. 239-40). As Clements puts it, " ... it is difficult to see how Poland could get away with less, given her geographic position, unless the Poles were willing to accept more than the two Soviet divisions presently on her soil." For some reason, Mr. Clements seems to believe that Soviet occupation units can substitute for Poland's own military strength. And what geography does Mr. Clements have in mind? Certainly not the border with the USSR, or Czechoslovakia, or East Germany—even if the Poles doubled their strength, they would not be able to defend the country against their "fraternal" neighbors. On the other hand, no NATO country today has any intention of attacking Poland. Why then shouldn't the Polish defense budget be reduced by half? According to Polish experts, Poland could solve all of its agricultural investment problems in three years using ony 10 percent of the defense budget (see *Kontakt* [Warsaw-London], No. 2, 1983, p. 51). Making the Polish economy more efficient could save part of the (probably exaggerated) US$23 billion in Soviet "aid" and "loans" extended to that country.

In his observation on the production of the T-54/55 tanks, Mr. Clement again misses the point, which is the subordination of Polish arms production to Soviet needs. Neither Poland's arms production nor its defense burden is decided in Warsaw. Both are decided in the WTO command, e.g., in Moscow. However, Mr. Clements's misunderstanding of my statements regarding the production of the T-54/55 provides an opportunity to explain a basic issue in Soviet arms-production policy. In Warsaw Pact countries new models of weapons never totally replace old ones. For a number of years both models are produced simultaneously, with the old being improved and its numbers declining, while output of the new model increases, taking greater weight in the operating production lines. Even after production of the weapon itself is stopped, parts for the old model continue to be produced for many years. In other words, while we can say when a new model went into production, it is difficult to state exactly when production of the old model came fully to a halt. Even assuming that Mr. Clements's source (Zaloga) is correct in suggesting that production of the T-54/55 stopped in 1981, there would still remain a number of "frozen" production lines in full operational readiness in accordance with mobilization plans. The point here, however, is that the cost of the Soviet tank industry's program of switching to production of the new T-62, T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks was kept down and the actual switch facilitated by the very substantial T-55 production capacity in operation in Poland.

The factual errors pointed out by Mr. Clements have little bearing on the main thesis. The text of my article should have referred not to the An-2, but to the *An-28,* which went into production in Poland in 1977. But the story of the An-2 Colt is itself edifying. Its prototype was ready in 1947, and it was produced in the USSR until 1960. Poland re-

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ceived the license to produce it in the latter year, after the Soviets had developed more modern and much more powerful fighter and transport planes. This was done to exploit the Polish production facilities built on Soviet order in the 1950's to produce the MiG–15, which soon became *outmoded and was no longer* produced. After the 1956 events in Poland, the USSR was not eager to license production in Poland of the more modern MiG–19, or later models, for both security and political reasons. However, the well-known Mielec Aircraft Factory became in effect a "branch" of the Soviet aviation industry. More than 90 percent of the AN–2 transport planes it produced were delivered to the USSR, as was the case with most Polish-produced helicopters and ships. In return, Poland received what? Outmoded and expensive fighter planes from the USSR. In amounts decided by whom? Moscow. By the beginning of 1976, more than 6,000 An–2's of varied construction, out of a total production of about 6,900, had been delivered to the USSR.

The story of the Mi–2 helicopters is similar. This helicopter went into production in Poland in 1965, as correctly noted by Mr. Clements, in the Swidnik factory. But the Poles wanted to improve the old technology. The new Polish version Mi–2M first flew in 1974. Production of about 200 a year started in 1979, as indicated in my article.

The Poles should not be faulted for the inefficiencies of a system that was imposed on them by Soviet bayonets. Nor are they to be blamed for having to sacrifice basic needs such as food, housing, and health to enlarge a military force that is totally subordinated to the USSR. I, however, should perhaps be faulted for having written my article in such a way that the basic point eluded so careful a reader as Mr. Clements.

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LATIN CURRENTS

TO THE EDITORS: Permit me to suggest a footnote to Morris Rothenberg's excellent and timely essay on "Latin America in Soviet Eyes" (*Problems of Communism*, September-October, 1983). On page 14, concerning the Falkland/Malvinas dispute, he wrote: "The USSR has not rushed in with offers of military aid, though this may reflect Argentine rather than Soviet reticence." Cuba, however, did "rush in," with a highly publicized offer to provide "all necessary help" (obviously implying the possibility of military assistance) in support of Argentina's struggle against "foreign imperialism." (See, e.g., Havana Television, May 1, 1982, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* [Washington, DC], May 4, 1982, p. Q/1; and *The New York Times*, June 3, 1982, p. 15.) There was no response from Buenos Aires.

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TO THE EDITORS: In his article "Latin America in Soviet Eyes," Morris Rothenberg says: "A steady stream of Soviet statements has denied any involvement in El Salvador on the part of the USSR, Cuba, or Nicaragua. . ." (p. 13). Personally, I place a low value on the credibility of Soviet statements, but I looked in vain for any contrary statement in this article.

Covert activities against Nicaragua are clearly stated by the US Administration to be aimed only at pressuring Nicaragua to cease its aid to El Salvador rebel forces. So it would seem important to establish good evidence that there actually is a flow of military supplies from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Reports in the US press this year have often said that such aid is negligible. Looking at a map of the area, it seems that it would be relatively easy for the Honduran military with the guidance of US instructors to interdict such a flow of arms across Honduran territory, a transit requiring the crossing of three rivers. The press also reports that US aerial surveillance planes are in action, including overflights of Nicaragua.

Can Mr. Rothenberg enlighten us on this matter?

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MR. ROTHENBERG RESPONDS: I thank Professor Halperin for his kind words and his footnote, which reinforces my speculation that reticence about receipt of Soviet or Cuban military aid may have come from the Argentine side. However, both sides evidently sought to keep their options open, at least as of November 1982, when the Argentine Defense Minister came to Moscow for Leonid Brezhnev's funeral and was received by the Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov. According to *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow) of November 17, 1982, the two discussed "matters of mutual interest."

Like Mr. Burton, I do not take at face value Soviet denials of outside Communist aid to El Salvador. Rather, my intent was to bolster the point made at the end of the article that Moscow has been and will continue to be circumspect in how it manages this outside aid. I agree with the implication of Mr. Burton's comment that the USSR, or more likely its proxies, is continuing military deliveries to El Salvador, although Administration sources as cited by *The New York Times* on July 31 and October 5, 1983, reported a diminution of such deliveries—whether as a result of US pressures or a lack of need on the part of Salvadoran guerrillas. The October 5 article also noted a shift in such deliveries to small arms, ammunition, and spare parts, which might explain the difficulty in detecting them.

MORRIS ROTHENBERG
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Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).

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